University of Kentucky

UKnowledge
Theses and Dissertations--Philosophy

Philosophy

2018

INTERPRETING THE REPUBLIC AS A PROTREPTIC DIALOGUE
Peter Nielson Moore
University of Kentucky, weg.nach.innen@gmail.com
Digital Object Identifier: https://doi.org/10.13023/etd.2018.331

Right click to open a feedback form in a new tab to let us know how this document benefits you.

Recommended Citation
Moore, Peter Nielson, "INTERPRETING THE REPUBLIC AS A PROTREPTIC DIALOGUE" (2018). Theses and
Dissertations--Philosophy. 20.
https://uknowledge.uky.edu/philosophy_etds/20

This Doctoral Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Philosophy at UKnowledge. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Theses and Dissertations--Philosophy by an authorized administrator of UKnowledge. For
more information, please contact UKnowledge@lsv.uky.edu.

STUDENT AGREEMENT:
I represent that my thesis or dissertation and abstract are my original work. Proper attribution
has been given to all outside sources. I understand that I am solely responsible for obtaining
any needed copyright permissions. I have obtained needed written permission statement(s)
from the owner(s) of each third-party copyrighted matter to be included in my work, allowing
electronic distribution (if such use is not permitted by the fair use doctrine) which will be
submitted to UKnowledge as Additional File.
I hereby grant to The University of Kentucky and its agents the irrevocable, non-exclusive, and
royalty-free license to archive and make accessible my work in whole or in part in all forms of
media, now or hereafter known. I agree that the document mentioned above may be made
available immediately for worldwide access unless an embargo applies.
I retain all other ownership rights to the copyright of my work. I also retain the right to use in
future works (such as articles or books) all or part of my work. I understand that I am free to
register the copyright to my work.
REVIEW, APPROVAL AND ACCEPTANCE
The document mentioned above has been reviewed and accepted by the student’s advisor, on
behalf of the advisory committee, and by the Director of Graduate Studies (DGS), on behalf of
the program; we verify that this is the final, approved version of the student’s thesis including all
changes required by the advisory committee. The undersigned agree to abide by the statements
above.
Peter Nielson Moore, Student
Dr. Eric Sanday, Major Professor
Dr. Clare Batty, Director of Graduate Studies

INTERPRETING THE REPUBLIC AS A PROTREPTIC DIALOGUE

_______________________________________________________________
DISSERTATION
_______________________________________________________________
A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in the
College of Arts and Sciences
at the University of Kentucky
By
Peter Nielson Moore
Lexington, Kentucky
Director: Dr. Eric Sanday, Associate Professor of Philosophy
Lexington, Kentucky
2018

Copyright © Peter Nielson Moore 2018

ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
INTERPRETING THE REPUBLIC AS A PROTREPTIC DIALOGUE
Protreptic is a form of rhetoric, textual and oral in form, which exhorts its
recipients to reorient their lives both morally and intellectually. Plato frequently portrays
Socrates' use of this rhetoric with interlocutors who are enticed by the moral and political
views of figures from Athens' intellectual culture. During these conversations Socrates
attempts to persuade his interlocutors to reorient their lives in a way that conforms more
closely to his own moral and intellectual practice of philosophy. Plato's depiction of
protreptic, however, also exerts a protreptic effect on readers of his dialogues. Plato's
writing thus performs a dual function, simultaneously depicting instances of protreptic at
work and attempting to exert a protreptic effect on readers.
In this dissertation I argue that this dual function of Plato's writing is inseparable
from his conception of philosophy. I analyze the structure of protreptic in Plato's writing
by identifying four aspects essential to an interpretive method that takes full stock of the
protreptic function of Plato's dialogues. These aspects are (1) the proper recipient of
protreptic; (2) the persuasive means available to protreptic; (3) the immediate target of
persuasion; (4) the ultimate philosophical aim toward which protreptic advances the
recipient. While some of these aspects must be determined with respect to particular
dialogues, those that concern the form of Plato's writing—such as the means of
persuasion and ultimate philosophical goals—can inform a general approach to Plato's
dialogues. The means that Socrates uses to persuade his interlocutors are sometimes
affective, influencing their emotions, and other times intellectual, appealing to them
exclusively with logical argument. I argue that a combination of these means in form that
I call “provocative-aporetic” better accounts for the means that Plato uses to exert a
protreptic effect on readers. Aporia is a simultaneously intellectual and affective
experience, and the way that readers choose to respond to aporia has a greater protreptic
effect than either affective or intellectual means alone.
The Republic is a crucial dialogue for studying protreptic because it addresses the
ultimate moral and intellectual ends toward which Plato hopes to reorient readers, and
puts the various protreptic means at Socrates' and Plato's disposal on full display. The
dialogue offers both an argument for a life committed to virtue, and an outline of the
theoretical insights—mathematical and dialectical—that philosophers may hope to gain
from more serious study. It also portrays Socrates in conversation with characters of a
variety sufficient to show his rhetorical and argumentative repertoire. In this dissertation I
carry out a reading of the Republic according to the four aspects of the structure of

protreptic discussed above. More specifically, I identify moments at which Glaucon and
Adeimantus answer Socrates' questions in such a way that they concede to Socrates the
truth of premises that contradict their defense of the unjust life. These moments reveal
that the central point of dispute in the Republic concerns the nature of moral agency—
particularly the functions of reason, desire, and habituation for moral agents.
Accordingly, I identify two models of agency—a Technē Model and a Virtue Model—
that ground their respective defenses of justice and injustice, and hold their own
assumptions about reason, desire, and habituation within their respective moral
psychologies. Glaucon and Adeimantus' moments of capitulation function as moments of
aporia for readers, who are then provoked to overcome the aporia by explaining why the
capitulation is reasonable. In doing so, we gain an account of how Glaucon and
Adeimantus are coaxed to abandon their original views about justice, injustice, and moral
agency and to accept those of Socrates. This account in turn yields insight into protreptic
by depicting how Socrates brings about a reorientation toward philosophy from within a
non-philosophical perspective.

KEYWORDS: Protreptic, Plato, Tripartite Psychology, Virtue Ethics, Plato's Moral
Psychology
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Introduction
Plato's dialogues present a difficulty that one does not typically face when
studying the writings of other philosophers. The simultaneous charm and frustration of
Plato's writing lies in its intertwining of challenging logical argument with such dramatic
details as historical contexts and figures, narrative arcs, and the complex psychologies of
interlocutors with whom Socrates speaks. We might conjecture that Plato's mixing of
these elements is explained by his commitment to truth καὶ λόγῳ καὶ ἔργῳ—“in both
word and deed”: his philosophy strives to satisfy our intellectual demands, while also
remaining true to life.
These features of Plato's writing demand that one cultivate, to an extent not
demanded by the writings of other philosophers, an awareness of the hermeneutic
principles that one uses to study the dialogues. In contrast, the majority of philosophical
writings that a student in philosophy typically reads take the form of treatises or
discourses. When we read these genres, we tend to rely on a principle of sincerity: the
works are attempts by their authors to represent, as unambiguously as possible, their
views on a topic, and to persuade us of the same. Questions of interpretation arise in this
genre from issues in translation, ambiguity in the terms of an author's argument, and
logical soundness. These questions are challenging in their own right, but in a certain
sense they can be approached with straightforward investigative methods. An issue of
translation might be resolved by studying the way an author uses a certain word in the
contexts of the same work and other works. Ambiguities in the meaning of a particular
term might also be resolved by examining the kinds of examples an author uses to
demonstrate the meaning of a term, and by testing examples against each other to see
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whether the terms can be defined in a way that accommodates the variety of its referents.
We assume these problems arise because (a) the author was not aware of them; or (b) was
aware of them but lacked the acumen to resolve them himself; or (c) couldn't have
anticipated the interpretive problem that we face (as in the case of translation)—not
because of an author's deliberate attempts to confuse us.1
But the sincerity principle is not absolute; there are many legitimate reasons for
abandoning it. Some genres, such as comedy and satire, are constituted by insincerity. In
these genres an author can disavow much of what he says, and our taking the author
seriously would indicate a failure on our part to properly understand that genre. We might
also believe that political, historical, and psychological circumstances have affected the
composition of the work in such a way that to properly interpret it, we must abandon the
sincerity principle. For example, in a work published under a regime with strict
censorship laws, an author might express allegiance to the regime, but secretly be trying
to subvert it. In that case, we should not believe the authors professions of allegiance. If
we have reason to believe a letter was written under duress, then we might doubt the
sincerity of its author and disbelieve its contents. If we believe an author was
psychologically deranged, we might not have as much reason to disbelieve the contents
of the his writings, but we might doubt whether the views are really his own, especially if
we have other writings that we consider representative of the author's sanity. We might
also abandon the sincerity principle if we were in the grip of some form of skepticism.

1 One might object that studying a text in this way does not require that we speculate about the internal
life of the author; all that matters is what the text actually says, and whether it is internally consistent. I
do not think this objection can stand, however, because whether we think an author is deliberately
misleading us or misrepresenting his intentions can affect how we conduct these tests. For example, if
we believe an author is telling a joke in a passage where an ambiguous term appears, we might take this
as a reason not to consider that passage in our inquiry.
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Maybe sincerity is impossible, or maybe an author made it his personal project to pretend
to be sincere in his writings, and was so good at pretending that he escaped detection in
being insincere. Moreover, these considerations need not apply to a work as a whole; they
might apply to portions of the same work.2
As philosophers, however, we tend to take the sincerity principle as the rule rather
than as the exception. The fact that we expect an argument to justify allowing an
exception to the sincerity principle, and demand that these arguments conform to high
standards, implies our commitment to this principle. For example, if Machiavelli's the
Prince is a satire, someone must make the argument that it is a satire, and the argument
must say more than that it would just be interesting to read the work as a satire.3 Many
works could be made more interesting if we read them without the sincerity principle, but
we would fault such whimsical readings for being bad scholarship, maybe even bad
philosophy: this kind of reading would miss the mark of truth.
Throughout the history of Plato scholarship, interpreters have found reasons to
exempt Plato from the sincerity principle by referring to some of the exceptions
mentioned above. The influential thesis regarding “esoteric doctrines,” for example, relies
on both Plato's own writings and testimony from historical contemporaries to argue that
Plato taught doctrines to his students that were not included in the dialogues.4 This does

2 For example, Scholars debate about whether the speech of Lysias in the Phaedrus was a genuine speech
of Lysias' or an invention of Plato's. If it was an invention of Plato's, we might also wonder whether it
was meant as a satire of Lysias' speeches: maybe Plato wanted to ridicule Lysias' style by exaggerating
certain themes and rhetorical tropes. For an informative discussion of this debate concerning the speech
of Lysias, see Harvey Yunis, ed. and commentator, Plato: Phaedrus (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2011), 98.
3 See Garrett Mattingly, "Machiavelli's Prince: Political Science or Political Satire?" The American
Scholar 27 (1958): 482-491.
4 Plato expresses doubts about the value of writing in his own writings, most notably the Seventh Letter
and the Phaedrus. The testimony about Plato often come from students in close-enough proximity to
Plato's time to be trusted. See Aristotle's Physics, 209b13–15; Metaphysics, A.5-6. Another source is the
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not immediately imply that Plato was deliberately trying to deceive readers; however, it
does imply that he chose not to disclose something to readers. Of course, non-disclosure
alone does not provide a reason to abandon the sincerity principle; for example, the fact
that I do not disclose intimate details about myself in this dissertation does not imply that
I am insincere in writing it. No one would expect me to disclose such details. However,
subsequent attempts at reconstructing the esoteric doctrines do seem to require an
exception to the sincerity principle. For these attempts would allow scholars to say of
particular passages that “If Plato were being totally sincere with us, he would say X in
this passage because X is what he really believes.” The attempt at reconstruction thus
makes Plato's non-disclosure a matter of insincerity, rather than a failure to disclose a
contingency that we would not expect him to disclose in the first place.
Others have argued that the dramatic structure of Plato's dialogues licenses our
interpreting them as comedies, tragedies, or even as novels.5 This sort of interpretation
challenges the sincerity principle because authors of works in these genres might
primarily intend that their audience have an aesthetic experience, rather than adopt a
particular belief. A tragedian does not need to endorse political revolution in order to
write a play about political revolution that affects an audience in an aesthetic way.
Moreover, the fact that the dialogues contain dramatis personae provides another reason
for granting an exception to the sincerity principle. How do we know which character
represents Plato's views? Across the dialogues, too, Socrates argues for apparently
account of Aristoxenus, and student of Aristotle's. For a discussion and reproduction of Aristoxenus'
account, see Konrad Gaiser, “Plato's enigmatic lecture 'On the Good,'” Phronesis 25, No.1 (1980): 5-37.
5 Nussbaum does not endorse the view the dialogues are tragedies, but she discusses ways in which they
bear a strong resemblance to tragedies in the effect they have on readers See Martha Nussbaum, The
Fragility of Goodness (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 128-129. Blondell suggests the
novel form as a genre for the dialogues; see The Play of Character in Plato's Dialogues (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2003), 17.
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contradictory positions.6 This observation might lead us to ask whether we should take
Socrates as the same Socrates in each dialogue. A common way of dealing with this
difficulty is to treat each dialogue as “hermeneutically sealed:” we ought not to refer to
other dialogues or external sources to interpret a particular dialogue.7 However, even if
we take this approach and consider Plato's dialogues as pastiches of other genres, we still
must ask whether he is trying to induce an aesthetic experience in readers, or engaging
them in an activity and way of thinking we would consider philosophical.
The purpose of this discussion is simply to point out that the unique difficulty in
studying Plato lies in the demand that the dialogues place on scholars to first become
aware of the principles they use to interpret these dialogues, and then decide which
interpretive principles are appropriate. Moreover, these questions of interpretation are
inseparable from the question of what philosophy is for Plato. For example, perhaps we
ought to give up the principle of sincerity as an interpretive principle, and give up the
project of trying to discover what Plato really believed. Perhaps a principle of organic
unity of a dialogue is more philosophically fruitful than the principle of sincerity.8 On this
assumption, we should not worry about whether Plato is revealing his true face, and
instead try to construct meaning out of whatever Plato happened to write—sincerely or
not—by explaining how the different parts of a dialogue—argumentative, dramatic,
historical—contribute to a harmonious whole.
The very notion of what counts at philosophy is at stake in these principles
because they compel us to ask whether philosophy is an exclusively intellectual exercise,

6 E.g., Socrates' accounts of virtue in the Protagoras and in the Republic.
7 See Blondell, 6-9; for her argument for the differentiation of various Socrateses throughout the
dialogues, 10.
8 For good summary of the use of this principle in the scholarship, see Blondell, 4.
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or necessarily requires certain moral practices and commitments. Consider, for example,
an irony that arises from exempting Plato from the sincerity principle. A refrain of
Socrates' in the conversations that Plato portrays is that the interlocutor ought to answer
his questions by stating what he really believes. So the Socrates that Plato himself
portrays at least appears to hold his interlocutors to a principle of sincerity as a
requirement for doing philosophy with him. Socrates' reasons for this demand are
explicitly moral: his interlocutor's soul would benefit more from answering sincerely,
because even if he is refuted, he stands to benefit from becoming aware of his own
ignorance. Moreover, the matters under discussion—justice, eros, beauty—and are of the
greatest importance to the way the participants in the conversation conduct their lives.
Requiring that the interlocutor answer sincerely ensures that he has a personal stake in the
conversation, and maintains the possibility that he could be genuinely transformed by the
conversation. Why shouldn't we require sincerity of Plato if we are to do philosophy with
him?9 Clearly, Plato is long-dead and can no longer have a personal stake in any
conversation; nonetheless he was once alive and seemed to have had enough of a
personal stake in the debates of his own time to respond to them. If we exempt Plato from
the sincerity principle, much of his moral-philosophical project loses its normative
force—he rather begins to resemble a hypocrite for demanding sincerity of his imaginary
characters, but not of himself. Of course, it is as possible that Plato was a hypocrite as it
is for anyone to be a hypocrite. But if we abandon the sincerity principle and opt
exclusively for the unity principle, then we risk approaching his dialogues as merely
9 Blondell, The Play of Character in Plato's Dialogues, 21, also observes that Plato does not heed
Socrates' imperative regarding sincerity, and rightly identifies this violation of the imperative as a
necessary feature of the dramatic form of Plato's writings. I differ here in calling attention to the way
that the sincerity principle works as an assumption for doing philosophy, rather than as a feature of
dramatic form.
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interesting aesthetic artifacts that engage our intellects in a hunt for coherence amid a
strange complex of arguments and drama.
My own approach to reading Plato assumes both principles. Plato weaves logical
argument, dramatic forms, historical events, poetic metaphors, and the complex
psychologies of interlocutors into artistic masterpieces, and the most responsible way to
interpret these works is to begin from the assumption that there is a real unity among
these parts. On the other hand, when we read the dialogues, certain patterns emerge that
are difficult to explain without the sincerity principle.10 As we have seen, however, this
interpretive principle immediately raises the problem of determining what Plato really
believed—a question that may well be unanswerable, given the nature of his writing. But
if we alter the thing we think Plato was sincere about, we might avoid that implication.
Even if we do not receive the doctrines of the “real” Plato from the dialogues, Plato
seems sincere about his commitment to the value of the examined life. Perhaps what
Plato really believes in is not a system of doctrines, but a way of living that cannot be
easily communicated or taught by means of argument. And perhaps the dialogues better
interpreted as exhortations that attempt to persuade readers to adopt this way of life.11
Another term for this kind of exhortation is “protreptic.” In Plato's time, protreptic
had developed into something of genre of its own right among the academic schools of
Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle.12 For this reason protreptic is often likened to a kind of

10 Blondell argues that there is an “internal structure of the works themselves, a structure recurring often
enough to constitute a pattern.” She suggests the elenchos as one such pattern that functions as a
“central strand in Plato's thinking about how to do philosophy” (The Play of Character in Plato's
Dialogues, 13).
11 See Also Dimitri Nikulin, The Other Plato: The Tübingen Interpretation of Plato's Inner-Academic
Teachings (Albany, NY: SUNY Press, 2012), 15. I am not persuaded that Plato had no “doctrines”
whatsoever, such as—most notably—a theory of forms. My only suggestion here is that for the purpose
of interpretation, altering our expectations about what Plato was sincere about would be fruitful.
12 A thesis that James Henderson Collins II establishes very convincingly in Exhortations to Philosophy:
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rhetoric that might have functioned as a sort of “advertisement” for a philosophical
school to the literary, non-philosophical public. While there is some truth in this claim, I
do not think it fully describes the aims Plato had for the protreptic rhetoric of his
dialogues. For example, the Republic—the subject of this dissertation—has been
interpreted as protreptic dialogue primarily for its central books, where Plato alludes to a
more advanced education that awaits those who pursue philosophy more seriously. The
implication of this view is that the Republic aims primarily to make its readers
enthusiastic about the mathematical and dialectical studies that comprise philosophical
education proper.13 In this dissertation, I dispute these views of both Plato's use of
protreptic in general and the protreptic rhetoric of the Republic. While Plato may have
been interested in attracting students, this end does not really explain the distinctive
character of his writing. In Chapter I, I propose some distinctions concerning the
recipient of protreptic; the means of persuasion; the conviction of which the recipient is
to be persuaded; and the learning that a recipient might engage in to become persuaded. I
argue for a conception of “provocative-aporetic” means of persuasion that Plato uses to
convince readers of the value of his moral-philosophical project, whether or not he hopes
to recruit them as students. Briefly put, these means use the experience of aporia that
follows on refutation as a provocation to readers to explore the arguments on their own.
These means are helpful in persuading readers of various philosophical claims because
they encourage readers to see the truth of the claims for themselves.

The Protreptics of Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle (New York: Oxford University Press, 2015). I agree
with the claim that there were protreptic works circulating, which might have performed the function of
“advertisements;” however, I doubt that this thesis alone is sufficient to explain the distinctive character
of Plato's writing.
13 See Harvey Yunis, “The Protreptic Rhetoric of the Republic,” in The Cambridge Companion to Plato's
Republic, ed. G.R.F. Ferrari, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 19-20.
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The Republic is a particularly challenging dialogue to study because, although it is
clearly organized around an inquiry about justice, it contains such a wide variety of
topics—theories about political institutions, moral psychology, virtue, pedagogy,
childhood education, and philosophical education—that thoroughly exploring all of these
topics is not feasible. It is also difficult to say much novel about the Republic, given the
quality and quantity of scholarship. For this reason it is probably inevitable that to some I
will appear to have neglected certain aspects of the Republic's argument—most notably
the theoretical education of the philosophers in Books V-VII and the degeneration of
regimes in Books VIII and IX. My reasons for overlooking these sections of the Republic
in this dissertation are that they do not play an essential role in convincing Glaucon and
Adeimantus of the tripartite psychology that grounds their acknowledgment that justice is
the health of the soul in Book IV. In other words, by Book IV the brothers are already
persuaded that justice is intrinsically desirable. Thus, viewing the dialogue as a protreptic
work indicates that much of the persuasive work is happening in Books II-IV.
In this study of the Republic I argue for three theses about Books II-IV. First, I
argue that the primary function of these Books is to settle a dispute about the nature of
moral agency. I identify two distinct models of agency—what I call the Technē Model
and the Virtue Model of justice and agency—each with its own commitments regarding
the relation between reason and desire, motives that are psychologically basic, and the
normative status of nomoi. From an argumentative standpoint, my dissertation tracks
Glaucon and Adeimantus' gradual transition of commitment from the Technē Model to
the Virtue Model. Second, I argue that studying the provocative-aporetic means by which
Socrates persuades them to adopt the Virtue Model of justice yields crucial insights in to
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the way Plato exerts a protreptic influence on his Readers. Most curious about the
arguments in Books II-IV are moments of capitulation on the part of Glacuon and
Adeimantus—moments at which they concede Socrates' premises for the Virtue Model of
agency and justice, and neglect to defend their own Technē Model of agency and justice.
A large portion of this dissertation is devoted to identifying these moments and carefully
assessing the reasons why, at those moments, Glaucon and Adeimantus concede the
points that they do.
The third thesis for which I argue is that tripartite psychology, despite its share of
significant interpretive difficulties, yields deep insights into moral psychology. With
respect to the protreptic function of Books II-IV, I argue that Socrates' arguments for
tripartite psychology yield a convincing argument for why reason is not instrumental to
desire. This conclusion is crucial in gaining Glaucon and Adeimantus' consent to the
Virtue Model of justice. However, I also argue that tripartite psychology tasks the
brothers with a project of its own—what I call the “project of psychic integration.” This
project, along with the accompanying virtues that support it—sophrosunē, courage,
justice, and wisdom—functions as a preparatory education for the person of a
philosophical nature, who will pursue the mathematical-dialectical studies described in
Books VI and VII. Briefly put, I argue that the hypothesizing power of the logistikon
introduced in Book IV threatens the soul with a disintegration more harmful than the
threat of disintegration that the soul faces from the epithumotikon and thumos alone.
Without the virtues that support the project of psychic integration, the potential
philosopher risks allowing his intellectual talents to be recruited in the service of wicked
ends.
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Chapter I: Situating the Republic as a Protreptic Dialogue
Moral arguments are unique among philosophical arguments in that they aim not
only to persuade someone of the truth of some claim, but also to affect a person's
conduct. While ethical arguments may aim to persuade a person of a particularly limited
claim, such as the justice of a particular action, or the value of a specific custom for a
community, it would be a mistake for people who make moral arguments to limit their
concerns to the finer points of their respective disputes, which may be of interest only to
professional philosophers. When we advance moral arguments, we also have a concern
for moral education, because, at the very least, we have an interest in cultivating the kind
of person who would be receptive to a moral argument.14 But when we turn our attention
to moral education, the end toward which we hope a moral education will guide a person
becomes more difficult to define. It would not suffice to say that the end of moral
education is to persuade a person of all the specific moral rules he or she ought to follow
in his or her life; for circumstances may change in such a way that the old rules are no
longer applicable. If it is correct to say that we want someone who is responsive to
changes in the ethical landscape, then we mean that we hope a moral education imparts
not simply the specific rules of moral life, but a more fundamental moral orientation. This
concern about fundamental orientation is the reason we debate about the values we wish
to see an education impart; we believe these values influence the whole trajectory of both
an individual life and the life of a community.
The Republic offers an argument on behalf of justice that touches on these two

14 Republic I shows us the significance of even this achievement. When Polemarchus issues the veiled
threat that if Socrates does not come to the house of Cephalus, he and his followers will take Socrates
by force, Socrates suggests that he might persuade them to let him go. Polemarchus replies by pointing
out that he wouldn't be able to persuade them if they weren't willing to listen (327c8-9).
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interests of moral argument. It portrays Socrates' attempt to persuade Glaucon and
Adeimantus of the truth of the specific claim that justice is intrinsically good for a person,
and offers an account of the effect of a moral education on their overall moral orientation,
such that they would see the value in being practically committed to justice. But the
Republic also cautions us not to trust the simplicity of this story about the effect of
education on a person. Plato's allegory of the cave, which provides a metaphor for the
effect of education on a human being, raises difficult questions about the effect of moral
education and philosophical argument on a person. Quite strikingly, a process of
education that might take years or decades is summed up in two actions: a prisoner in the
cave is released from chains and compelled to exit the cave.15 These details of the
allegory raise two important questions: who or what, in non-allegorical terms, does the
releasing, and why must a person be compelled to exit the cave? The image Plato
provides is deceptive because it gives the impression that a teacher could release us by
simply imparting some instruction. In reality, the thing that releases us from the chains
might be years of study, reflection, and gradually re-habituation in light of the
conclusions we reach. And it might be that we must be “forced” out of the cave because
aligning our most basic orientation with these insights requires counter-acting the power
of habit and the familiarity of custom, both of which may hinder us when see the truth of
some insight and want to align our lives with that truth. In a sense, then, the efficacy of
moral persuasion and education rests on the efforts of an individual who takes these such
persuasion and education seriously. No teacher or system of education can force a

15 Rep., 515c1-e1; we are asked to imagine that the prisoner is “compelled suddenly to stand up”
(ἀναγκάζοιτα ἐξαίφνης ἀνίστασθαί, 515c5); “compelled to look at the light” of the fire (πρός αὐτὸ τὸ
φῶς ἀναγκάζοι αὐτὸν βλέπειν, 515e); and “dragged by force” out of the cave (ἕλκοι τις αὐτὸν βίᾳ,
515e4-5).
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reorientation; it must come about through an individual's own effort.
Protreptic is a type of discourse that attempts to effect this reorientation of a
person's life. The word “protreptic” comes from the Greek verb προτρέπειν, the literal
meaning of which is to “turn toward.”16 The literal sense provides an apt metaphor for the
kind of “reorientation” that we aim to instill by moral arguments and education. But
protreptic attempts to be intellectually persuasive in addition to being exhortatory; it tries
to persuade us of the truth of some claim, or the value of some practice, and encourages
us to re-orient our lives around this new conviction. That this strategy is one that Plato
and Plato's Socrates exercise is apparent throughout the dialogues. The Phaedrus contains
a conversation in which Socrates attempts to persuade the dialogue's namesake that eros
is a “good” kind of madness and a form of desire essential to a philosophical life. This
claim represents a value that might regulate an entire life. At the midpoint of the
dialogue, Socrates offers a prayer that Phaedrus might “turn to philosophy.”17 We can
interpret this as a way of exhorting Phaedrus to re-orient his life around the eros for
wisdom. In the Apology, Socrates defends his unpopular practice of exposing others'
ignorance by arguing that he is doing a service to the city of Athens. This service is to
remind people that care for the soul and virtue is more important than money and
honors.18 In other words, Socrates denies that his philosophizing amounts to clever word
games and rhetorical manipulation; his purpose is to effect a moral transformation in his
interlocutor. The Republic portrays Socrates' attempt to dissuade Thrasymachus of his
praise of injustice, and, although Socrates may have failed to “turn” Thrasymachus on
16 For an informative overview of the uses of this verb in a variety of ancient Greek texts, see James
Henderson Collins II, Exhortations to Philosophy: The Protreptics of Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle
(New York: Oxford University Press, 2015), 7-15.
17 Phaedrus, 257b4-8.
18 Apology, 30a9-b4
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that particular occasion, Socrates later alludes to reconciliation, or at least attempt at
reconciliation, with Thrasymachus.19 We can interpret this expression of good will as a
sign of Socrates' commitment to caring for an interlocutor's soul. His aim in the
conversation with Thrasymachus is not simply to win the argument, but to effect a reorientation of Thrasymachus' character.20
However, to say that protreptic attempts to effect a reorientation “from within” is
not very philosophically precise, because it is not clear what we mean by “within.” To
make progress in understanding the effect that protreptic may have on an interlocutor in a
Platonic dialogue, we must drop metaphorical language; we must parse the phenomenon
of protreptic--a complex interaction between a speaker, a recipient, and a form of
discourse—into logical parts. I propose four questions for the purpose of studying the
protreptic effect of a Platonic dialogue. In what follows, I explain the reasons for posing
these particular questions:
1) Who is the recipient of protreptic?
2) What are the means of persuasion?
3) What is the recipient being persuaded of?
4) What does the recipient learn from protreptic?21

19 Republic, 498c.
20 Basil O'Neill argues that even Thrasymachus “turns” to philosophy, at least to a small degree, because
Socrates “prods” the rational part of Thrasymachus' soul in order to “develop its rational-social
tendencies.” See “The Struggle for the Soul of Thrasymachus,” in Ancient Philosophy 8 (Mathesis
Publications): 178.
21 Collins argues that protreptic discourse has four features. It is (1) dialogic, in the sense that it includes
the voices of its competition; (2) agonistic, in that it self-consciously competes with other protreptic
discourses; (3) situational, in that its “shape and content” depends on its audience; (4) rhetorical, in that
it has a “unique objective and persuasive means” (Exhortations, 17-18). It should be clear that the
questions I have posed overlap to a great extent with these features; however, I diverge from his
framework because a primary concern of mine in this dissertation lies in differentiating philosophical
discourse from rhetoric. Collins construes protreptic as a genre whose purpose is for “marketing,” i.e.,
for winning students over from competing intellectuals (Exhorations, 41). That there is some truth in
this description of the historical circumstances of protreptic is indisputable; nonetheless, the
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As the examples above indicate, Plato portrays Socrates in conversation with a
variety of interlocutors. Some of these interlocutors are nearly strangers to philosophy;
some are followers of Socrates who aspire for his wisdom; and some are philosophicaltypes who have theoretical and practical commitments that are antithetical to those of
Socrates.22 This variety in the types of interlocutors Socrates faces raises a problem for
Socrates' protreptic efforts. Not every interlocutor will respond in the same way to the
type of argument that Socrates might prefer to give if that person were more
philosophically mature. The dialogues often show how certain argumentative strategies
are more persuasive for one interlocutor than for another; Socrates is carefully attuned to
the personality of his interlocutor, and tailors his speech to be maximally persuasive to
that interlocutor.23 However, Plato seems to prefer a particular type of subject in his
portrayals of Socrates' protreptic efforts. A frequent recipient of Socrates' protreptic
efforts is an interlocutor who respects and admires Socrates, but who appears to be
enticed by the views of sophists.24 The reason for this interest is probably that such an
interlocutor is more likely to be influenced by protreptic than a committed sophist is.
consequence seems to be that philosophy is indistinguishable from rhetoric.
22 Euthyphro is a good example of the first type; Glaucon, Aristodemus, and Hippocrates are examples of
the second; and Callicles and Thrasymachus are examples of the third.
23 Socrates describes this matching of means to character as an essential aspect of the practice of rhetoric
and dialectic in the Phaedrus (271d-e). In asserting this, however, Socrates does not disavow the
strategy as non-philosophical. He seems to acknowledge the value of rhetoric when it is used in the
service of philosophy. Marina McCoy argues that Socrates uses rhetorical devices that correspond to
many of the devices mentioned in rhetorical handbooks, and that there is no easy way to distinguish
purely philosophical, i.e., “rhetoric free,” discourse from rhetorical discourse in Socrates' speeches
(Plato on the Rhetoric of Philosophers and Sophists, [New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008], 34).
24 Interlocutors of this sort appear all over Plato's corpus. In the opening scene of the Protagoras,
Hippocrates asks Socrates to introduce him to Protagoras. Socrates then engages Hippocrates in a
conversation about what he expects to learn from Protagoras. Although Hippocrates is passive for the
remainder of the dialogue, Plato clearly shows his concern for the fate of a budding intellectual whose
allegiance—either to Socrates or the sophists—is uncertain. In the Republic, Glaucon seems to waver
between his commitment to justice and the enticement of Thrasymachus' argument against justice.
Although he expresses a commitment to justice, the fact that he restates Thrasymachus' argument in a
more convincing way than Thrasymachus could indicates that he finds the arguments against justice
compelling.
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In the most general sense, then, protreptic can be described as a kind of rhetoric,
in that it consists in speech that aims to persuade someone of something. This aspect of
Socrates' efforts is on full display in the dialogues: Socrates offers arguments for the
purpose of either dissuading interlocutors of some belief they hold or persuading them to
adopt some belief he considers true and vital to the practice of philosophy. But it would
be wrong to limit Socrates' protreptic efforts to persuasive speech alone, because in
addition to changing his interloctuor's beliefs he is interested in affecting his interlocutor's
character and life-conduct. So, it is more accurate to describe protreptic as an effort to
persuade someone, using speech, of the truth of some view, and to affect that person's
character such that his actions align with that belief.
If we limit speech to the context of purely logical argument, explaining how the
latter aspect occurs is not immediately clear. This is not to say that the use of speech to
alter a person's conduct is mysterious. In dealings with friends people regularly use
speech in ways that alter conduct. For example, I might explain to a friend that I find
some of his jokes offensive. This complaint might prompt my friend to re-evaluate his
sense of humor, and as a result, cease telling such jokes. But philosophical conversation
often takes place—as it does for Socrates—between two people who are not friends at all,
and who are perhaps even hostile to each other. Nonetheless, there is an expectation that
one person ought to be able to persuade the other of his point of view without resorting to
any feelings of common affection. In that case, how can speech alone affect a person's
character and conduct?
These considerations about the variety of interlocutors, the concern for individuals
whose allegiance to either philosophy or sophistry is uncertain, and the exhortatory

16

aspect of protreptic, require that we ask questions (1) and (2). Because Socrates often
speaks with multiple interlocutors, we must identify the one to whom he is seriously
applying his effort at protreptic. Moreover, we must identify what kind of person this
interlocutor is, such that Socrates might think his effort is better spent with that person
rather than another.25 Because this interlocutor has certain characteristics and certain
commitments which make him unique, we must ask what means Socrates has at his
disposal to make his arguments maximally persuasive.
Questions (3) and (4), however, arise from a worry about the means available to
Socrates for persuading an interlocutor to reorient his life around Socrates' vision of
philosophy: is false speech a permissible means—if it would be more effective in
bringing about this reorientation—than true speech? For example, suppose that the only
aim of protreptic was to persuade an individual to adopt a belief and corresponding
reorientation. Could a philosopher be just as unscrupulous as a sophist and deliberately
use a false logos to bring about this change? Although the difference between (3) and (4)
may seem small, I suggest that this distinction is crucial because it separates protreptic
from mere rhetoric and makes the use of rhetoric philosophically responsible.26 Besides
this concern about the responsible use of logos, however, there is a good logical reason
for differentiating these questions. Suppose that someone wants to persuade me that
vaccines are effective in developing immunity to infectious agents. To persuade me of
25 This does not necessarily imply that some souls are not worth the trouble, or that only certain souls are
truly “worthy” of protreptic. Brickhouse and Smith use standard features of Plato's moral psychology to
argue that some individuals are, from a Platonic perspective “incurable,” as if no amount of reasoned
argument, or even punishment, could persuade such individuals to adopt a moral attitude (“Incurable
Souls in Socratic Psychology,” in Ancient Philosophy 22 [2002]: 34-35).Their claim is that some
individuals may become so habituated to satisfying their appetites in spite of other demands that not
even punishment could help form the belief that certain behaviors are wrong. While this description of
the “incurable” person might be correct, I question whether such a person could exist in actuality.
26 Below I argue that this distinction is crucial for properly understanding the protreptic effect of Socrates'
arguments in the Republic on Glaucon.
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this, the person might convey to me the current theory about how the immune system
works. So, in order to be persuaded of the specific claim about vaccines, I have to learn
about something else, namely, the immune system. Similarly, to be persuaded of some
typically Socratic claim, an interlocutor may have to learn about some other subject. For
example, to persuade Protagoras of the claim that knowledge is virtue, Socrates must lead
him through an investigation of the “art of measurement,” with reference to pleasure and
pain.27 It is the study of pleasure and pain that lends plausibility to the claim of which
Socrates hopes to persuade Protagoras. Thus, the use of a false logos would not be
responsible, because the recipient expects to be persuaded by learning something true.
§ 1.The Means of Persuasion: Affective, Intellectual, and Provocative-Aporetic
As I suggested above, Socrates appears to tailor his speech to the character of his
interlocutor to make his arguments maximally persuasive. Therefore we must examine
what means are at his disposal, and what effects they may have on interlocutors. In what
follows, I discuss the means of persuasion that I identify as affective and intellectual. I
argue that neither means is sufficient of its own accord to exert a protreptic effect in the
sense discussed above, i.e., to persuade or dissuade an interlocutor of a certain view and
to reorient that interlocutor's life around this new conviction. Instead, I propose that
“provocative-aporetic” means are an amalgamation of the intellectual and affective
means. Furthermore, these means best account for the dramatic and literary features of
Plato's dialogues, and exert a greater protreptic effect in virtue of the unique intellectual
and affective state that aporia brings about.28

27 Protagoras, 356d4.
28 Robert E. Cushman proposes that aporia brings about a moment of “affectional suspension,” wherein
the interlocutor has the choice to cultivate his intellectual appetite for wisdom and the pleasure of
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Affective means of persuasion. Socrates sometimes dissuades or persuades
interlocutors of certain commitments by arousing such emotions as anger, shame, and
fear.29 Socrates may also exploit affective states that seem to have distinct interests, such
as thumotic and erotic interests, in order to elicit logical concessions.30 Examples of
Socrates' use of these means are numerous in the dialogues. For example, in the Phaedrus
Socrates embarrasses Phaedrus by demanding that Phaedrus reveal the text of Lysias'
speech, which he had been hiding in his cloak. This embarrassment reveals that Phaedrus'
true intention was to test his oratorical skill on Socrates—an intention he tried to conceal
by hiding the text of Lysias' speech. In the Republic, Socrates seems to exploit Glaucon's
sense of shame and erotic interests to elicit his agreement that a lover is a lover of the
whole class of the thing that he loves, and not picky about particular instances.31 Socrates
refers to Glaucon's love of young boys to elicit this agreement, and Glaucon seems

wisdom (Therapeia: Plato's Conception of Philosophy [University of North Carolina Press: 1958], 85).
This proposal is unique, but I suggest that Cushman overlooks the more complex dynamic that aporia
has with affection and intellect.
29 Jill Gordon identifies Socrates' conversations with Callicles, Thrasymachus, and Meno, and Alcibiades'
confession in the Symposium that Socrates alone could make him feel ashamed, as evidence that shame,
rather than pure argumentation, is one of the chief tools that Socrates uses to refute his interlocutors
(Turning Toward Philosophy: Literary Device and Dramatic Structure in Plato's Dialogues, [University
Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999], 21-28).
30 Yunis argues that Socrates must resort to affective means of persuasion because many of Socrates'
arguments run counter to deeply-held conventional norms. For example, the arguments concerning
marriage and property arrangements in Republic V—Socrates encounters a “fundamental protreptic
problem: if the interlocutors–and the reader–see the validity of Socrates’ argument on justice but are
reluctant to accept it because it strikes them as impossibly far-fetched, how can they– interlocutors and
reader–be encouraged to overcome their reluctance and accept the argument anyway?” Yunis' answer is
that Plato and Socrates rely on the emotions of both reader and interlocutor to “tip the scales,” so to
speak, in favor of rational assent, and thereby get the reader or interlocutor to conduct his or her life
differently (“The Protreptic Rhetoric of the Republic” in The Cambridge Companion to Plato's
Republic [New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007], 21-22).
31 Republic, 475c1; Gordon, drawing from the Meno, argues that Socrates' purpose with the slave is to
show that Meno's answers are no better than those of the slave, who answers confidently, but
incorrectly. When Meno sees himself in the example of the slave, he feels shame as a result, and
changes his comportment in the second half of the dialogue. (Turning, 108-109). McCoy argues that
Socrates defeats or silences his interlocutors in the Gorgias and Protagoras by shaming them. For
example, he curbs Hippocrates' enthusiasm by forcing him to admit that if he learns from Protagoras, he
will become a sophist. Hippocrates experiences shame upon admitting this (Plato, 78-79).
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embarrassed about Socrates' use of his tastes as an example.32 This teasing may help
persuade Glaucon that he ought to turn his erotic interests toward wisdom. In the
Apology, Socrates seems to deliberately provoke the jury with his proposal that he ought
to be honored as an Olympic victor for his service to the city.33 This strategy would be
counterproductive if Socrates' goal were an acquittal, but if Socrates' goal is to compel
the members of the jury to realize their own lack of virtue, then this strategy might gain
some traction. By comparing himself to an Olympic victor, Socrates suggests that Athens
excels in a sort of competition with other cities in virtue of his philosophizing. This
implication fits well with his injunction that Athenians ought to give up the love of
money and honor. Finally, David Gallagher has argued that Socrates uses fear and pity to
dissuade Glaucon of Thrasymachus' views. He proposes that Republic VIII and IX
function as a “slippery slope” argument about an erotic person who seeks luxury and
public honors: the lesson is that such a person “boards a train of rapid degeneration in
character that leads straight, and almost irreversibly, to the tyrant.”34 The effect of this
argument, even if unsound, is to cause Glaucon to fear the consequences of adopting
Thrasymachus' approval of the tyrant.35
I include erotic and thumotic interests as two types of affective conditions because
they both have distinct emotions, pleasures, and pains inherent to them. Socrates often
32 Εἰ βούλει, ἔφη, ἐπ' ἐμοῦ λέγειν περὶ τῶν ἐρωτικῶν ὅτι οὕτω ποιοῦσι, συγχωρῶ τοῦ λόγου χάριν (Rep.,
4754a2-4). Glaucon says he will “concede for the sake of the argument” Socrates' use of him as an
example. Glaucon's choice of the verb συγχωρώ suggests a definite concession here. Probably he would
prefer that his erotic tastes not be matter of public of examination, conducted by none other than
Socrates.
33 Apology, 36d-e.
34 David Gallagher, “Protreptic Aims of Plato's Republic,” in Ancient Philosophy 24 (2004): 310.
35 Gallagher argues that Glaucon does not answer Socrates' question about what man corresponds to the
timocratic regime because he seeks Socrates' esteem and is thus ashamed to admit that he is, in fact, a
lover of honor (“Protreptic Aims of Plato's Republic,” 297). The implication is that shame could be
instrumental in coaxing Glaucon away from the love of honor. For an analysis of the specific emotions
that Socrates arouses to “turn” Glaucon to the philosophical life, see 306-307.
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appeals to these interests, and these appeals differ from direct attempts to elicit an
emotional response. Nonetheless, we should consider Socrates' appeal to these interests
as an instance of the use of affective means to exert a protreptic effect. The characteristic
emotions of thumos appear to be pride in what brings honor and good repute, shame at
dishonorable things, and anger at perceived moral injury.36 It is a challenge to explain
why precisely these emotions are characteristic of thumos, but a tentative answer is that
they all stem from a sort of “social consciousness,” or one's consciousness of oneself
among others. Honor and disgrace are terms that depend upon the consciousness of the
judgment of others, whether those others are real or imagined.37 For example, Marina
McCoy has documented Socrates' use of epithets that appeal to Glaucon's thumos in their
discussion of the sun analogy and the divided line. Socrates describes the Sun—which is
the analogue for the form of the Good--as “most honorable” in an effort to get Glaucon to
see the value, in terms that he can understand, of knowledge of the Good.38 Likewise in
the Protagoras, Socrates exploits Protagoras' reputation as a teacher of virtue to raise the
stakes on their conversation, and intensify the effect of his eventual elenchos. It is not
36 Another reason for Socrates' appeal to thumotic interests may lie in his conviction that the training of
thumos is essential for the development of the proper moral character. Christopher Gill argues that the
first portion of education in Republic II-IV applies primarily to the training of the θυμοειδές, since this
portion of education is meant for children and adolescents who have not reached full rationality, so that
they must first learn the right emotional reaction to social norms, so as to “ensure by a kind of aesthetic
habituation that these norms become ingrained in the ψυχή” (“Plato and the Education of Character,”
Archive für Geschicte der Philosophie 67 [1985], 11). Gill rightly identifies the aim of education in the
Republic as “psychic harmony,” but faults Plato's account for lacking continuity between the program
for the training of the θυμοειδές and the program for developing a critical power of reason.
37 The discussion of poetry in Book X provides some basis for distinguishing thumotic emotions from the
emotional life of the soul generally. In this discussion Socrates identifies pity as most relevant to
analysis of drama, and describes a “pitying element” of the soul. On the basis of Book X and the
example of Leontius in Republic IV, Rana Saadi Liebert makes a good case that the example of
Leontius in Book IV shows that one function of thumos is to restrain undue pity for others (“Pity and
Disgust in Plato's Republic: The Case of Leontius,” in Classical Philology Vol. 108, No.3 [July 2013]:
179-201). Pity is of course directed towards others, but it does not require the same degree of selfawareness that shame does. On her reading, this explains why Leontius rebukes himself from looking at
the bodies specifically of dead criminals.
38 McCoy, Plato, 135.
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simply because Protagoras is debating someone in a public setting that he has an interest
in winning the argument;39 the very nature of Socrates' question—whether virtue is
teachable—touches a thumotic interest of Protagoras'. If Protagoras cannot defend his
claim that virtue is teachable, then he would have no right to be a teacher of the virtue.
Thus, by putting one of Protagoras' thumotic interests at stake, Socrates intensifies the
personal investment that Protagoras has in the questions they discuss about virtue.40
While it is undeniable that Socrates uses affective means to influence his
interlocutors' responses and to steer the direction of a conversation, these means cannot
suffice alone to exert the full protreptic effect that Socrates desires. Eliciting concessions
by manipulating an interlocutor's affective responses does not require that the interlocutor
examine his assumptions from a logical perspective.41 For example, while Socrates'
likening of himself to an Olympic victor may prompt a few to self-reflection, many will
likely be annoyed by the proposal. Moreover, interlocutors must have genuine curiosity
about the direction of Socrates' argument; if they did not have this curiosity, it would
seem more appropriate for them to cease conversing, especially if they really believed
that Socrates was manipulating them emotionally. For example, while Glaucon is
embarrassed by Socrates' teasing in the Republic, he lets himself be used as an example
for the sake of the argument, presumably because he recognizes something true in

39 In as at least a public a setting as he can be without being in the law courts. In the dialogue Protagoras is
staying with Callias, and when Socrates and Hippocrates arrive at Callias' house, they discover a large
gathering of potential students and other sophists.
40 One might question whether Protagoras, rather than Hippocrates, is the proper recipient of protreptic in
that dialogue. McCoy points out that Socrates curbs Hippocrates' enthusiasm for Protagoras by forcing
him to admit that if he learns from Protagoras, he will become a sophist. Hippocrates experiences shame
upon admitting this (Plato, 78-79).
41 David L. Blank goes so far as to suggest that Socrates purposely manipulates the affective sensibilities
of his interlocutors, and that the emotions themselves “eventually lead them to the cathartic experience
of aporia, at which point they typically experience the sort of anger just described” (“The Arousal of
Emotion in Plato's Dialogues,” in The Classical Quarterly, vol.43, no.2 1993]: 436).
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Socrates' claim. Socrates' claim about that effect that eros has on the total orientation of a
person affects Glaucon personally, but Glaucon may not feel emotionally manipulated
because he has the virtue to see contingencies about himself as exemplary for an
educational purpose. Thus, Glaucon's investment in the conversation goes beyond his
affective states; he is genuinely curious to see the argument through.
Intellectual Means of Persuasion. Intellectual means of persuasion refer to
Socrates' use of purely logical arguments to persuade his interlocutors of certain
propositions that belong to his moral-philosophical project; for example, that “wisdom is
virtue” or “there is such a thing as the equal itself.” That Socrates tries to persuade his
interlocutors by logical argument is undeniable; the assumption that he uses primarily
intellectual means of persuasion explains why so much literature on the dialogues tests
Socrates' arguments for features such as soundness and validity.42 Moreover, a
characteristic of Socrates' philosophizing is his confidence that argument has the power to
improve people morally, and that an interlocutor's soul is bettered by experiencing a
logical defeat that results in aporia.43 Thus the most basic function of intellectual means
is to bring about a preferable epistemic state in the interlocutor; whether the interlocutor
is persuaded of some core thesis of Socrates' moral-philosophical project, or made aware
of his ignorance by being subject to elenchos, his epistemic state improves by either
gaining a true belief or giving up a false belief.
Nonetheless, there is a sense in which intellectual means alone cannot suffice to
42 For two noteworthy worthy approaches in the intellectual manner, see Gregory Vlastos, “Justice and
Psychic Harmony in the Republic,” in The Journal of Philosophy, Vol.66, No.16 (Aug. 21, 1969): 505521; David Sachs, “A Fallacy in Plato's Republic,” in The Philosophical Review, Vol.72 No.2 (April,
1963): 141-158. Both allege that Socrates commits the fallacy of equivocation in the Republic.
43 A conviction Socrates expresses when describing his “maieutic” practice in the Theaetetus. Socrates
says that some people become angry with him for depriving them of their false intellectual “offspring,”
and he defends himself by saying that he does this out of kindness to them, because it is better to rid
oneself of a false belief (151b-c).
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exert a protreptic effect on an interlocutor. One shortcoming of the use of intellectual
means is that it presupposes that the interlocutor has achieved a condition of soul in
which reason “rules,” or functions as the primary influence on their beliefs and actions.
Euthyphro and Thrasymachus provide good examples of this shortcoming. Euthyphro
hears Socrates' argument and participates in Socrates' reasoning about piety, but when he
discovers that his answers are causing them to circle back on the definitions of piety that
were tried and discarded, he opts out of the conversation.44 Rather than let the
conclusions of the argument affect him, he buries his head in the sand and chooses to
ignore those conclusions. In other words, Euthyphro seems to lack a sense of the value of
a life committed to reason—a life in which the best logical arguments ought to function
as the standard for his beliefs. Without this conviction, it is difficult for Socrates to reach
him by reasoned argument alone. By contrast, Thrasymachus seems to acknowledge the
primacy of reason in determining one's beliefs. Throughout his conversation with
Socrates, he insists that injustice is “wisdom” and in general more reasonable than
justice. But when Socrates defeats him in argument, he shuts down and becomes overlyconciliatory in his responses. Reason does not “rule” his soul because he is not willing to
let the best argument—one to which he has no reply—determine his character. When we
speak of Socrates' attempt to “turn the soul,” it is this very achievement of the rule of
reason which we have in mind, namely, that which the practice of philosophy
presupposes. Thus, if Socrates relies primarily on intellectual means to exert a protreptic
effect on an interlocutor, he seems to be caught in a circle: one must be persuaded to
develop a condition of soul in which reason rules (so as to be able to practice
philosophy), but attempting to persuade a person (by argument) seems to already
44 Euthyphro, 15d-e.
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presuppose such a commitment.

§2. Provocative-Aporetic Means and Provocative Aporetic Reading
In the preceding sections I argued that neither intellectual nor affective means
alone would suffice to have a protreptic effect on an interlocutor, because (a) emotional
manipulation is unlikely to impart a lasting conviction about some matter of
philosophical importance and (b) intellectual means presuppose an intellectual
disposition that many recipients of protreptic may not have achieved yet. There is,
however, a philosophical experience that has a protreptic effect by unifying these two
means. This experience is aporia. From an intellectual point of view, aporia is an
experience of confusion, bewilderment, or uncertainty that results from an elenchos
(refutation) and thereby makes the interlocutor aware that some one of his beliefs entails
a contradiction with another belief.45 This experience is unique because it makes the
interlocutor aware of the need to re-examine his assumptions in a way that simply
45 Not all interlocutors acknowledge their ignorance and re-examine their beliefs; Euthyphro, for example,
fails to do so. Examples of aporia abound in the dialogues. Meno likens his refutation by Socrates to
being stung by an electric ray, as though he cannot reply because his tongue has been numbed (Meno,
80b); in the Republic, Thrasymachus shows a blush of embarrassment when Socrates refutes his claim
that injustice is wisdom and goodness (Rep., 350d). His capitulation to Socrates at this point suggests an
experience of aporia; he falls silent and blushes because he realizes he can no longer answer Socrates in
a coherent way. These observations motivate a line of interpretation which characterizes “aporetic”
dialogues entirely negative; they tear down an interlocutor's beliefs and offer no replacements. For a
good summary of this view of the aporetic dialogues, See Terence Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1979), 35. Blank suggests that the “beneficial” result being refuted in
dialectical inquiry is that “the respondents are not said to learn any thesis or doctrine, but only that they
should blame their confusion on themselves and seek their salvation in philosophy” (“The Arousal of
Emotion in Plato's Dialogues,” 431). In contrast with the negative interpretation, Francisco Gonzalez
argues that aporetic dialogues are constructive because aporia can issue in a positive insight into virtue
by interpreting a number of traditionally-regarded “aporetic” dialogues, such as Laches and Charmides.
Regarding the discussion of temperance in the Charmides, he concludes that “though the dialogue
succeeds in showing us this knowledge [of temperance] at work, it must end in aporia because this
knowledge is non-propositional” (Dialogue and Dialectic: Plato's Practice of Philosophical Inquiry
[Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1998], 58). Gonzalez proposes that aporia results in this
conversations only because the interlocutors expect that knowledge of virtue is propositional. But if
knowledge of virtue is non-propositional, and aporia turns out to be necessary for the eventual insight
into the performance of the virtue, then aporia may issue forth a positive insight.
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receiving an argument cannot: the intellectual pay-off in in re-examining one's beliefs
consists in seeing for oneself which of one's assumptions need correcting. This is more
effective than receiving an argument because it invites the interlocutor to participate in
the construction of a philosophical position that will correct his former assumptions.46
Aporia also produces a unique affective response; for example, it may produce
feelings of anger or embarrassment. But the character of aporetic anger is different from
thumotic anger. Although anger is typically identified as a thumotic emotion—because it
is usually a response to the perception of some moral wrong—aporetic anger differs in
that it lacks a target. Interlocutors may feel embarrassed or vulnerable after having their
ignorance exposed, but they often have difficulty identifying a clear moral injury as the
cause of their anger. Thus their anger lacks a target; they have no one to blame. After all,
Socrates does not insult, threaten, or lie to them; he only asks questions that his
interlocutors cannot answer.47 Meno's comparison of Socrates to an electric sting-ray is
telling here, for it suggests that the interlocutors struggle to identify the harm that they

46 The Republic provides an instance of a character correcting an interlocutor's claims. In Book I,
Cleitophon tries to defend Thrasymachus after Socrates' first counter-argument by suggesting that what
Thrasymachus “meant” to say was that rulers fashion those laws that seem most advantageous to them
(340b5). It should be noted that views differ with respect to the intellectual benefit of aporia. The basic
point of disagreement is whether aporia yields positive or negative insight. The view that aporia results
in negative insight is encapsulated in the idea that aporia does nothing more than expose an
interlocutor's ignorance. The view is so influential that it provides the basis for differentiating “early”
from “middle” dialogues. Others, however, utilize the negative aspect of aporia for different purposes.
McCoy suggests that Socrates uses provocative-aporetic means because he believes virtue cannot be
taught. Since virtue allegedly cannot be taught, Socrates must attempt to get interlocutors to care about
virtue in some way. Socrates does this by inducing “a kind of intellectual and emotional disequilibrium
in the souls of those to whom he speaks, with the hope that his audience will emerge from this
disequilibrium with a commitment to seek the truth” (Plato, 24). Again, the inducement of “intellectual
and emotional disequilibrium” is unmistakable as a characterization of aporia.
47 Plato often likens the power of rhetoric to “charm” or “bewitch” an interlocutor. In the Phaedrus,
Socrates says that he was “bewitched” (καταφαρμακευθέντος, 242e2) by the demand to produce a
Lysianic speech; in the Republic, Glaucon suggests that Thrasymachus was “charmed like a snake”
(ὥσπερ ὄφις κηληθῆναι, 358b3) by Socrates' words in Book I. Interlocutors may feel anger because they
feel Socrates has somehow used some verbal trick that they fail to identify because they lack expertise.
This sense of being at a disadvantage might account for a thumotic kind of anger; however, it is still the
interlocutor's lack of ability which is to blame for his difficulty in answering Socrates' questions.
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believe Socrates has inflected on them when he refutes them. If the harm is the sort one
receives from accidentally stepping on a torpedo fish, then moral indignation is not really
the appropriate response—hence the puzzling character of the anger they feel. One
proposal is that Socrates' ultimate goal in bringing about this strange affective state is that
the intended effect of aporia is to retrain the interlocutor's anger on himself.48 This is
likely true, but it requires an explanation of how it is possible to retrain one's anger
oneself. The problem is remedied if we notice that aporetic anger lacks a proper target,
and thus primes the interlocutor to recognize his own inability to answer Socrates'
questions as the proper target of his anger. In unifying the intellectual and affective means
of protreptic, aporia can provoke an interlocutor both personally, by putting something at
stake for him, and intellectually, by revealing the need to re-examine his beliefs and
commitments. For this reason I identify a third kind of means as “provocative-aporetic”:
aporia is meant to provoke an interlocutor both intellectually and emotionally.
Having discussed the three means by which Socrates attempts to exert a protreptic
effect on an interlocutor, it is necessary to complicate this account of the means of
protreptic by examining the protreptic effect of Plato's dialogues on readers. So far, I have
limited the analysis of the means of protreptic to the relations that we, as readers, observe
between Socrates and interlocutors. But this restriction neglects the fact that Plato likely
wrote his dialogues in the hopes of helping both his contemporaries and future
generations to at least recognize the value of philosophy, if not to become philosophers

48 Blank's proposal in “The Arousal of Emotion in Plato's Dialogues,” The Classical Quarterly 43, no.2
(1993): 436. Yunis also acknowledges Plato's use of devices that arouse certain emotions as well,
though he attributes a slightly different function to those devices. He argues that because many of
Socrates' arguments run counter to deeply-held conventional norms—for example, the arguments
concerning marriage and property relations in Republic V—Socrates must resort to emotional means to
“tip the balance” in favor of his own views (“The Protreptic Rhetoric of the Republic,” 22).
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themselves. The Phaedrus—a dialogue that contains Plato's critique of the value of
writing for philosophers—provides especially good evidence for thinking Plato may have
had such hopes for his dialogues. There is an unmistakable irony in the fact that Plato has
Socrates argue that a philosopher would not seriously attempt to educate others in written
form, since in doing so he performs the very contradiction of that which his character
Socrates advises.49 Accounting for the full bearing of this irony on the dialogue would
require a chapter in itself, but a few observations about the relationship between Socrates
and Phaedrus will lend credence to the claim that Plato's dialogues also exert a protreptic
effect on readers. Plato portrays Phaedrus as an admirer of the logographoi, or
professional speech-writers. In one of the first scenes of the dialogue, Phaedrus reads, at
Socrates' request, a speech of one such well-known speech writer, Lysias.50 The two
discuss the qualities of good and bad speeches and written compositions, and Socrates
tries to convince Phaedrus that Lysias' speech lacks these features. In the midst of this
conversation, Socrates offers his critique of writing: writing only “repeats the same thing”
and cannot respond to the specific needs and questions of a reader in the way that an
interlocutor can; readers may think they have acquired expertise when they read
something, even though they haven't; and writing may make readers forgetful since it
functions as a kind of externalized memory that prevents them from exercising their
internal power of memory.51 Whether these were Socrates' specific worries about writing
is impossible to say; but Plato's rebuttal is not to abandon writing, but rather to write in
49 Socrates likens the writings of a philosopher to the plants that a farmer might sow in the “Garden of
Adomis” (Phaedrus, 276b3). Yunis suggests that because these plants likely would have been used as
decorations for a festival, the farmer would not have been interested in their ability to produce fruit. By
analogy, the philosopher would realize that his writings would only serve the purpose of entertainment.
See Harvey Yunis, ed. and comm., Plato: Phaedrus (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2011),
232.
50 Phaedrus, 231a-234d.
51 These criticisms begin with Socrates' telling of the myth of Theuth and Thamus (274d-275b).
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such a way that the dialogue mimics a living interlocutor.52 If a philosophical dialogue
can perform the role of interlocutors for readers, then it has the potential to exert a
protreptic effect on readers.
Mitchell Miller provides a useful framework for thinking about the place that
readers occupy in the relation to a Platonic dialogue. He describes the structure of a
typical dialogue between Socrates and an interlocutor as “mimetic irony.”53 According to
Miller, mimetic irony is structured by four moments:
1. Elicitation; the “basic position of the non-philosopher” is laid forth in its strongest
form.
2. Refutation by the philosopher; the philosopher argues with the non-philosopher,
inducing him into aporia. According to Miller, “this refutation characteristically
brings the non-philosopher into aporia and appears to bring dialogue itself to a
decisive impasse.”
3.

Reorientation; “the philosopher makes his most basic contribution, a reorienting
insight that shows a path through the aporia. This insight is characteristically the
most profound and original of the dialogue.”

4.

Return; the philosopher steers the conversation back “to issues or difficulties or,
even, the plane of discourse prior to the basic refutation.”54

Miller points out that the most curious aspect of mimetic irony lies in the fourth moment.
Why do Platonic dialogues contain a “return” to the level of discourse prior to the
52 Socrates proposes as a requirement for a good logos that it be organized like a living being ([…] δεῖν
πάντα λόγον σπερ ζῷον συνεστάναι, 264c3-5). Readers might take this as a hermeneutic principle and
apply it to the logos of the Phaedrus itself. Cf. Nussbaum, The Fragility of Goodness (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1986), 126.
53 Mitchell Miller, Plato's Parmenides: The Conversion of the Soul, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University
Press, 1986), 5-8.
54 Miller, Conversion, 7.
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philosopher's refutation of that discourse? Miller suggest that Plato offers this as a test to
his readers: “The failure of an interlocutor to meet the philosopher's test within the drama
is, in its basic function, Plato's test and provocation of his hearer.”55
If the reader's task is to perform the “return” to the non-philosopher's level of
discourse in the way that the interlocutor should, but fails to do, then the reader is
effectively being invited to respond to Socrates on behalf of the interlocutor who has
failed to carry out the return to non-philosophical discourse. What makes this possible is
the privileged perspective that readers have on the written conversation: they may review
the conversation, the interlocutor's governing assumptions, and the philosopher's
“reorienting insight.” They are then tasked with explaining how certain governing
assumptions of the interlocutor's position are either overturned or re-contextualized
within a new framework for understanding the issue at hand. Readers find themselves in
an improved epistemic state as a result of this exercise because they have benefited from
the mistakes of the interlocutor portrayed in the dialogue. That is, the insight readers gain
is not negative, i.e., not simply a discovery of their own ignorance; rather, they are
presented with a compelling—though ultimately false—view about some issue of
philosophical importance. They are then tasked with explaining for themselves why that
view is ultimately false, and how Socrates' insight points beyond the aporia.56
Having considered only the protreptic effect of provocative-aporetic means on
readers, I should conclude this section with a few remarks about the effect of affective
and intellectual means on readers. The new layer of complexity that the reader
55 Miller, Conversion, 8.
56 Frede advances a position similar to the one I am proposing here. See also Michael Frede, “Plato's
Arguments and the Dialogue Form,” in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, suppl. vol.: Methods of
Interpreting Plato and His Dialogues, ed. J. C. Klagge and N. D. Smith (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1992), 217.
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contributes arises from fact that the affective or intellectual means of protreptic that
Socrates exercises on an interlocutor need not be the same that Plato exercises on the
reader.57 For example, we may pity an interlocutor who himself feels shame or anger at
having been refuted by Socrates; we may also experience a sort of anticipatory pity, or
feeling of suspense because we foresee an interlocutor's elenchos even before the
interlocutor is aware of it.58 Finally, our ironic relation to the text may also play on our
sense of humor, as we may find it difficult to refrain from laughing at interlocutors who
are oblivious to their own ignorance.59 With respect to intellectual means, the question we
must ask is whether the argument Socrates uses to persuade an interlocutor is the same
argument that Plato intends to persuade his readers. In this way a reading of a dialogue
that hopes to account for the protreptic effect of the dialogue must differentiate between
the views of Socrates and the views of Plato for structural reasons, rather than for merely
historical reasons, e.g., for the purpose of assigning a chronology to the dialogues. The
difference between these two readings is the difference between an “earnest” and “ironic”
readings of Plato's work. On the earnest reading, the arguments and teachings of the
dialogues are explicit, while on the ironic reading, the arguments and lessons are
concealed from immediate view. A good example of the divergent conclusions that these
two ways of reading draw about Plato's beliefs can be found in the Protagoras. Vlastos,
57 Gordon also distinguishes between “two levels of action with respect to the Platonic text: there is the
action depicted within the dialogue, that is, the plot, and there is the inter-action, between the reader and
the dialogue. Both levels of action in Plato's dialogues bear on his philosophical aim of turning souls
toward the life of philosophy” (Gordon, Turning, 80).
58 Blank, 434
59 Euthyphro provides an excellent example of this sort of phenomenon. Miller explores the problem that
the comedic aspects of the dialogues raise for Socrates' “moral-philosophical” project. Briefly put,
laughing at the ignorance of others does not seem to make us more virtuous, even if those whom we
laugh at are fictional characters in a dialogue. This raises a question about how readers are to interact
with Plato's dialogues in such a way that they do not unknowingly engage in vice. See Mitchell Miller,
“The Pleasures of the Comic and of Socratic Inquiry: Aporetic Reflections on Philebus 48A–50B” in
Arethousa, Vol. 41, No.2 (Spring 2008): 266.
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adhering to a developmental chronology of Plato's corpus, identifies differing views on
the akrasia phenomenon as evidence for situating Protagoras as an early dialogue and
Republic as a middle dialogue.60 In the Protagoras, the claim that no one is “overcome by
pleasure” in spite of knowing or believing that they ought to act otherwise depends upon
the success of Socrates' argument for the “art of measurement.” Thus, the view that
wisdom consists in knowledge of a hedonic calculus is identified as an “early” Platonic
doctrine. On an ironic reading, however, Plato might not have been advancing this view
in the Protagoras. Socrates uses the art of measurement in fundamentally eristic
conversation with Protagoras, to refute Protagoras' claim that most of the virtues are
similar, though courage is unique and “separate.” Plato underscores this eristic aspect by
portraying the humorous realization that Socrates and Protagoras have unknowingly
switched the positions for which they were arguing: both were so caught up in refuting
each other that they forgot the respective positions they were arguing for.61 When
Socrates realizes this, he suggest that they continue their conversation to see what went
wrong.62 If readers take up that suggestion, then they are forced to re-examine the
arguments for the art of measurement on account of the support it provides for Socrates'
unintentionally reversed position, i.e., that virtue is teachable. Thus, an “earnest” reading
can maintain the hedonic calculus as an “early doctrine” only by ignoring dramatic
60 Gregory Vlastos, Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher (New York: Cambridge University Press,
1991), 48. Although Vlastos devotes the first chapter of his book to a defense of an “ordinary” sense of
irony, he tends to perform “earnest” readings of Plato's dialogues. He defends the “hypothesis” that “[...]
Plato in those early works of his, sharing Socrates' basic philosophical convictions, sets out to think
through for himself their central affirmations, denials, and reasons suspensions of belief by pitting them
in elenctic encounter against the views voiced by a variety of interlocutors. In doing this Plato is
producing, not reproducing, Socratic philosophizing. Employing a literary medium which allows
Socrates to speak for himself, Plato makes him say whatever he—Plato—thinks at the time of writing
would be the most reasonable thing for Socrates to be saying just then in expounding and defending his
own philosophy” (Socrates, 50).
61 Prt., 361a-c; namely, that virtue is teachable (Protagoras) and virtue is not teachable (Socrates).
62 Prt., 361c-d.
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features of the dialogue.

§ 3. Studying the Protreptic Effect of the Republic
I argued above that four questions ought to guide a study of the protreptic effect of
a Platonic dialogue:
1) Who is the recipient of protreptic?
2) What are the means of persuasion?
3) What is the recipient being persuaded of?
4) What does the recipient learn from protreptic?
In the following I outline answers that inform this study of the protreptic effect of the
Republic.
There is some difficulty in determining the recipient of protreptic in the Republic
because multiple interpretations seem to be supported by the content of the inquiry of the
Republic and the variety of interlocutors with whom Socrates speaks. For example, one
possibility is that an immoralist or moral skeptic is the recipient of the argument of the
Republic. Thrasymachus is, not unreasonably, often presented as the representative of this
personality, and Socrates seems sincere about trying to dissuade Thrasymachus of his
views.63 Since the argument that Socrates makes in the remainder of the dialogue seems
to be intended to refute the immoralist's position, the immoralist would seem to be the
recipient of protreptic. Even though Socrates speaks primarily with Glaucon and

63 O'Neill rightly disputes this characterization, arguing that Thrasymachus' commitment to wisdom (of a
sort) in fact provides a “lever” for Socrates (“The Struggle for the Soul of Thrasymachus,” 177). At the
very least, Thrasymachus wants to appear admirable to Socrates—that is, he implicitly acknowledges
Socrates' approval as a kind of normative standard. O'Neill's argument could be represented by the
stronger claim that the Republic contains an argument that no one could be a thoroughgoing immoralist
and have an interest in vindicating the immoralist position in debate.
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Adeimantus after Book I, it is possible that he still has the immoralist in mind as the
person he hopes to persuade to see the value of justice.
Another possibility is that Glaucon and Adeimantus are the primary recipients of
Socrates' protreptic efforts. I argue that this interpretation makes better sense of the
content of Socrates' argument and the silencing of Thrasymachus in Book I. To begin, the
view that the immoralist or moral skeptic is the immediate recipient of Socrates'
protreptic efforts encounters a difficulty I call the “problem of incommensurability.”
Simply put, the problem is that Socrates and the immoralists and moral-skeptics he
encounters—interlocutors such as Thrasymachus and Callicles—hold beliefs about each
other that are accessible only from their respective points of view. For example, Callicles
and Thrasymachus both view philosophers like Socrates, who have commitments to
moral principles and do not use their rhetorical skills to manipulate the polis, as fools and
incomplete sophists.64 From the perspective of the philosopher, however, sophists such as
Thrasymachus and Callicles are, in a sense, incomplete philosophers.65 To get either
Socrates or a sophist of Thrasymachus' ilk to sincerely adopt the other's view would seem
to require a kind of gestalt-shift; it seems that no rational argument could persuade the
one to adopt the perspective of the other.66 To effect such a “shift,” Socrates must either

64 As evinced by Thrasymachus' taunts in the Republic (336c1; 343a5) and Callicles' assertion in the
Gorgias that philosophy is only good when studied “moderately in young age,” but not good as a lifelong pursuit (μετρίως ἅψητεαι ἐν τῇ ἡλικία, 484с8).
65 McCoy argues for this point: “the distinction between the philosopher and the sophist only makes sense
from the point of view of the philosopher. That is, to the philosopher, the sophist is something like an
incomplete philosopher. But only the philosopher can know this because only the philosopher has the
greater context of the whole for understanding what the human being really desires. From the point of
view of the sophist, however, the philosopher might only appear to be a bad sophist. […] the way in
which the distinction between philosophy and sophistry is understood depends upon one's prior
theoretical stance—a theoretical vision defined less in terms of precise characterizations of the forms
and more by understanding one's own deepest desires as a human being” (McCoy, Plato, 133).
66 This conclusion results especially for those who argue that Thrasymachus holds a logically coherent
position. C.D.C. Reeve suggests that Socrates' arguments in Book I are all flawed, so that they in fact
fail to show any inconsistencies in Thrasymachus' view. Thus he concludes that it is “not sheer
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rely on entirely affective means, or find leverage in the form of a prior commitment to
even the most minimal commitment to normativity, and show that this commitment
implicitly commits the interlocutor to some proposition closer to Socrates' position. If
Socrates relies solely on affective means, then “protreptic” resembles emotional
manipulation, and if he cannot leverage some minimal commitment of the interlocutor's
to gain consent to a proposition closer to his own view, then it is difficult to see how
meaningful dialogue, with the potential to fundamentally reorient an interlocutor, could
even get off the ground.67
The problem of incommensurability can be avoided by identifying Glaucon and
Adeimantus as the primary recipients of Socrates' protreptic efforts.68 Although Glaucon
revives Thrasymachus' position in Book II, he does so insincerely because is not actually
committed to Thrasymachus' view.69 Rather, he seeks a counterargument against
Thrasymachus that can withstand his strongest defense of the immoralist's position.

dogmatism on his [Thrasymachus'] part” when Thrasymachus remains unconvinced. In Reeve's view,
Socrates has only refuted “the man,” but not the theory (Philosopher-Kings: The Argument of Plato's
Republic [Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing, 2006], 21-22). McCoy argues that “Thrasymachus gives an
internally consistent picture of the human being: we all desire power, honor, and material gain. Just laws
and the consequences of disobeying hem are obstacles to this for everyone who is not a ruler. […]
Thrasymachus' position remains a coherent, if immoral, alternative to the Socratic position that it is
better to be just than unjust because his main claim that the unjust person is happier than the just person
still has not been addressed” (Plato, 117). McCoy arrives at this conclusion on the grounds that
Socrates' elenchoi in Book I are flawed, so that Thrasymachus' position simply hasn't been refuted.
67 McCoy identifies this problem as the cause of the breakdown in conversations between Socrates and
committed sophists such as Callicles and Thrasymachus (Plato, 100). The two parties simply lack
common assumptions that can serve as a starting point for persuading one or the other. For example,
one of the chief disagreements between Socrates and Callicles concerns the relation between pleasure
and the good. Socrates denies that pleasure is identical with the good, while Callicles identifies the two
(Gorgias, 495d).
68 Reeve and Yunis share this view with me. See Reeve, Philosopher-Kings, 35-40. Yunis argues that
“Protreptic discourse is not educational discourse as a whole and does not by itself bring about
education in virtue. Rather, protreptic addresses the initial or preparatory stages of education. It aims to
get education in virtue under way, to get the reader or auditor turned and moving in the right direction,
and to make the acquisition of virtue an urgent priority.” See Harvey Yunis, “The Protreptic Rhetoric of
the Republic” in The Cambridge Companion to Plato's Republic (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2007), 3-4.
69 Republic, 358c7
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Socrates' argument in the Republic simply isn't intended to persuade an immoralist to
adopt a moral point of view; rather, it aims to persuade individuals who are already
practically committed to justice, but who are troubled by their lack of reply to individuals
like Thrasymachus. On this approach, the argument of the Republic aims to show that
Glaucon's conviction that the just life is better is right, not that the immoralist is wrong.70
Glaucon and Adeimantus' possession of conversational and epistemic virtues
provides another reason to believe that the brothers are the primary recipients of Socrates'
protreptic efforts. Book I is striking for its portrayal of the kinds of people with whom
Socrates cannot carry on sustained conversation. Cephalus, the first interlocutor, is
willing to participate in a conversation only on the condition that it will not expose him to
the rigor of Socrates' questioning. Thus, when pressed to define justice, he turns the
conversation over to his son, Polemarchus. Polemarchus proves an unsuitable interlocutor
as well, though for different reasons. He is willing to subject himself to Socrates'
elenchos, but his reasoning about justice remains too wedded to conventional ideas of
retribution and recompense. This is apparent in the way that Polemarchus' initial
definition of justice—giving what is due to friends and enemies—is partially reaffirmed
in Book IV, where Socrates argues that judges enact a type of restorative justice by giving
what is due to each class.71 But this reaffirmation comes about only after a long logos
through which Glaucon and Adeimantus construct a theoretical city. Because
Polemarchus' thinking relies too much on convention, he is not ready to think about
justice “in itself,” for that task will require the flexibility in thinking that can tolerate the

70 See also Myles Burnyeat, “The Truth of Tripartition.” In The Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society
106 (2006): 3.
71 Republic, 433e.
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annihilation of conventions, at least in thought.72 Polemarchus lacks this flexibility, which
is why he is not the proper interlocutor for a sustained conversation about justice.
Thrasymachus, being an anti-conventionalist, thus represents the opposite
extreme. It is this anti-conventionalism that makes Thrasymachus' proposal more
interesting, and somewhat compelling, since he recognizes that appeals to traditional
authorities do not carry much evidential weight in philosophical arguments. But the
extremity of Thrasymachus' anti-conventialism precludes his practice of the virtue of
courage or “spiritedness,” a virtue that Socrates identifies as crucial for philosophical
conversation in many dialogues.73 This is apparent in his reaction to Socrates' first
challenge to his argument that justice is the “advantage of the stronger.” Thrasymachus is
clearly stunned by Socrates' response, and Cleitophon tries to save him by saying that “he
meant what the advantage of the stronger is what the stronger thinks is good for himself;
this is what the weaker must do, and he posited justice as this.”74 Polemarchus, however,
points out that “that's not how it was said.”75 Thus we see in this response that
Thrasymachus is not willing to accept the risk that comes with advancing a philosophical
position, because the other participants must hold him accountable to his own words.
Unwillingness to accept the risk that comes with philosophical conversation, however,
betrays a lack of courage in the sense that Socrates means. A second scene that shows
Thrasymachus' lack of courage occurs at the end of the elenchos in Book I, when

72 Reeve argues that Polemarchus' dependence upon conventional morality but lack of tools with which he
might encounter “moral skepticism” reveals the “problematic nature of Socratic elenchos.” The
elenchos cannot benefit Polemarchus because it simply seems to destroy his belief in convention
without replacing it with anything new. By introducing him into moral skepticism, Socrates may in fact
be corrupting Polemarchus rather than helping him (Philosopher-Kings, 8-9).
73 See Theaetetus. 145b; Republic, 357a2; Laches, 194a1.
74 […] τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον ἔλεγεν ὅ ἡγοῖτο ὁ κρείττων αὑτῷ ξυμφέρειν τοῦτο ποιητέον εἶναι τῷ
ἥττονι, καὶ τὸ δίκαιον τοῦτο ἐτίθετο (340b4-7).
75 Ἀλλ' οὐχ οὕτως, ἧ δ' ὅς ὁ Πολέμαρχος, ἐλεγετο (340b7-c1).
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Socrates takes his turn at advancing his own argument about justice. Rather than answer
honestly, Thrasymachus simply answers in a way that will humor Socrates and finish the
argument as quickly as possible.76 This refusal to answer honestly also shows his
unwillingness to take risks in philosophical conversation. Though he offers no resistance
in his answers, he is unwilling to assume the risk of the new hypothesis that Socrates
proposes because he only answers to spare himself further embarrassment; he thus
remains dissociated from the argument. This reaction stands in contrast with that of
Glaucon, who accepts the hypothesis of the city-soul analogy because he is genuinely
willing to see where it leads for the sake of the argument, not for the sake of sparing
himself embarrassment. The willingness to genuinely accept a hypothesis indicates a kind
of courage that is indispensable to philosophical conversation, and this is why Glaucon is
a suitable interlocutor for the remainder of the Republic. In short, Glaucon represents a
person whose thinking is flexible enough to tolerate the erosion of traditional authority in
thought, but not so anti-conventional that he cannot simply accept or receive a new
starting point for inquiry.77
In short, Glaucon and Adeimantus are the primary recipients of Socrates'
protreptic efforts because (a) they have the right intellectual temperament and
conversational virtues, and (b) they are already practically committed to the just life, but
seek an argument to defend this commitment against immoralists like Thrasymachus.78
Harvey Yunis argues that readers of the Republic too may have been the intended
76 After the final refutation, Thrasymachus says that he'll behave with Socrates “as one does with old
women telling stories” (350d, Griffith). When Socrates draws the conclusion that injustice is “never
more profitable than justice,” Thrasymachus quips that “It's Bendis' Day. Make a real feast of it,” as if
to imply that he has simply been letting Socrates have his way (354a, Griffith).
77 It is worth noting that the word for “tradition,” παράδοση, is related to the verb παραδίδωμι, to “hand
over.” The metaphor suggests that we are “recipients” of cultural authorities.
78 See Also Roslyn Weiss, “Wise Guys and Smart Alecks in Republic 1 and 2,” in The Cambridge
Companion to Plato's Republic, ed. G.R.F Ferrari (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 92.
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audience of this argument. He proposes that readers who stand to benefit most from the
dialogue are those who, like Glaucon, are intellectually curious, have some familiarity
with the way philosophical conversations proceed, and seek a more intellectually
responsible argument for the value of justice than appeals to traditional authority
provide.79 However, this identification of the prior commitments of Glaucon,
Adeimantus, and the intended audience of the Republic raises a worry about what these
audiences actually gain from the argument of the Republic. Glaucon's sympathy for
Socrates' views raises the worry that he is, in a sense, already persuaded of Socrates'
view. If that is so, then it would seem that Glaucon is “persuaded” of something he
already believes. But to learn something, one must become persuaded of something one
did not already believe. Therefore, it would seem that Glaucon and like-minded readers
do not really learn anything from Socrates' protreptic efforts. This worry forces us to
clarify what the recipients of protreptic—Glaucon, Adeimantus, and readers—learn; for
otherwise, the manner in which they are persuaded appears circular. 80
To answer this worry we must attend to the distinction between what protreptic is
meant to persuade a recipient of, and what the recipient learns from protreptic. With
regard to the Republic, the claim which Glaucon and readers are meant to be persuaded of
is that justice is a good desirable both for its own sake and for its consequences. Socrates
of course also hopes to persuade Glaucon and readers of the superior value of the
philosophical life, but this goal seems to be secondary to the former, as the inquiry
79 Yunis, “The Protreptic Rhetoric of the Republic,” 5.
80 I raise this worry on the basis of Yunis' analysis of the protreptic function of the Republic. Yunis argues
that “Protreptic discourse is not educational discourse as a whole and does not by itself bring about
education in virtue. Rather, protreptic addresses the initial or preparatory stages of education. It aims to
get education in virtue under way, to get the reader or auditor turned and moving in the right direction,
and to make the acquisition of virtue an urgent priority.” See Yunis, “The Protreptic Rhetoric of the
Republic,” 3-4.
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concerning justice receives the greatest continuity of treatment across the ten books of the
Republic.81 Moreover, while Socrates describes the intellectual and moral character of the
philosophy and outlines a program of studies for such a person, his aim might not be to
persuade Glaucon to follow the path of the philosopher, but rather to recognize the value
of having philosophers in political life. If the point of which Glaucon and readers are to
be persuaded is clear, then the question remains as to what the recipients of protreptic
learn from the argument of the Republic. In the following chapters, I argue that Glaucon
and readers learn about a moral psychology that explains why the characteristics such as
courage, self-control, wisdom, and justice, are virtues; that is, why these characteristics
belong to soul that is in good condition. In a certain sense, then, the questions that guide
the inquiry of the Republic are really quite simple: (1) what is good for me? And (2) what
am I such that X is good for me? An argument of this sort is crucial to the inquiry of the
Republic because the immoralist denies that these virtues in the conventional sense are
good for a person, and instead posits something like “anti-virtues” of his own. On my
reading of the Republic, readers are witness to argument between people who, as a
consequence of their holding contrary assumptions about the relation between reason and
appetite, arrive at two different models for understanding what justice is. I call these two
models the “Technē Model” and “Virtue Model” of justice. Glaucon accepts justice as a
virtue in the way Socrates means—as an inner ordering of the parts of the soul—only on

81 Contra Yunis, 15-17. Yunis argues that the Republic is meant to persuade the literate public that they
would benefit from the rule of philosophers. Book VI certainly contains an argument of this sort, but it
is not clear that this argument is the central argument of the Republic. The nature of the philosopher also
bears on the question concerning the happiness of the just life. Irwin argues that Socrates is committed
to a “comparative thesis” about the happiness of just and unjust lives (Plato's Ethics, 192-193). Socrates
wants to show that the just life is happier than the unjust life, but not necessarily that justice is sufficient
for happiness. If this is correct, then the ranking of the lives—money-making, honor-loving, and
philosophical—in Book XI according to quality and quantity of pleasure (581c-588a) could be read as
an argument for the comparative thesis.
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the condition that he accept a quite different conception of agency than he endorsed at the
beginning of the dialogue. I suggest that the same lessons about agency as Glaucon and
Adeimantus receive are offered to readers of the Republic.82
So far I have answered three of the four questions for a study of the Republic as a
protreptic dialogue: (1) who the recipients of protreptic are (readers, Glaucon and
Adeimantus); (3) what the recipient is to be persuaded of (the intrinsic value of justice);
and (4) what the recipient learns from protreptic (a theory of moral agency that explains
why justice and the virtues are virtues). What remains is a discussion of the means of
protreptic that Plato may utilize with respect his readers. Here I suggest the answer
diverges from the previous three, because readers partake in the structure of mimetic
irony, and thus their vantage point differs from interlocutors. Nonetheless, the transition
between Books I and II provides a model, in the ways that interlocutors converse and
change roles in a provocative-aporetic way, for the way Plato may apply provocativeaporetic means to readers. Book I ends as a typically aporetic dialogue might end:
Thrasymachus is refuted and silenced, and Socrates offers a glimpse of his own view of
justice, but we still lack a definitive view of what justice is. Book II begins, however,
with Glaucon's attempt to represent Thrasymachus' views better than Thrasymachus
could himself; that is, Glacuon notices a moment of aporia and attempts to answer for the
interlocutor who was refuted in such a way that aporia might be overcome. Glaucon,
therefore, is performing the structure of mimetic irony for readers. If readers are to
engage with the provocative-aporetic means that Plato offers for the re-orientation of

82 Collins also proposes that moral psychology is one of the primary domains of protreptic. He argues that
the protreptics of Plato, Isocrates, and Aristotle each contain differing notions of human psychology,
and attempt to differentiate between “worthless” and “harmful” lifestyles in terms of their respective
notions of psychology See Collins, Exhortations, 4.
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their lives, they must mimic this role that Glaucon performs for them. My reading of the
Republic in this dissertation therefore proceeds in accordance with these provocativeaporetic means. My strategy for reading the Republic is as follows.
1. Identify moments of aporia and moments when interlocutors need the reader's
assistance to correct their answers.
2. Identify the governing assumptions that lead to aporia, and whether the response
to aporia can maintain coherency among the initial governing assumptions
(Chapter 2; primarily Republic I-II)
3. Identify moments at which interlocutors (typically Glaucon or Adeimantus) reply
in ways that contradict the governing assumptions of the aporetic portion of the
dialogue (Chapter 3; primarily Republic III-IV);
4. Identify the replacements for the initial governing assumptions (Chapter 4;
primarily Republic IV).
One concern remains, however, with respect to this schema for analyzing the
protreptic effect of Plato's dialogues: what is the overall conception of philosophy with
which recipients are being encouraged to engage? This question should concern us
because, while Socrates and Plato may offer their own respective lessons for interlocutors
and readers, we might wonder what the purpose of these lessons is. Do they lead
somewhere, perhaps to a more “advanced” program of study, or do they serve to initiate
us into a general practice of philosophy? An examination of the significance of these
alternatives for protreptic is well suited to a reading of the Republic because the dialogue
seems to offer both to readers. The dialogue is somewhat jarringly divided by two
separate inquiries: an ethical and psychological inquiry about justice, and an intellectual
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and metaphysical inquiry about the nature and wisdom of the philosopher. On the one
hand, in Book VII Socrates describes a program of mathematical and dialectical studies
(524d-534c), ostensibly as a kind of advanced training for those guardians who are to be
philosopher-kings. But he seems to hold open the possibility that these studies are crucial
for anyone who is lover of wisdom, whether or not political conditions would allow that
person to have any political influence.83 The end-result of these studies is insight into the
“first principle itself” (αὐτὴ τὴ ἀρχὴν, 533c8), and the ability to “grasp the account of the
being of each thing” (καὶ διαλεκτικὸν καλεῖς τὸν λόγον ἑκάστου λαμβάνοντα τῆς οὐσίας,
534b2-3), especially of the good (τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, 534b6). Moreover, Socrates proposes that
these studies play a role in securing the virtue of the guardians in a way that musical and
physical education could not. Socrates contrasts intellectual virtues—such as natural
intelligence, good memory, and the like—with “virtues of the body,” and suggests that
the former can affect the latter:
rational thought […] becomes useful and beneficial, or useless and harmful,
depending on which way it is facing. Think of those people who have the
reputation of being evil but clever.84
Here, then, the worry is that when intellectual virtues are recruited in service of the
wrong ends, they wrongly reorient the virtues of the body. There is some question about
what Plato means by “virtues of the body,” but a decent conjecture is that he has in mind
the virtues we acquire by habituation. For example, if courage just refers to the ability to
endure fear without panicking, then the worry seems to be that “rational thought” might

83 The allegory of the cave suggests this possibility by presenting the philosopher as someone who could
emerge from a political context that is in fact hostile philosophy, e.g., one in which non-philosophers try
to kill the philosopher (Rep., 517a).
84 518e, Griffith
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recruit courage in the service of some utterly wicked project. Therefore, some ultimate
metaphysical insight into the good is necessary to prevent the corruption of these
virtues.85
On the other hand, Socrates continually flags the inadequacy of his metaphors for
describing both the effect of mathematical-dialectical education on a person, and the type
of knowledge these studies yield. For example, he calls the sun-analogy for the form of
the Good a “child of the good” (ἔκγονός τε τοῦ ἀγαθοῦ, 506e3), and reveals that
throughout the conversation about mathematical-dialectical studies, he has only been
showing Glaucon an “image” (εἰκόνα, 533a2) of the things that dialectic studies. In light
of Socrates' description of dialectic as that which will test who is “capable of giving up
eyesight,” one might note the irony in the fact that Plato offers images as a way to
encourage –protrepein—us to give up our eyesight. This is like offering someone a
drawing by Escher in order to persuade him that he ought not to use his eyes. If the
ultimate goal of philosophy is at odds with the means of protrepic, then how do these
means usher people toward that end? Some interpret these cautionary signs as an
85 This function of insight into the forms is evident at least in the Republic, Symposium, and Phaedo. In
the Symposium, Diotima concludes her speech by saying that whoever glimpses the Beautiful itself
gives birth not to “images of virtue” (εἴδωλα ἀρτεῆς, 212e6) but “true virtue” (ἀρετὴ ἀληθῆ, 212e7).
“True virtue” is often contrasted with the virtue of the honor-lovers of the “lower mysteries” (See
Sheffield, Plato's Symposium: The Ethics of Desire,). In the Phaedo, Socrates distinguishes between the
“slavish” virtue of those who have not freed themselves from the calculation of bodily pleasures and
pains, and the true virtue of philosophers who have (Phaedo, 69c-69d). What Christopher Bobonich
calls the “dependency thesis” is one way of understanding how metaphysical insight yields true rather
than spurious virtue. On his view, “True virtue requires that (i) a person aim at wisdom for its own sake,
and (ii) wisdom govern all the person's exchanges involving other things, that is, that the person choose
and act on the basis of wisdom” (Plato's Utopia Recast, 16). True virtue requires that one be a
philosopher—a lover of wisdom—and that one have insight into the forms (i.e., have wisdom). These
qualities allow the philosopher to use what Bobonich calls “dependent” goods: “x is a Dependent Good
if and only if x is good for a person who possesses wisdom (phronēsis) or knowledge of the good and x
is bad or at least not good for a person who lacks wisdom or knowledge of the good” (Plato's Utopia,
40). Stated briefly, goods such as bodily pleasure, wealth, and honor can only be goods for the person
who uses them with wisdom. Thus philosophical conversion is necessary to become the kind of person
who can use such goods. See also Irwin, who also appears to endorse a version of the dependency thesis
(Plato's Moral Theory, 224; 233-238).

44

indication that the conception of philosophy toward which Plato wants us to “turn” lies
somewhere in his portrayal of Socrates' practice of caring for the soul and performance of
various conversational and epistemic virtues, rather than in an ultimate metaphysical
insight.86 For example, Socrates induces aporia in his interlocutors in order to make them
aware of their own ignorance and open their beliefs to revision, and he encourages
interlocutors to say what they really believe in conversation, rather than to argue for a
view that they don't hold from a detached perspective.87 Socrates demonstrates this
practice in the Republic by educating Glaucon's spirit (thumos) and re-orienting his eros
away from appetitive pleasures toward intellectual pleasures. Glaucon genuinely benefits
from this reorientation because this alliance of thumos and eros puts him at risk of
becoming a tyrant.88
I refer to these two ways of interpreting the ultimate project of philosophy as
“metaphysical” and “methodological” interpretations. On the metaphysical interpretation,
the ultimate aim of the project of philosophy is a kind of metaphysical insight that we
have interest in both for its own sake and in order to perfect our virtues. On the
methodological interpretation, the practice of caring for the soul—both one's own and

86 Annas cautions readers not to put too much stock in the use of images in Republic VI-VII (An
Introduction to Plato's Republic [New York: Clarendon Press, 1981]: 238). McCoy argues for this
conception of Plato's philosophy in general. She reaches this conclusion by studying the rhetorical tools
that sophists and philosophers—as Plato portrays them—use, and denies that any “foundational
knowledge” (e.g., of the forms) distinguishes philosophers from sophists in the use of rhetoric (Plato on
the Rhetoric of Sophists and Philosophers, 5; 132). Jill Gordon argues that Socrates' way of seeking
knowledge in the dialogues does not really resemble dialectic. She suggests that he relies on something
like a method of falsification instead (Turning Toward Philosophy, 83-84). Moreover, she argues that
Socrates seems to justify some of his beliefs on ethical rather than purely logical grounds, e.g., the
belief that there is even knowledge to be found (Cf. Phaedo, 90d-e, the “misology” passage; See
Gordon, 39).
87 These features are on full-display in the Republic. Both Thrasymachus and Polemarchus encounter
aporia, and Socrates says that he would prefer Thrasymachus say what he really believes in response to
his questions (350e5).
88 See McCoy, Plato, 135; Paul Ludwig, “Eros in the Republic,” in The Cambridge Companion to Plato's
Republic, ed. G.R.F Ferrari (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 225.
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others'--is the ultimate aim of the project of philosophy. These two interpretations are not
contradictory. A metaphysical interpretation can accommodate an account of how the
philosopher cares for the soul, and a philosopher who makes it his task to care for the
soul could possess metaphysical insight. Nonetheless, these two interpretations express
requirements about virtue that are difficult to combine. On the metaphysical view,
anything short of metaphysical insight into the good seems to imply that whatever virtue
one possesses is spurious, whereas on the methodological view, genuine epistemic and
dialogical virtues seem to be possible regardless of whether one possesses metaphysical
insight, and perhaps even before one could have the metaphysical insight that would
make one's virtue non-spurious.89
A final goal for this dissertation is therefore to propose a way in which the
Republic might reconcile these interpretations of the Plato's general conception of
philosophy. In Chapter 4, I argue that tripartite psychology and the moral project of
psychic integration offer the tools for reconciling these interpretations. More specifically,
I argue for two points that make this reconciliation possible. First, I argue that tripartite
psychology's analysis of the moral virtues in terms of relations between parts of the soul
also provides a model for understanding what is virtuous in the dialogical and epistemic
practices Plato encourages us to adopt, and in this way provides the materials to explain
how the moral virtues are necessary preliminaries to intellectual virtues. Second, I argue
that an interest in metaphysical insight must arise from within the project of psychic
integration, because the logistikon's power of hypothesizing threatens the success of this
89 Cf. Annas, who argues that moral virtues are necessary in order for a person to even be interested in the
form (Introduction, 237). Iakovos Vasiliou rightly disputes the strictness of the condition that the
metaphysical interpretation places on the possession of true virtue (From Phaedo to the Republic” in
Plato and the Divided Self, ed. Rachel Barney, Tad Brennan and Charles Brittain [New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2012], 20-22).
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project. I propose that this interest in metaphysical insight is spurred by an aspect of
dianoia, or mathematical thinking, already present in tripartite psychology.
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Chapter II: A Provocative-Aporetic Reading of Republic 1: Defining the Technē
Model of Justice
The purpose of this chapter is to carry out a provocative-aporetic reading of Book
I of the Republic. In what follows, I argue that an unacknowledged dispute between two
conceptual models of justice causes the aporia that Polemarchus and Thrasymachus
encounter in their separate conversations with Socrates. The model to which Polemarchus
and Thrasymachus subscribe I call the “technē model” of justice, while the model to
which Socrates subscribes I call the “virtue model” of justice. Both models say something
about (a) what justice is and (b) what kinds of beings agents are such that they have either
a use or a need for justice. By the end of the chapter, I will define the governing
assumptions of these two models, as well as of their corresponding notions of agency. On
my reading of Book I, Socrates refutes both Polemarchus' and Thrasymachus' variations
of the technē model of justice by showing that justice cannot be what they claim it is in
light of their commitments regarding (c) the ways that agents relate to knowledge and (d)
the kinds of knowledge that agents draw upon for action. Finally, I shall argue that while
Socrates' concluding proposal of a virtue model of justice results in aporia, this aporia is
provocative rather than negative: Socrates' proposal exhibits the third aspect of mimetic
irony by foreshadowing key moments in the overall argument of the Republic--such as
the city-soul analogy and tripartite psychology--which help establish the virtue model of
justice. For this reason we ought to carefully study the emergence of the technē model of
justice in order to understand what aspects of the technē model Socrates' later arguments
address.
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§1. Elenchos of Polemarchus: the Origins of the Technē Model of Justice
The technē or craft analogy likens virtue to the kind of knowledge and reasoning a
craftsman might use to create a product. A craft defines for a craftsman what the product
is, what materials should be used, and what guidelines the craftsman should follow to
reliably produce that product. Thus the craftsman primarily exercises instrumental
reasoning, since the means are the focus of his reasoning. Knowledge or expertise on this
model consists in the ability to reason well about the means and to reliably produce the
product of the respective technē. As an analogy for virtue, the craft metaphor suggests
that virtue consists in the application of certain guidelines to certain materials in order to
produce an action that is virtuous.90 A person earns the characteristic virtue (courage,
justice, etc.) as an epithet if he can follow these guidelines in the right way and produce
reliably virtuous actions.
The technē model of justice first appears when Polemarchus agrees that justice is
“giving any individual what is appropriate for him” (...τοῦτ' εἴη δίκαιον, τὸ προσῆκον
ἑκάστῳ ἀποδιδόναι, 332c1-2). It is Socrates' initiative which connects the idea of “the
appropriate” (τό προσῆκον) with methods in the arts (τέχναι), such as “medicine”
(ἰατρική, 332c5) and “cooking” (μαγειρική, 332d1). Two terms appear to determine the
90 There is a well-established line of interpretation concerning Plato's use of the craft analogy in the
Republic. Irwin argues that Plato introduces the craft analogy in Book I for the purpose of rejecting it
later. He interprets this rejection as an indication that the craft analogy was a Socratic thesis which Plato
found implausible by the time he wrote the Republic. On this line of interpretation, the problem of
akrasia offers the primary reason for rejecting the craft analogy. The craft analogy comes with certain
psychological assumptions, for example, that happiness is the determinate end which all men seek, and
about which there is no disagreement (Socratic eudaimonism); that virtue is the means to achieving
happiness; and that ignorance of these means is the of vice and unhappiness (Socratic intellectualism).
Akrasia is impossible on this account because knowledge is the primary psychological motivator, and is
therefore sufficient for achieving the aim of happiness. See Irwin, Plato's Moral Theory (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1977), 6-10; 166-172; Brickhouse & Smith, “Reply to Rowe” in The Journal
of Ethics, Vol.16, No.3 (September 2012): 327-328. For a detailed treatment of varieties of Socratic
intellectualism, see Rowe, “Socrates on Reason, Appetite, and Passion: A Response to Thomas C.
Brickhouse and Nicholas D. Smith, Socratic Moral Psychology, in The Journal of Ethics 16, No.3
(September 2012): 305-324.
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“appropriate” in the practice of a technē: the “what” (τί) that the art gives that is due or
appropriate, and the recipient (τίσιν) of the thing given.91 For example, in medicine the
recipient is the body, and the things given are “drugs and food and drink” (332c6-7). By
defining technai according to their distinctive “gifts” and “recipients,” Socrates is able to
ask what gifts and recipients make justice a technē. Polemarchus replies in a way that
retains the gift-recipient paradigm: justice gives benefits to friends and injuries to
enemies.92 In light of Polemarchus' parentage, this definition of justice is unsurprising.
Cephalus—his father—was an arms manufacturer who supplied the Athenians during the
Peloponnesian War.93 Polemarchus' definition of justice is thus shaped by his father's
ideals and his experience in business: justice is primarily about maintaining partnerships
and stifling competition for the sake of benefit for oneself and one's allies.
Socrates, however, renders the usefulness of justice uncertain by pointing out that
help for friends and harm for enemies is best secured by expert practitioners of other
technai. For example, a doctor is best for helping a friend who is sick; a ship's captain is
best at helping friends who are going on a voyage at sea; the person who knows
agriculture is best for helping friends make a livelihood in peacetime. What benefit could
justice possibly give, since it seems that other arts already procure most, if not all, of the
important benefits for life? Here Polemarchus replies that justice is useful in “contracts,”
specifically in the safe-keeping of money and possessions that are not currently in use. In
this way Polemarchus limits the technē of justice to helping friends and harming enemies
91 Socrates asks […] ἡ τίσιν οὖν τί ἀποδιδοῦσα ὀφειλόμενον καὶ προσῆκον τέχνη ἰατρική καλεῖται; “by
giving to whom and what thing owed and appropriate, is the art of medicine so-called?” I translate the
participle as causative because Socrates appears to be asking what means and what recipient define the
art of medicine.
92 […] ἡ τοῖς φίλοις τε καὶ ἐχθροῖς ὠφελίας τε καὶ βλάβας ἀποδιδοῦσα (332d4-5). The article ἡ refers back
to δικαιοσύνη (332d2).
93 Plato: The Republic, trans. Tom Griffith, ed. G.R.F Ferrari (New York: Cambridge University Press,
2009), 349-350.
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in a very narrow range of activities.94 In response to this limitation, Socrates makes an
observation about the morally-neutral status technical knowledge that prepares the
ground for the aporia that Polemarchus will encounter: the same technē that doctors use
to heal their friends may also be used to poison their enemies; similarly, the same art that
helps the military strategist guard a camp can help him discover weaknesses in the enemy
camp. Thus, if a practitioner of the technē of justice can benefit friends by keeping their
possessions and money safe, he can harm enemies by having the corresponding expertise
about how to steal things that are kept in safety. Thus, Socrates concludes by pointing out
that on this line of reasoning, justice must be “some art of stealing” (ἡ δικαιοσύνη […]
κλεπτική τις εἶναι, 334b3-4). For that is what it must be if it is to benefit friends and harm
enemies.
On the technē model of justice, agents are portrayed as knowers and users of
various skills, whose explicit products are various goods, such as health in the case of
medicine and security in the case of military strategy. These technai give agents
knowledge about the means to use and the guidelines to follow to produce a good for a
certain thing, e.g., health for a human body or security for a city, but the same knowledge
can be used to the opposite effect—to bring about what is bad for an object of the
technē—by deliberately failing either to use one of the necessary means or to apply the
proper guideline to the right circumstances. For example, a doctor might deliberately use
an emetic to harm a patient when he ought to use a laxative. But the knowledge of these
technai appears to be morally neutral, because according to Polemarchus expertise in the
technē requires knowledge of both how to cause both harm and help to the same object:
94 Καὶ περὶ τἄλλα δὴ πάντα ἡ δικαιοσύνη ἑκάστου ἐν μὲν χρήσει ἄχρηστος ἐν δὲ ἀχρηστίᾳ χρήσιμος
(333d6-7); “And in all other things justice is useless in the use of each, but useful in the non-use [of
each thing]?”
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the exemplar of rational insight is precisely the ability to see the double-edged nature of
technical knowledge, and a practitioner would be a deficient knower if he lacked
knowledge of how to cause harm with the technē.95 This understanding of technē is,
moreover, necessary to Polemarchus' definition of justice as giving what is due to friends
and enemies. For consider a person who lacked insight into the capacity for harm that
each technē affords, and used technai only for the good they produce, oblivious to the
harm they can cause. Polemarchus would have to admit that such a person would perhaps
not make the most useful friend—not because the person lacks moral qualities that are
important to friendship, but because he lacks a kind of insight that one would want one's
friend to possess, if the goodness of a friend consists also in the ability to harm mutual
enemies.
Since the knowledge of technē as Polemarchus construes it is morally neutral,
“friend” and “enemy” are the relations that must determine the use of the technē, for
otherwise the practitioner will not know whether to use the technē to help or harm in any
given situation. “Friend” and “enemy” thus function as coordinating terms that
determine when someone should use medicine to poison a rival, and when to use cooking
to please a business-partner. But technē plays no role in determining the meanings of
these terms.
From the above we have established that the practice of justice as a technē relies
on antecedent decisions about who one's friends and enemies are. Socrates proposes that
95 Julia Annas remarks on this feature of technē in Polemarchus' argument, but she fails to notice that
Polemarchus must construe technē as double-edged if it is to satisfy the demand that his definition of
justice places on individuals, i.e., to help friends and harm enemies (An Introduction to Plato's Republic
[New York: Clarendon Press, 1981], 28). Contrast this with Thrasymachus' conception of technē.
Thrasymachus agrees with Socrates that every technē seeks the good of the object under its care, but
subordinates technē to the self-interested ends of the user (342c-343c). Shepherds kill their sheep not
because the art of shepherding includes knowledge of how to harm the sheep, but because the art of
shepherding is ultimately subordinate to the self-interested ends of the user.
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these decisions in turn rely upon judgments about a person's basic moral character, as we
tend to “think dear” (φιλεῖν, 334c4) those we think are good (χρήστους, 334с4) and
“hate” (μισεῖν, 344с5) those we think are bad (πονηρούς, 334с5).96 This raises that
possibility that we might be mistaken in our judgments about who is good and who is
bad, and this possibility results in consequences that Polemarchus considers undesirable.
For example, we might wrongly take to be an enemy someone whom we think is bad, but
who really is good. One immediate consequence of this admission is that it would be just
for a person to “benefit the wicked, and harm the good.”97 Polemarchus refuses to accept
this consequence, so Socrates revises his argument to say that “it must be just to harm the
unjust, and benefit the just.”98 This revision leads to another consequence Polemarchus
will not accept, because one might be mistaken about the nature of one's friends; for
example, if it turned out that one's judgment about one's friend was incorrect, and one's
friend was actually unjust, then it would be just to harm that friend. This consequence
contradicts Polemarchus' initial assertion that it is just to harm one's enemies and help
one's friends.
What I would like to observe here is that the question as to who one's friends and
enemies are is crucial to understanding the cause of Polemarchus' aporia not only
because it reveals that Polemarchus holds unexamined assumptions about who friends
and enemies are, but because it reveals a deeper contradiction in the conception of agents
96 Εἰκὸς μέν ἔφη, οὕς ἄν τις ἡγῆται χρηστούς, φιλεῖν, οὕς δ' ἄν πονηρούς, μισεῖν (334с4-5).
97 Ἀλλ' ὅμως δίκαιον τὸτε τούτοις, τοὺς μὲν πονηρούς ὠφελεῖν, τοὺς δὲ ἀγαθοὺς βλάπτειν (334c7-d2).
98 Τοὺς ἀδίκους ἄρα, ἦν δ' ἐγώ, δίκαιον βλάπτειν, τοὺς δὲ δικαίους ὠφελεῖν (334d5-60). Annas also notes
that Polemarchus is upset by the implication that his definition of justice fails to guarantee that just
actions will always be good. Rather than reaching this point by way of the discussion about friends,
however, she reaches it by way of an analysis of technē as instrumental, “means-ends” reasoning that
does not distinguish between good and bad ends (Annas, Introduction, 28). She suggests that
Polemarchus is shocked by the realization that his definition implies that justice is also an “art of
stealing.” That assessment appears to be correct, but Annas overlooks the more devastating character of
the critique of Polemarchus' assumptions about friends and enemies.
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as users of morally-neutral technai. Polemarchus initially describes moral agency as an
interaction of a particular motivation and type of intelligence. Agents are motivated to
increase their own resources and maintain the social capital that gives them access to
these resources. Their intelligence consists in an insight into the double-edged nature
technē, and this insight is necessary for them to actually fulfill the imperative to help their
friends and harm their enemies. But when Socrates examines the qualities for which we
choose our friends—that we like people we think are good, and dislike people we think
are bad—he reveals the possibility that we may be ignorant of what “good” and “bad”
mean with reference to persons, and that we care about whether our friends are good or
bad. In this way Polemarchus admits that one could not be just in circumstances that, for
entirely contingent reasons, place one in partnership with bad people and enmity with
good people. This admission contradicts the prima facie morally-neutral status of the
technē of justice, because if justice as a technē were a morally-neutral form of
knowledge, then it would not matter whether one “used” this technē to help wicked
friends and harm virtuous enemies.
The contradictions to Polemarchus' initial definition that follow from the use of
this observation about the possibility of ignorance show that ignorance of “good” and
“bad” threatens the very possibility of reliably practicing the technē of justice. This
shows us that agents on the technē model must have both an interest in and access to a
type of knowledge that is not a technē, viz., knowledge of what makes a person good and
what makes a person bad. Without this knowledge, they risk committing injustice. Given
this breakdown in the analogy of justice with technē, I suggest it is no accident that at this
point in the conversation Socrates proposes that justice is a virtue: virtue seems to capture
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the orientation toward the good that was absent from Polemarchus' definition of
justice.99 With this proposal, Socrates opens a new set of possible argumentative moves,
which may demand actions that contradict Polemarchus' definition of justice according to
the technē model. For example, if the technē model is correct, then if I am an accountant
and in a position to help my friend become extraordinarily wealthy, then I ought to do so.
But concern about whether my friend is a good person might cause me to wonder
whether making him extraordinarily wealthy would actually be good for him. Out of
concern for the good of my friend, therefore, I might not use my skills in accounting to
make him extraordinarily wealthy. This example helps identify what is at stake in
Polemarchus' agreeing that justice is a virtue, a premise that Socrates uses to reach a final
refutation of Polemarchus' position.100 Polemarchus agrees that people who have an arete
cannot make others worse at the technē in which they have an excellence by means of the
very technē at which they are excellent; for example, a musician cannot “by means of
music” (τῇ μουσικῇ, 335c5-6) make a person “unmusical,” or worse at music. We should
notice something peculiar in Polemarchus' agreement to this claim: he has contradicted
his initial presentation of technē as a morally-neutral form of knowledge. Now his claim
is that a person who has an arete in a technē cannot use that technē to produce something
contrary to that good which the technē is supposed to produce. What has changed
99 Socrates asks Ἀλλ' ἡ δικαισύνη οὐκ ἀνθρωπεία ἀρετή (335с3); “Isn't justice a human virtue?” Annas
puzzles over Polemarchus' acceptance of the premise that justice is a virtue and that what is good can
cause no harm (Introduction, 32-34). But it is easily explained if we attend to the problem that the
question of friends and enemies raises for Polemarchus. C.D.C Reeve notices a common strategy in
Socrates' use of the craft analogy in his elenchoi. He argues that the elenchos has the following form:
“(I) Socrates and his interlocutor assume that the conventionally recognized virtue under discussion is
also a genuine virtue. (2) They conclude either that it is a craft or that it is good, admirable, and selfbeneficial. (3) Socrates argues that if the virtue is what the interlocutor says it is, either it lacks some
feature that the crafts possess, or it is not good, admirable, or self-beneficial. (4) The interlocutor is
refuted” (Philosopher Kings: The Argument of Plato's Republic [Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing,
1988], 4). The devastating effect of problem of ignorance of “good” and “bad” with reference to persons
suggests that something like this strategy may be operative in the elenchos of Polemarchus.
100 335c4
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Polemarchus' mind in this matter appears to be his acknowledgment that justice is a
virtue. Polemarchus may accept this claim because justice is conventionally named as a
virtue; however, I suggest that the preceding discussion concerning friends and enemies
has influenced his thinking. Virtue captures the concern that people have for the good as
something that orients their conduct, and it is this concern that peeks through
Polemarchus' unwillingness to accept the implication that a just person might, in doing
justice, harm a good person.101

§2. First Elenchos of Thrasymachus: Reasserting the Technē Model of Justice
Thrasymachus provides the first illustration in the Republic of someone who has
an affective response to aporia. Plato likens him to a “wild beast” springing at its prey,102
and he appears angry at the way Socrates has led Polemarchus around in circles in the
search for justice. Although the aporia is not Thrasymachus' own aporia, but
Polemarchus', Thrasymachus expresses a reaction that might be typical for an interlocutor
who experiences his own aporia: anger at the person who led him into this condition.
Although Thrasymachus initially plays coy, it soon becomes apparent that he wants to
propose his own definition of justice, one that will remove the aporia that resulted from
the conversation he just witnessed between Socrates and Polemarchus. In the following, I
will argue that Thrasymachus tries to remove this aporia by reasserting the technē
model's notion of agency, which Socrates had made dubious in his conversation with
101Annas faults Socrates for this final argument because it requires that (a) we construe justice as a power,
much like heat, that cannot produce its opposite, and (b) other crafts be “examples of skills which are
impartible and can be passed over from one person to another without regard for any motivation other
than the sharing of the requisite common aim” (Introduction, 33). I agree with her assessment of the
argument, but I suggest that we should draw the conclusion that the difficulties follow because the
technē model of justice is inadequate for the inquiry into justice, not because Socrates is deliberately
equivocating.
102[…] ὥσπερ θηρίον ἧκεν ἐφ' ἡμᾶς (336b5)
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Polemarchus. Thrasymachus reasserts the technē model of justice by raising a skeptical
objection against Socrates' claim that justice is a virtue. The argument on which
Thrasymachus' objection rests can be put quite simply: the just person harms himself and
helps others (primarily the rulers),103 while the unjust person helps himself and harms
others;104 if justice were a virtue or an excellence, it would not harm its possessor;
therefore, justice cannot be a virtue. Thus, in Thrasymachus' opinion, there is nothing
particularly impressive or excellent about just people; to the contrary, he argues that they
are simple-minded dupes who serve the interests of another person (the ruler)--and there
is nothing particularly kalon about that. As we shall see, the set of considerations that
leads Thrasymachus to argue that the unjust person helps himself concerns precisely (a)
the type of knowledge and insight the unjust person has and (b) the nature of rational
action as such.
To raise this skeptical objection, however, Thrasymachus must lay the political
and psychological foundations that make it plausible. The distinctness of these points is
unfortunately complicated by the fact that he appears to change his position as Socrates
questions him.105 First, he says that justice is the “interest of the stronger,” a definition

103[…] οἱ δ' ἀρχόμενοι ποιοῦσιν τὸ ἐκείνου ξυμφέρον κρείτοννος ὄντος, καὶ εὐδαίμονα ἐκείνον ποιοῦσιν
ὑπηρετοῦντες αὐτῷ, ἑαυτοὺς δὲ οὐδ' ὁπωστιοῦν (343c5-d2). “...the ruled do the advantage of that
person who is strong, and make him happy by serving him, but make themselves not at all [happy].”
104This becomes apparent when Thrasymachus claims that the tyrant brings himself the “greatest
happiness” through unjust actions, and the “greatest misery” to those who suffer his actions (344a).
105Another way of putting the question is whether Thrasymachus is a conventionalist or an immoralist.
The point of dispute between these two readings concerns the meaning of the terms “just” and “unjust,”
and whether actions which are called just or unjust are so really or apparently. Support for reading him
as a conventionalist is found in Thrasymachus' first definition of justice: justice is simply conformity to
the laws, and there is no non-conventional (e.g., natural, deontological) source of approbation of
characteristically just actions. Support for the immoralist reading is found in Thrasymachus' second
definition, where injustice is said to be more profitable than injustice. On this view, just and unjust
actions have some distinction and basis in nature, but unjust actions just turn out to be more
advantageous profitable for the agent who performs them. For a discussion of conventionalism and
immoralism, see Annas, Introduction, 36-37; For an argument that these options are not mutually
exclusive, see McCoy, Plato on the Rhetoric of Philosophers and Sophists (New York: Cambridge

57

that he proposes on the basis of observing the politics of city-states;106 later he claims that
injustice is “more profitable” than justice, and that the unjust person is happier than the
just person. Since the first definition concerns the relation of rulers to the ruled in
communities, while the second concerns the welfare of the individual person, it seems
that Thrasymachus is simply talking about two different things. Moreover, the first claim
appears to be descriptive, while the second appears to be normative, offering a
recommendation for how one ought to live if one wants to live well. Consequently, some
scholars have argued that Thrasymachus' view is actually incoherent, since he seems to
be talking about two different things.107 I shall argue that Thrasymachus in fact offers a
logically consistent view in which the political and psychological underpinnings of his
objection mutually reinforce each other. On my analysis the problem with Thrasymachus'
view is not logical inconsistency, but its reliance on a false description of agency—a
description that Socrates in the remainder of the Republic endeavors to overturn.
The political aspect of Thrasymachus' objection appears in his first definition of
justice, i.e., that “justice is nothing other than the interest of the stronger.”108 When
pressed to explain what he means, Thrasymachus offers what appears to be simply a
description of what is common to all types of political regimes: in aristocracies,
democracies, and oligarchies, the rulers fashion the laws for their own advantage and
interest, and “make it clear that what is an advantage for themselves, the rulers, is what is

University Press, 2008), 112-113.
106[…] φήμι γὰρ ἐγὼ εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἤ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον, (338c1-2).
107Annas holds this view, saying that “His [Thrasymachus'] real position is the immoralist one, but he
begins by stating it in a confused way which appears to lead to conventionalism, and Socrates' initial
arguments are directed at making him clarify what he really holds and reveal it as immoralism”
(Introduction, 37).
108[…] φήμι γὰρ ἐγὼ εἶναι τὸ δίκαιον οὐκ ἄλλο τι ἤ τὸ τοῦ κρείττονος ξυμφέρον (338c1-2).

58

just for the ruled.”109 Superficially, Thrasymachus appears to be offering a merely
descriptive thesis. Gerasimos Santas describes Thrasymachus' method as an “empirical
generalization” of the trends observed in the “aims of the laws and the motives and
practices of the legislators in each state.”110 Santas is correct in characterizing the way
that Thrasymachus reaches his definition as a type of “empirical generalization,” a
description of trends he has observed in other poleis. Where he errs, however, is in
attributing to Thrasymachus “the assumption that the positive laws of a state determine
completely what justice is in that state.”111 This assumption does not seem to me to
accurately characterize Thrasymachus' view of the laws in poleis. It is crucial to note here
that Thrasymachus also says that justice is “for the ruled”112 when he is asked to explain
himself, as this clarification indicates that, in his view, justice describes a power
differential that separates rulers from ruled. Positive (written, institutionalized) laws are
one manifestation of this power dynamic, but unwritten, conventional morality is just as
much a part of this power dynamic. Thrasymachus thus maintains a sharp distinction
between the rulers and the ruled as far as the behavior of each is concerned. Justice is “for
the ruled” in the sense that the subjects must comply with the laws on pain of being

109[…] θέμεναι δὲ ἀπέφηναν τοῦτο δίκαιον τοῖς ἀρχομένοις εἶναι, το σφίσι ξυμφέρον (338e3-4).
110Gerasimos Santas, Understanding Plato's Republic (Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishing, 2010), 17.
111Santas, Understanding Plato's Republic, 18.
112I disagree primarily with Gerasimos Santas in my interpretation here. Santas suggests that
Thrasymachus offers an “empirical generalization” of all the different types of constitutions, and draws
the conclusion that, simply as a matter of fact, the rulers of every sort of regime behave in this way
(Understanding Plato's Republic, 17). From this point in Thrasymachus' argument, Santas infers that
“this argument reveals a method for finding out what justice is: on the assumption that the positive laws
of a state determine completely what justice is in that state, the method consists in an empirical
investigation of the aims of the laws and the motives and practices of legislators in each state, and then
generalizing from the results to what is common to the justice of all states” (18). While it is certainly
true that Thrasymachus makes an empirical generalization, Santas imposes a notion of justice alien to
Thrasymachus' view when he says that Thrasymachus works from the “assumption that the positive
laws of a state determine completely what justice is in that state.” What Santas fails to notice here is that
justice is for the ruled and not, a feature of the laws themselves. He makes the mistake, however, of
thinking that Thrasymachus conceives of justice as a feature of the laws themselves.
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punished; justice is “the advantage of the stronger” in the sense that the rulers derive
benefits from the obedience of their subjects to laws, while rulers themselves—as
Thrasymachus will later celebrate--are free from any constraints the laws might put on
their behavior. Both aspects of the definition are necessary to describe a power dynamic
that Thrasymachus thinks obtains in any polis where there is a distinction between ruler
and ruled.
But is Thrasymachus' initial definition of justice solely a descriptive “empirical
generalization”? Although it does not appear immediately from the first set of exchanges
between Socrates and Thrasymachus, I suggest that the first definition in fact contains a
prescription: fashioning the laws so as to be advantageous to themselves is not only how
rulers tend act, but how they ought to act. Although this dimension will not come into full
view until we examine the exchanges in Socrates' elenchos, at the very least we can
observe how Thrasymachus later admits that what makes these rulers happy are the
liberties they have to commit crimes, amass wealth and luxuries, and get away with the
crimes by convincing their subjects that they have done something just. In other words,
injustice is not only politically expedient, but also brings personal happiness. Even if
Thrasymachus' empirical generalization is false—as Santas suggests it is113—and it turns
out that as a matter of fact rulers in most regimes tend to legislate for the good of the
governed, or at least not exclusively for their own advantage, Thrasymachus can still
reply that these people are not ruling as they ought to rule, because they fail to secure
their own happiness in some way. Thus, Thrasymachus' claim that only rulers who
practice injustice on a “mass scale” can properly be considered happy bestows the first

113Santas argues that the generalization might be false of participatory democracies, where in a sense
everyone is a ruler and everyone is ruled (Understanding Plato's Republic, 18).
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definition with normative force. Any ruler who really knows what he's about—
Thrasymachus can reply—will choose to rule in the way that he has described, by making
laws in his advantage and deceiving the populace into the belief that obeying these laws
is just.
Thrasymachus reasserts the technē model of justice when he responds to Socrates'
challenge that rulers sometimes make mistakes about what laws will be to their
advantage. If justice is for the subjects to comply with the laws regardless of the actual
consequence of those laws for the rulers, then justice will not also bring advantage of the
stronger in cases where the ruler is mistaken. Thrasymachus must respond to this
challenge by explaining what sort of knowledge rulers draw upon so as to avoid mistakes.
Thus we find ourselves reconsidering essential features of agency: what kinds of
knowledge agents draw upon, and how this knowledge determines what kinds of actions
they perform. Thrasymachus begins his response by clarifying what makes someone both
stronger and a ruler. Digging in his heels, he replies “do you think that I call 'stronger' the
person who makes a mistake, whenever he makes a mistake?”114 This reply identifies a
condition that bestows strength on an agent: agents are stronger only insofar as they
judge correctly the potential that a particular law has to be in their interest. Thus,
Thrasymachus appears to draw some connection between strength and knowledge. In
drawing this association between strength and knowledge, however, Thrasymachus
places a crucial demand on the conversation, one that remains operative throughout the
entirety of Socrates' elenchos. He and Socrates are to think technical knowledge “in
precise language” (κατὰ τὸν ἀκριβῆ λόγον, 340e2), by imagining agents as idealized
users who adhere both perfectly and exclusively to the constitutive norms of the technē
114[…] ἀλλὰ κρείττω με οἴει καλεῖν τὸν ἐξαμαρτάνοντα, ὅταν ἐξαμαρτάνῃ, (340c6-7).
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they practice. To explain his meaning, Thrasymachus resorts to examples of practitioners
of different arts, such as a doctor or an accountant. We do not attribute such titles to
people in virtue of the mistakes they make. “The person who makes a mistake makes a
mistake,” he explains, “when his knowledge fails him, at which point he is not a
practitioner of his skill.”115 If the same relation between expertise and title holds in the
case of the strong, then the implication with respect to rulers must be that only those who
are stronger in virtue of a technē that gives them political insight are properly qualified as
rulers. For ease of reference, let us refer to this technē as the politikē technē, or the
“political art.”116
Positing knowledge of the political art as the condition that makes a person
stronger puts Thrasymachus' conception of who rulers are in a new light, as it appears to
rely on an implicit distinction between rightful rulers and de-facto rulers.117 For example,
a ruler or ruling party in a state might have the political and military power to rule
securely, yet lack the knowledge that Thrasymachus says is necessary to make them
strong in the sense he means. Conversely, an individual might possess the knowledge or
wisdom of the politikē technē that makes him strong in Thrasymachus' sense, yet lack the
political or military power that would secure his rule. Thus, what makes a person strong
is not merely power, whether it be military, political, or some other type; rather,
Thrasymachus appears to be suggesting that knowledge of some kind of politikē technē is

115[…] ἐπιλιποῦσης γαρ ἐπιστήμης ὁ ἁμαρτάνων ἁμαρτάνει, ἐν ᾧ οὐκ ἔστι δημιουργός, (340e4-5).
116Reeve also construes the rule-qualifying knowledge as knowledge of a craft, but he does not name this
craft the πολιτκή τέχνη (Philosopher Kings, 12).
117See also Santas, Understanding Plato's Republic, 20. Santas notices the same distinction and correctly
points out the ambiguity about who the stronger are in Thrasymachus' theory. Are the stronger merely
the de facto political authorities at any given moment? Or are the stronger, as Thrasymachus suggests
here, those intelligent enough to judge which laws will be in their advantage, regardless of whether
these individuals hold authority? Cf. Weiss, who argues that by “stronger” Thrasymachus just means
whoever happens to have political power (“Wise Guys and Smart Alecks in Republic 1 and 2, 94).
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what makes an individual “truly” strong, and thus qualified to rule. Unless Thrasymachus
is simply misspeaking, we must acknowledge this implication of his use of the technē
model to describe political wisdom.
The claim that knowledge of the politikē technē qualifies a person for rule by
providing him with strength offers yet another indication that agency is a central, if
unacknowledged, point of dispute in Book I. Thrasymachus appears to deny (or at least
demote to a secondary status) that conventional indicators of political strength—such as
military power, wealth, reputation, and birth—bestow rule-qualifying strength. The
reason for this denial may simply be that these indicators are often distributed arbitrarily,
to individuals who lack political wisdom, while knowledge is essential to agency as such.
People can receive indicators of power by chance, whereas their possession of knowledge
seems to be something achieved through their own effort. The suggestion that we think of
rulers as “stronger” on analogy with knowledgeable practitioners (δημιουργός, 340e5) of
different technai (ἰατρὸν 340d3; λογιστικόν, 340d4) also provides a model for thinking
about what role justice has in the application of rule-qualifying knowledge, i.e., the
politikē technē. Specifically, I suggest it implies a commitment to what I call the
“artificiality thesis,” or the view that nomoi are not worthy of moral respect because they
are artifacts. Rulers, like doctors and accountants, have knowledge of certain principles
by which they correctly determine the laws that will be to their advantage. Successfully
implementing the advantageous law requires the use of justice, since the subjects must be
persuaded to obey such a law and not rebel. Thus, on the technē model, rulers use justice
in the same way that a doctor might apply a balm to lessen the pain of some other
treatment. That is to say, on the technē model, justice is a kind of product and instrument
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that rulers knowledgeable about politikē technē both create and use. “Rightful” rulers are
those who possess the knowledge of how to use justice to dupe their subjects into
believing that it is just for them to obey the law and that the laws are fair; though they,
from their “enlightened” perspective, know justice is more like a poison for keeping the
ruled in ignorance about the truth of justice. If “justice” refers to the conviction that
subjects have in their obligation to obey the rulers, then Thrasymachus' position is that
this belief is an artifact, a tool that rulers use to manipulate subjects.118 Only the
“simpletons” believe that the laws express real obligations.119 Finally, we can note a
return to the portrait of agency that we received from Polemarchus: agents are users of a
kind of knowledge (technē). But unlike Polemarchus, Thrasymachus does not posit
“friend” and “enemy” as relational terms that would determine the specific use of the
technē. Instead, a fundamentally exploitative relation between ruler and ruled determines
those for whom the technē is a help and those for whom it is a harm.
Another implicit distinction that arises from making knowledge of the politikē
technē a qualification for rule is that between the ignorant and the wise, the gullible
“simpletons” and the enlightened. As a matter of necessity, some—indeed most—people
must take the laws seriously; if everyone treated justice as an artifact and instrument, then
there would be neither subjects to speak of, nor any place for rulers of the sort

118Thrasymachus is a conventionalist, but in a limited sense. He is a conventionalist—i.e., believes that
just behavior is that defined by the laws—about one aspect of justice, i.e., that justice is obeying the
laws. If one of the laws is “subjects must obey the laws!” then Thrasymachus can be a conventionalist
about that law, since he can maintain that it is one that rulers invent, and that obeying it grants subjects
the title “just.” But, as we shall see, this does not require him to be a conventionalist about pleonektic
actions; some actions really are pleonektic, not by convention, but by nature. The question that decides
whether Thrasymachus is an immoralist is whether pleonektic actions are really unjust (immoralism), or
only apparently unjust (conventionalism). But here Thrasymachus isn't talking about pleonektic action;
he has in mind only the belief that subjects have in their obligation to obey the laws. That obligation, he
suggests here, has no basis in nature.
119This view of the artificiality of justice forms the basis of what I will later call the “artificiality thesis.”
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Thrasymachus has in mind.120 That Thrasymachus holds this distinction finds
confirmation at two moments. The first is when he admits that the person who practices
injustice is happiest.121 That is to say, Thrasymachus actually esteems the life of injustice
when he insists that selfishness and injustice “on a mass scale” earn tyrants the titles
“happy” and “blessed.”122 In order for the tyrant to be able to act as he does, some people
must either believe that justice is obeying the laws, or at least be too afraid to disobey.
The second moment occurs when Thrasymachus flouts the traditional associations of
wisdom and goodness with justice, claiming instead that injustice is “good judgment”
(εὐβουλίαν, 348d1), while justice is “noble simple-mindedness” (γενναίαν εὐήθειαν,
348d2). To be a ruler after Thrasymachus' manner, one must be among the “enlightened”
who know that in fact they practice injustice, and in fact “injustice is profitable and
advantage for oneself,” though as a matter of necessity one must conceal one's injustice
with the justice in which only “simpletons” believe.123
Although Thrasymachus' initial intention was to offer a simple and universal
definition of justice in political regimes, Socrates' elenchos uncovered a number of
crucial, though unstated, commitments that Thrasymachus has concerning governance
and political wisdom. Socrates began by offering a counterexample to Thrasymachus'
first definition in the form of cases where rulers are mistaken about their advantage, and
their subjects obey. In that case, justice would not be the advantage of the stronger.

120Reeve captures this point well by describing Thrasymachus' position as “an insightful theory of the
polis as a kind of exploitation machine in which both social behaviour and the standards by which it is
evaluated are arranged by those who have the power to rule so as to benefit themselves” (Philosopher
Kings, 15).
121[…] ἥ τὸν μὲν ἀδικήσαντα εὐδαιμονέστατον ποιεῖ (344a5).
122[…] εὐδαίμονες καὶ μακάριοι κέκληνται (344b7-c1).
123[…] τὸ δ' ἄδικον ἑαυτῷ λυσιτελοῦν τε καὶ ξυμφέρον (344c7-8). For a similar remark about the
enlightened status of the unjust, see also Weiss, “Wise Guys and Smart Alecks in Republic 1 and 2,” 94;
97.
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Thrasymachus musters a clever reply to the objection by identifying strength with an
essential feature of agency—knowledge—rather than with indicators of strength that are
arbitrarily distributed. But the claim that knowledge bestows rule-qualifying strength
requires that he posit several distinctions between types of political actors (qualified vs.
unqualified rulers, enlightened vs. unenlightened agents). Thus, the elenchos reveals how
Thrasymachus constructs his politics around his beliefs about the type of person who is
qualified to rule.124 Such a person must have an interest in the true and the false, the
correct and incorrect, insofar as he has an interest in correctly judging what laws will be
to his advantage. As we saw, Thrasymachus likened this correct judgment to a kind of
technical knowledge or wisdom, and identified justice as one of the tools in this political
“technician's” repertoire. So, while Socrates does not fully refute Thrasymachus here, he
succeeds in drawing out Thrasymachus' views on the crucial point of dispute for the
virtue and technē models of justice, i.e., what kinds of knowledge agents draw upon, and
how agents paradigmatically demonstrate that they are knowers.

§3. Second Elenchos of Thrasymachus: Instrumental Normativity and Enlightened
Self-Interest
Before proceeding with Socrates' more sophisticated elenchoi, we should consider
what options are available for a critique of Thrasymachus' position. First, one could
question whether knowledge of the political art entails strength in the sense that
Thrasymachus means, i.e., as the right to assert an exploitative relation to ruled. Second,
one could question whether the agent actually receives the sort of advantage or benefit

124Reeve reaches a similar conclusion, though he emphasizes the pleonektic desire of the ruler
Thrasymachus idealizes as that around which Thrasymachus constructs his politics (Philosopher Kings,
15).
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that Thrasymachus claims the agent will receive when he treats justice as an instrument.
Socrates pursues both strategies in his elenchoi. In likening rulers to practitioners of a
technē (e.g., the πολιτκή τέχνη) who use justice in the same manner that doctors use
medicine, Thrasymachus opens his position up to the first possible critique. Socrates
begins by pointing out that every technē, strictly speaking, seeks the good of the object
under its care.125 Doctors, for example, consider only what is good for the patient; they
make the patient's body stronger, not themselves. Similarly, horse-trainers make horses
strong and healthy, not themselves. If the generalization holds, then the implication will
be that the politikē technē strictly speaking, prioritizes the good of the ruled, not the
ruler.126 Thus, rulers who know the politikē technē would be wiser, but not “stronger” in
the sense Thrasymachus means; nor would justice be the “advantage of the stronger,”
since rulers would not be “stronger,” and the ruled would be the beneficiaries.
If this line of reasoning is correct, then technai do not give strength to their
practitioners, but rather to the objects under their care. Of course, Thrasymachus might
define strength as the insight into the “double-edged” nature of technē, as in Socrates'
conversation with Polemarchus: technē gives ability to hurt and harm, and strength is
simply the possession of this double power. But Socrates' elenchos here can block this
response with the point he makes about the success conditions and constitutive norms of
technai in general.127 Technai have specific materials and products: a doctor works on

125[…] Οὐδὲ ἄλλη τέχνη οὐδεμία ἑαυτῇ οὐδὲ γὰρ προσδεῖται, ἀλλ' ἐκείνῳ οὗ τέχνη ἐστίν (342c2-3): “Nor
does any other art need in addition [the advantage] for itself, but rather for that thing of which it is a
technē.”
126A conclusion Socrates draws when he says that “no one in any position of rule, to the extent that he is
ruling, seeks out or imposes the advantage for himself, but rather the advantage for the person ruled and
for whatever thing he crafts.” […] οὐδὲ ἄλλος οὐδεὶς ἐν οὐδεμίᾷ ἀρχῇ, καθ' ὅσον ἄρχων ἐστίν, τὸ αὑτῷ
ξυμφέρον σκοπεῖ οὐδ' ἐπιτάττει, ἀλλὰ τὸ τῷ ἀρχομένῳ καὶ ᾧ ἄν αὐτὸς δημιουργῇ (342e5-7).
127A point Socrates makes when he defines the technē of the doctor in the “exact sense.” Socrates points
out that “it has been agreed that the exact [ἀκριβὴς] doctor is an authority over bodies, but not a
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bodies and tries to produce health in them; the cook works on food and tries to make it
pleasant to taste, etc. The practitioner of the technē then uses the principles of the technē
to bring about what is good for the product, not for himself. For example, when a watch
breaks, a person will bring it to the watch-maker to restore, or make the watch whole
again. The person who knows a technē but who uses it to harm or destroy the object of
proper care isn't really using the technē when he destroys or harms the object. The fact
that it often requires very little skill to harm or destroy anything provides some evidence
that this is true. And if no technical skill is required to harm and destroy objects that fall
under the care of distinct technai, then technai do not bestow strength in the “double”
sense, since the technē simply does not bestow the power to harm and destroy.
Thrasymachus replies by pointing out that no one adheres strictly to the
constitutive norms of the technai he or she practices: the doctor must make a living, and
shepherds slaughter their sheep.128 The essence of this reply is that the interests of human
life take precedence over the constitutive norm of any particular technē. Ultimately,
technai serve the purposes and the interests of the user—for what other reason would
humans invent technai than their own benefit? This sort of reply should be familiar by
now; the resemblance it bears to Polemarchus' answers is unmistakable. Like
Polemarchus, Thrasymachus is simply stressing the priority of the ends of the user of any
technē. The various technai themselves may have certain constitutive norms, but the
businessman.” ὡμολόγηται γὰρ ὁ ἀκριβὴς ἰατρὸς σωμάτων εἶναι ἄρχων ἀλλ' οὐ χρηματιστής, 342d5-6).
By differentiating the doctor from other craftsmen, Socrates seems to be making the point that technai
have constitutive norms of their own. Failing to act in accordance with those norms entails that one is
simply not practicing the technē one took one's to be practicing. Defining the constitutive norms of
technē in general is quite difficult. One of the main distinctions that a definition must address is that
between doing an activity poorly and simply failing to do the activity; for example, the difference
between playing chess badly and failing to play chess at all. It is not necessary for my purposes to
resolve this difference, however, because what is more important is seeking “the advantage for oneself”
is definitely not a constitutive norm of the technai Socrates mentions.
128343b1-2.
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interests of the user eventually defeat these norms. Although he does not exploit this line
of reasoning, Thrasymachus could make an even more radical claim: on the technē
model, no one can practice perfect justice because the interests of life eventually require
the betrayal of the constitutive norms of other distinct technai. Enlightened rulers simply
draw this insight to its logical extreme. They realize that selfish interests—and hence
injustice—must take precedence over the constitutive norms of any particular technē, so
that these norms do not inspire any unconditional respect by themselves. Enlightenment
thus consists in being honest with oneself about the ultimate priority of self-interest, in
addition to having knowledge about the true benefit of injustice.
Happiness enters Thrasymachus' argument about the superiority of injustice by
way of this claim about enlightened self-interest. Thrasymachus presents several lines of
evidence to suggest that those who practice injustice—enlightened rulers in particular—
are alone truly happy. First, he argues that the “just man has less than the unjust in every
situation.”129 In contracts, for example, he says that the unjust person always comes out
with more than the just person. Although Thrasymachus is unclear about why he thinks
this is the case, Socrates' earlier allusion to the Odyssey might be of some help, where
Odysseus' grandfather Autolykos is said to have “exceeded men in stealing and oaths” (ὅς
ἀνθρώπους ἐκέκεστο κλεπτοσύνῃ θ' ὅρκῳ τε, Od., 19.395-396).130 To interpret this line in
a way that conforms with Socrates' conclusion that justice was an “art of stealing,” we
might imagine that Autolykos exceeded other men “in oaths” by negotiating agreements
in such a way that he always managed to get a “greater share” for himself than might be
considered fair, or in such a way that he could avoid fulfilling his promises. So too with
129[…] δίκαιος ἀνὴρ ἀδίκου πανταχοῦ ἔλαττον ἔχει (343d3). A loose translation of πανταχοῦ, but
appropriate to the context.
130In his conversation with Polelmarchus (334b1-3). Socrates alludes to Odyssey 19.395-396.
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the just man when it comes to contracts.
Second, Thrasymachus argues that the unjust person benefits more than the just
person when holding political office because the just person's “personal property falls
into a sorry state because of his neglect, and on account of his being a just man he
receives no benefit from public funds.”131 In other words, it is the just person's
unwillingness to embezzle money and accept bribes which allegedly puts him in a worse
financial position, and thus makes him less happy. Finally, Thrasymachus says that the
unjust person has “the opposite” (τἀναντία, 343e7) of all the disadvantages that the just
person has. He then describes the unjust person as “the one able to pleonekteīn on a mass
scale,” and attributes this behavior to the tyrant.132 Because this person is willing to
commit injustice, he embezzles funds, accepts bribes, and steals from others in order to
benefit himself. If he does not, then he will suffer the disadvantages that the just person
suffers. Thus, the “enlightened” perspective of the unjust person is an essential feature of
Thrasymachus' view. Doing work in political office, such as taking care of budgets and so
forth, might benefit other people, but only a fool would practice justice while doing
unpaid work, and positively harm himself; hence Thrasymachus' view that the just person
is clueless about what his real interests are.
Socrates responds to this assertion of the priority of self-interest by trying to
account for self-beneficial activity in terms of the technē model, so as to avoid the
problem that agents will always be unjust for seeking their own advantage contrary to the

131[…] τά γε οἰκεῖα δι' ἀμέλειαν μοχθηροτέρως ἔχειν, ἐκ δὲ τοῦ δημοσίου μηδὲν ὠφελεῖσθαι διὰ τὸ
δίκαιον εἶναι […]
132Thrasymachus says that the unjust person has “the opposite” (τἀναντία, 343e7) of all the disadvantages
that the just person has. He clarifies by saying that he means “just the person I was now talking about,
the one able to pleonekteīn on a mass scale” (λέγω γὰρ ὅνπερ νῦν δὴ ἔλεγον, τὸν μεγάλα δυνάμενον
πλεονεκτεῖν, 344a1).
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technai they practice. He proposes that self-beneficial and self-interested actions are
accounted for by the practice of a distinct technē—the “art of earning a wage” (τὴν
μισθωτικήν, 346b6). In this way Socrates can acknowledge that people make their
livelihoods by practicing various technai, but still maintain that the technai they practice
benefit solely the objects under their care. Socrates then uses on this distinction to argue
that the politikē technē does not of itself benefit its practitioner. Proof of this, he says, lies
in the fact that rulers demand payment for their services, and there is a penalty on others
who refuse to partake in ruling.133 Moreover, the reluctance many people have to holding
political office attests to fact that ruling—in the “precise” sense—consists in doing what
is good for someone else. Governing is difficult; far easier is letting others govern while
enjoying the benefits of social order for oneself.
There is something quite awkward in Socrates' reply, though Thrasymachus
apparently lacks the argumentative finesse to point out the problem. To begin, the
misthōtikē technē functions as a counterexample to Socrates' own principle that no technē
benefits its practitioner.134 Moreover, the proposal does not escape the question of the
prioritization of the ends that individuals will pursue as practitioners of multiple technai.
Thus Thrasymachus could reply, “yes, Socrates, you have discovered exactly what I
mean. In any pursuit, the misthōtikē technē trumps the constitutive norms of other
technai. Rulers do things for the benefit of the ruled to the extent that is practically
necessary. They sponsor festivals and give other sorts of pleasures to the citizens in order
to maintain the illusion that they govern with a view to the good of the governed; but in
reality they maintain their own interests. Eventually the interests of the user supersede the

133 347a.
134 I Rely on Reeve's insight for this point (Philosopher Kings, 19).
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constitutive norms of any technē he may use. And what this means is that only selfinterest, only one's own desires and aims, deserve unconditional respect.” As a matter of
practical necessity, people eventually betray the constitutive norms of the activities in
which they engage for the sake of benefiting themselves; that is, all normativity is
ultimately instrumental to selfish ends. This is what the enlightened ruler realizes about
justice: it has no unconditional claim upon him, but rather is another instrument for
manipulating other people. Thus, Socrates' use of the μισθωτική τέχνη does not address
the problem that, in Thrasymachus' view, this activity always eventually takes priority
over other activities, whether people admit it or not.
Even if Thrasymachus has a decent reply at his disposal, Socrates' point
nonetheless reveals an important limitation on the notion of agency that Thrasymachus
assumes. This limitation is revealed in the awkwardness of the proposal of the misthōtikē
technē.135 In likening self-care and self-benefiting activity to a technē, we are encouraged
to view self-benefiting goods as sort of consumable product, and ourselves as consumers.
Every other technē produces some effect in some object by means of certain instruments;
thus, if self-beneficial activity is a technē, then it must construe agents as beings that
utilize certain means to produce some state in themselves. Seasoned readers of the
Republic should recognize the assumptions that accompany the technē model of agency
as the very terms of dispute of the dialogue: what state is good to produce (e.g., pleasure
or psychic equilibrium?), and what goods produce it (e.g., money, honor, or wisdom?) Is
135Reeve is correct to identify the “art of wage-earning” as a counterexample to Socrates' first principle
about technē, but he errs in thinking that Socrates' position is untenable because he neglects the
governing role that technē model plays in Book I. The awkwardness of Socrates' proposal lies in the fact
that the technē analogy is not the correct model for thinking about self-beneficial activity, the goods of
human life and how one acquires them—in short, agency itself. In other words, Socrates' initial
principle about technē is true, and there can be no technē that benefits its practitioners. But if we are
interested in learning what kind of knowledge, goods, and activities are needed to benefit ourselves,
then the technē model cannot properly account for our agency.
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the part of the self that “uses” the means the same as that which benefits? What is being
benefited when I say that I am being benefited? One goal of Plato's argument—which I
intend to spell out--in the Republic is to disabuse us of the view that self-beneficial
activity is primarily consumption by proposing an alternative conception of selfbeneficial activity as psychic equilibrium.136 Although the reasons for favoring this
alternative are not yet apparent, we can see how the questions that the Republic sets out
to answer arise from shortcomings with the technē model of justice as early as Book I.

§4. Third Elenchos of Thrasymachus: Pleonexia as the Psychological Foundation of
Happiness
In response to Socrates' second elenchos, Thrasymachus tried to maintain his
position by arguing that an agent enlightened about the true source of normativity would
practice injustice: self-interest eventually supersedes all other activities that may require
one to temporarily suspend self-benefiting actions for the sake of actions that promote
some other good (as in the practice of a technē). He developed this claim from the kernel
of the idea that justice is the product of a technē—the art of ruling, or the politikē
technē—and thus has the status of an artifact for human use. Since the aims and interests
of the user eventually supersede the constitutive norms of the tool, the only ends that can
have unconditional value are the user's own aims and interests, whatever they may be. In
Thrasymachus' view, these realizations amount to a kind of wisdom, and thus explain his
insistence throughout Book I that injustice is knowledge and wisdom. In the third
136Reeve has argued that Socrates actually makes a mistake in suggesting the “wage-making art,” since
this art serves as a counterexample to Socrates' own principle that no art benefits its practitioner
(Philosopher Kings, 19). While Reeve is correct to point out the awkwardness of Socrates suggestion,
he misses the insight that an investigation into the cause of this “awkwardness” can reveal. The
awkwardness of the suggestion results from the limitation of the technē model for accounting for selfbeneficial activity, and for all the terms that are assumed in that activity, such as “self” and “benefit.”
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elenchos, however, Socrates shows how this claim conflicts with the demand from the
first elenchos that they consider agents as idealized users of technai. Taking this demand
as premise, Socrates will argue that unjust actions cannot result from knowledge of
technē. In this way he will try to show that Thrasymachus' claim that injustice is wisdom
is false; to the contrary, it is actually a mode of desire, i.e., pleonexia. As I interpret the
third elenchos, I shall argue that the chief point of dispute is whether or not pleonexia is
psychologically basic, that is, whether it is both the motivation that explains all other
human actions and the mode of desire that brings happiness.
Unfortunately, clarifying what Socrates and Thrasymachus mean by pleonexia and
the related phrases “pleon echeīn” and “pleonekteīn” presents the greatest challenge for
interpreting the third elenchos.137 Thrasymachus first uses the verb pleonekteīn to
describe the action of the tyrant, the ruler who “is able to get more than his fair share in
great things” (τὸν μεγάλα δυνάμενον πλεονεκτεῖν, 344a1).138 In this passage, the verb
classifies the unjust action as derivative of a more basic violation of limits or deserved
apportion. Pleonexia makes a second appearance in the third elenchos when Socrates
asks whether a just man “would think it right to pleon echeīn an unjust man” (349b2).
Thrasymachus replies that even the just person would “think it just and right—but he
wouldn't be able to do it” (349b6-7), but that the unjust person would try to pleon echeīn
everyone and think it right to do so.139

137Annas argues that Socrates equivocates between “having more” and “doing better” as senses of πλέον
ἔχειν (Introduction, 51).
138Griffith translates the passage as “able to commit injustice on a mass scale.” The translation of
πλεονεκτεῖν as “injustice,” however, obscures the quantitative aspect of injustice. Injustice is having
more than one's fair share, e.g., by stealing from others or embezzling funds. Unjust actions are
derivative of this more primary sense of exceeding limits and deserved apportioning of goods.
139Ἆρα ἀξιοῖ τοῦ δικαίου πλεονεκτεῖν καὶ τῆς δικαίας πράξεως; Πῶς γὰρ οὔκ; ἔφη, ὅς γε πάντων πλέον
ἔχειν ἀξιοῖ (349c3-5). Thrasymachus replies by affirming Socrates' question as two whether the unjust
person would “think it right” (ἀξιοῖ) to outdo the “unjust person and unjust action.” It is this claim that
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This response echoes a complaint that Thrasymachus made about those who
censure injustice when he was praising the tyrant; namely, that people who censure
injustice do so not because they fear committing injustice, but because they fear suffering
it.140 In other words, Thrasymachus' view is that the just person betrays, on account of his
cowardice, a desire which he himself both has and considers authentic, i.e., the desire to
pleonekteīn. These two commitments yield the premise that:
The just man does not try to pleonekteīn what is like him, but only what is unlike
him, whereas the unjust man tries to pleonekteīn both what is like him and what
is unlike him.141
But in the elenchos that follows, the examples that Socrates uses of practitioners of
technai (musicians tuning lyres, doctors) suggest a different sense for the phrase pleon
echeīn. For example, Thrasymachus agrees that if two musicians were tuning lyres,
neither would pleonekteīn the other in the tightening and loosening of the strings.142 The

allows us to construe Thrasymachus as an immoralist as well. For Thrasymachus, pleonektic actions and
non-pleonektic actions—actions that result in a greater or a lesser share of the available social goods—
correspond to real states of affairs. Moreover, the (alleged) advantages and disadvantages that
correspond to having a greater or lesser share are real as well. Thrasymachus is an immoralist because
he thinks that pleonektic actions are more profitable for those who perform them, and this profitability
provides a non-conventional sanction for those actions. Thus, one ought to perform pleonektic actions.
Of course, this result in a tenuous position in relation to conventionalism, since conventions typically
label pleonektic actions “unjust,” and “prohibited.” Thus, Thrasymachus would have to maintain that
conventions incorrectly assign prohibitions and approval to pleonektic actions, even though they are the
actions one ought to perform. There is, however, a way to reconcile Thrasymachus' views of
conventionalism and immoralism by referring to the distinction between the enlightened rulers and the
simpleton subjects. For the immoralist the profit, most other people must be conventionalists. Thus,
Thrasymachus' view amounts to something like “conventionalism for the many” and “immoralism for
the few.”
140 οὐ γὰρ τὸ ποιεῖν τὰ ἄδικα ἀλλὰ τὸ πάσχειν φοβούμενοι ὀνειδίζουσιν οἰ ὀνειδίζοντες τὴν ἀδικίαν
(344c2-4). “Those who censure injustice censure it because they fear suffering injustice, not doing it.”
141Ὁ δίκαιος τοῦ μὲν ὁμοίου οὐ πλεονεκτεῖ, τοῦ δὲ ἀνομοίου, ὁ δὲ ἄδικος τοῦ τε ὁμοίου καὶ τοῦ ἀνομοίου
(349d-2). “The just man does not have an advantage over the person like him, but over the person
unlike him; but the unjust person has an advantage over the person both unlike him and the person like
him.”
142Δοκεῖ ἄν οὖν τίς σοι ὦ ἄριστε, μουσκός ἀνὴρ ἁρμοττόμενος λύραν ἐθέλειν μουσικοῦ ἀνδρὸς ἐν τῇ
ἐπιτάσει καὶ ἀνέσει τῶν χόρδῶν πλεονεκτεῖν ἤ ἀξιοῦν πλέον ἔχειν (349e5-7). “Does someone seem to
you, say a musical man tuning a lyre, willing to have an advantage over a musical man in the tightening
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sense of pleonekteīn here appears to be “to have an advantage over,” e.g., as a taller
person has an advantage over a shorter person in a race. So, Socrates' claim—to which
Thrasymachus agrees—is that expert practitioners of a technē will not have an advantage
over other expert practitioners in practicing the activities that define that technē. But an
expert practitioner of a technē will “have an advantage over” (pleonekteīn) a nonpractitioner in the activity of the technē, because the practitioner knows what he is doing.
Santas argues that Socrates is equivocating in this elenchos by using pleonekteīn
to include more senses than Thrasymachus intends.143 For example, Thrasymachus agrees
when Socrates says that the unjust person “will get the advantage over both the unjust
person and [unjust] action, and he will strive so that he himself may take the greatest
share of everything.”144 But this claim concerns primarily the distribution of goods—of
which unjust people try to get more than everyone else—while Socrates' claims about
musical and non-musical people appear to concern whether a person practices a technē
well or poorly. Thus, it might be true that a musical person has a pleonektēma (advantage)
over the non-musical person with respect to the ability to play an instrument, while
equally expert musicians lack such a pleonektēma over each other, but this sense of
pleonekteīn (advantage over someone) is not the same as that which Thrasymachus meant
when he said the unjust person will try to pleonekteīn the unjust person; for when he

and loosening of the chords?”
143This is an argument by analogy and so cannot prove conclusively Socrates’ conclusion. But even as an
argument by analogy, it seems weak: the main notion Socrates uses, to outdo or overreach (pleonekteīn),
can mean different things when applied to justice and the arts; Thrasymachus uses it to refer to getting
and having more (than one’s share, more than the just, and even other unjust men) of the good things of
life – this is its standard use; whereas Socrates stretches its application to the arts to refer to outdoing or
overreaching in the activities of healing or tuning a lyre. In the one case we have the notion of doing
things well and doing them ill (the arts), in the other case we have the notion of not getting more good
things (justice) and getting more than others (injustice).” (Santas, Understanding the Republic, 29).
144 […] οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀδίκου ἀνθρώπου τε καὶ πράξεως ὁ ἄδικος πλεονεκτήσει καὶ ἁμιλλήσεται ὡς ἁπάντων
πλεῖστον αὐτὸς λάβῃ (349c5-6).
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made that claim, he meant only that the unjust person would always take a larger share
than he deserves, while the just person would always come out with less than he
deserves.
The charge of equivocation does not seem correct to me, however, because
Thrasymachus agrees that the unjust person will try to pleon echeīn everyone, and this
statement may accommodate the senses that Santas says are excluded. For example, when
Socrates asks whether Thrasymachus agrees that some people are musical, and others not
musical, this is an indication that by “everyone” Thrasymachus may include any person
who has acquired some form of expertise, such as a musician or a doctor. Moreover, it
would be strange for Thrasymachus to suddenly back down and say that pleonexia does
not apply to musicians, as if musicians could not also be unjust. Although there is little by
way of an explanation of Thrasymachus' acceptance of the examples of musicians and
doctors not having an advantage over each other, I propose that it is possible to reconcile
the two senses of pleonekteīn in these passages. The two senses are in fact united in a
common activity, namely, any sort of competition. In a race, for example, runners
compete for a prize, and in order to win the prize they seek even the slightest of
advantages over each other. Suppose that a runner who acquires a decisive but illegal
advantage defeats all the other runners. Then that person can be said to pleonekteīn in
both senses: he has gotten an advantage over the other runners, and taken more than his
fair share by undeservedly winning the prize. Moreover, there is a clearly instrumental
relation between the two senses: having an advantage over others in a competition is
conducive to having the prize.
That Thrasymachus intends competition as the context that unites both senses of
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pleonekteīn is corroborated by his use of the verb hamillaomai when describing the
behavior of the unjust person, who “will get the advantage over both the unjust person
and [unjust] action, and [he] will vie/compete [ἁμιλλήσεται] so that he himself may take
the greatest share of everything.”145 This proposal also conforms to his view that
individuals compete for goods and political power in a zero-sum game. I propose that
there is no equivocation in Socrates' argument if we keep the following two points in
mind. First, Thrasymachus and Socrates are still abiding by the requirement that they
describe practitioners of technai in the “strict” sense, i.e., as idealized agents who adhere
strictly to the constitutive norms of their technē and no other norms.146 Second, we should
interpret pleon echeīn as suggested above, i.e., as a reference to the instrumental relation
between illicit advantage and undeserved gain. If these two principles are true, then,
Socrates' claims about the differences between practitioners and non-practitioners of arts
make sense.
For Socrates' argument here to work, four sets of relations must be explained: (1)
the practitioner's advantage over the non-practitioner; (2) the practitioner's non-advantage
over the equally expert practitioner; (3) the non-practitioner's advantage over the nonpractitioner, and (4) the non-practitioner's advantage over the practitioner. Socrates uses
the example of two musician tuning their lyres to demonstrate relations (1) and (2). The
point of the example seems to be this. If we consider two musicians of equal expertise,
both aim simply at a standard that is defined by the structure of the instrument. Acting as
musicians in the “strict” sense, neither musician tries to have an undeserved share in the

145οὐκοῦν καὶ ἀδίκου ἀνθρώπου τε καὶ πράξεως ὁ ἄδικος πλεονεκτήσει καὶ ἁμιλλήσεται ὡς ἁπάντων
πλεῖστον αὐτὸς λάβῃ, (349c5-6).
146Thrasymachus demanded this “precision” in order to finesse his way out of Socrates' first challenge,
and the demand appears to be in play throughout the whole of Book I.
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distribution of goods or an illicit advantage over the other. There is no “reward” for
achieving the correct tuning; either they correctly apply the rules of the technē and
achieve the proper tuning, or they fail. Moreover, obtaining an illicit advantage would
mean departing from musical knowledge in the “strict” sense. On the other hand, a
musician has a clear advantage over the non-musician because the non-musician is
ignorant of both the standard and the means for achieving the standard. To explain
relations (3) and (4) in terms of the same example, I suggest that we focus on the idea of
musicians in the “strict” sense. Consider how a non-musician might achieve the proper
tuning in comparison with a musician. First, the non-musician could achieve it by
accident; second, he might try to prevent the musician from achieving the proper standard
by secretly loosening the strings on the musician's lyre. The second method would
amount to an illicit advantage, and so would count an as an attempt to pleonekteīn.
Notice, moreover, what this suggests about the way that a non-practitioner could try to
pleonekteīn a practitioner of a technē. The non-practitioner might try to prevent the
practitioner from achieving the standard that technē provides the mean to achieve. But
this strategy is quite different from achieving the standard for oneself; hence it is
pleonektic. Finally, the non-practitioner could try to pleonekteīn the non-practitioner in
the same way, i.e., by preventing the other from achieving the standard.147

147As example of these four relations, consider wrestlers and non-wrestlers. There is a sense in which two
equally-matched opponents don't lack an advantage over each other by means of the technē they
practice. Often equally-matched (and thus equally-expert) opponents compete without either achieving
a decisive win. In such cases factors such as physical characteristics and luck create the conditions for
applying a winning technique or throw. But the trained wrestler clearly has an advantage over the
untrained wrestler. The non-wrestler, on the other hand, must πλεονεκτεῖν the person like and unlike
himself for the following reasons. The person like the non-wrestler is another untrained wrestler. In such
competitions the advantage amounts to preventing the opponent from winning in some way; for
example, by applying a hold that would be normally ineffective against a trained opponent, or by
attaining some illicit advantage. Preventing another person from winning by some means unrelated to
the skills that the technē imparts is quite different, however, from recognizing an opportunity to apply a
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But notice that the non-practitioner has to be “unjust” in a certain sense in order to
obtain an advantage over the practitioner and the non-practitioner. Such a person lacks
knowledge of the relevant technē (i.e., is “ignorant”), and so his actions do not correlate
with the characteristic actions of the practitioner in the “precise” sense. This is the sense
in which the ignorant person resembles the unjust person—a conclusion that Socrates
draws when he points out that both the ignorant person and the unjust person try to
pleonekteīn those like themselves and unlike themselves. For example, suppose an
accountant accepts bribes in exchange for falsifying the records of expenditures in a
political office. There is a sense in which his action stems from ignorance, because
writing numbers that do not accurately represent the expenses of a company does not
require that he utilize his knowledge of arithmetic, compound interest, and the like—
writing any random number would do! His action is unjust precisely by failing to
conform the constitutive norms of his technē and the organizational function he is
supposed to perform.148
Socrates uses this resemblance between the unjust person and the ignorant person
to develop a contradiction out of Thrasymachus' premises. At the beginning of the
elenchos, Thrasymachus agreed that the just person resembles the knowledgeable

technique in a complex of chance factors. Finally, the non-wrestler has to πλεονεκτεῖν the trained
wrestler by seeking an illicit advantage, and thereby achieve an undeserved prize, since otherwise he
stands no chance.
148Reeve argues that Socrates' argument in the third elenchos is fallacious because Socrates has failed to
show that injustice is not a craft (Philosopher Kings, 20). I dispute Reeve's claim that Socrates has
failed to show that injustice is not a craft. Reeve challenges Socrates' claim that the unjust man tries to
pleonekteīn the unjust man by suggesting that injustice is a craft that the unjust person practices, and,
just as two practitioners of the same technē do not pleonekteīn each other by going “beyond the
principle of their craft,” so too do unjust men abide by the same principles of their own craft, viz.,
injustice (20). Here Reeve is introducing more than is contained in Thrasymachus' position, however,
because Thrasymachus did not argue that injustice is a technē; rather, he argued that unjust people use
the politikē technē to fashion laws that are advantageous to them and condition the population to obey
these laws. Glaucon, on the other hand, construes injustice as a craft by describing success and failure
conditions for the practice of injustice.

80

practitioner in that he “has an advantage” (pleonekteīn) over the person unlike himself
(the unjust person) but not the person like himself (the just person); the unjust person,
however, resembles the ignorant non-practitioner of a technē in “having an advantage”
(pleonekteīn) over the person like himself (the unjust person) and the person unlike
himself (the just person). Since Thrasymachus also agrees that the knowledgeable person
(ὁ ἐπιστήμων) is wise and good (350b2-3),149 and that “each person [the just person and
the unjust person] has the qualities of the person he is like” (350c), Socrates is able to
infer that the just person is also “wise and good,” while the unjust person is “ignorant and
bad.” These conclusions complete the elenchos.150

149“Ὁ δὲ ἐπιστήμων σοφός; Φημί. Ὁ σοφός αγαθός; Φήμι” (350b2-3).
150Socrates' argument here contains significant problems. Most notably, his interpretation of the likeness
relation seems to be false. Acknowledging the flaw in the argument is crucial to understanding why
Glaucon and Adeimantus revive Thrasymachus' position. I have recapitulated the whole of the argument
below, and explain Socrates problematic interpretation of the likeness relation.
(P1) “The unjust man is wise and good, while the just man is neither of these things” (349d).
(P2) “The unjust man is like the wise and good man, while the just man is unlike the wise and
good man” (349d). Socrates later clarifies this to mean that “we agreed that each of them [the just
person and the unjust person] has the qualities of the person he was like.” Agreeing to this premise
proves to be the decisive misstep for Thrasymachus.
(P3): the knowledgeable person (ὁ ἐπιστήμων) is wise and good (350b2-3).
(P4): The “wise and good” person, or expert practitioner of a technē does not πλεονεκτεῖ the
person like himself, but only the person unlike himself; The ignorant person or non-practitioner of
a technē πλεονεκτεῖ the person like himself and the person unlike himself (from discussion of
examples).
(C1): The wise person and the just person resemble each other in the following respect: both are
people who do not pleonekteīn the person like themselves, but only the one unlike themselves. Call
this aspect of resemblance aspect a.
From a purely logical perspective the most controversial aspect of this argument is Socrates'
interpretation of P3. When Socrates first introduces the premise, Thrasymachus agrees because it seems
self-evident that if the unjust person is wise and good, then such a person is like the wise and good
person (likewise for the just person). Thrasymachus thus interprets the premise to mean that
(Pt3) If X has properties p and q, and Y has p and q, then X resembles Y in respect of p and q.
This interpretation of the premise cannot furnish Socrates' conclusion, because Socrates uses the fact
that the just person resembles the expert practitioner in aspect a to attribute additional qualities to the
just person, namely, that the just person is good and wise. This becomes apparent when Socrates
reminds Thrasymachus that they agreed that “each of them had the qualities of the person he was like”
(350c), as Socrates uses this reminder to conclude that because the just person resembles the expert
practitioner in aspect a, the just person also has the qualities, or is “good and wise.” But this does not
follow from Pt3 because all that follows from Pt3 is that the just person and the expert practitioner
resemble each other in aspect a, not that the just person is also wise and good. Thus, Socrates must
assume a different interpretation of P3 to complete his elenchos:
(Ps3): If some X resembles Y in respect a, and Y has qualities b and c, then X also has qualities
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If Socrates' examples are correct descriptions of how practitioners and nonpractitioners differ with respect to pleonektic actions, then it suggests that there is some
connection between non-pleonektic action and technical knowledge, on the one hand,
and, on the other hand, between pleonektic action and ignorance on the other. Socrates
tries to understand the difference between pleonektic action and non-pleonektic action by
adhering to Thrasymachus' requirement that we think of practitioners of arts, and
practitioners of justice (as a technē) in the “strict” sense, that is, by thinking of agents as
idealized users of technai. But on this model, pleonektic actions appear incoherent from
the perspective of a knower, and seem to be indescribable according to the terms of the
technē in question. For this reason, Socrates argues that the unjust person resembles the
ignorant non-practitioner of a technē: the unjust person acts as if he had no knowledge
whatsoever of the technē in question. If we proceed on the same assumption that agents
are idealized users of technai, and the proposal that justice is a technē is still operative,
then the pleonektic action of the unjust person appears to stem from ignorance, not
knowledge.
Reeve has suggested that Book I contains Plato's refutation of Socrates' (his
teacher's) views on virtue.151 If that is correct, then the third elenchos may represent an

b and c.
On this interpretation of P3, Socrates can claim that because the just person and the expert practitioner
resemble each other in aspect a, the just person has the other qualities that belong to the expert
practitioner, i.e., “good” and “wise.” So,
(C2): The just person is wise and good, while the unjust person is ignorant and bad (contradicts
P1).
But there is a clear counter-example to Socrates' interpretation of P3:
(P1) Muscly athletes are strong and swift.
(P2) This statue of an athlete is muscly
(C): Therefore, by Ps3, this statue is also strong and swift.
While it might make sense to call a statue of an athlete muscly--if “muscly” refers to an aesthetic
feature and not a quality of flesh--it would be wrong to call it strong and swift, because statues cannot
move.
151 Philosopher Kings, 23.
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old vestige of the idea that no one knowingly and willingly does evil. But even on this
proposal a difficulty remains, namely, that pleonektic actions appear simply incoherent
when we consider the differences between the knowledgeable practitioner and ignorant
non-practitioner of justice. In the attempt to reconcile this difficulty, however, we
discover a significant conflict in the concepts of agency that Thrasymachus and Socrates
appear to hold. For Thrasymachus, pleonektic desire needs no explanation; it is
psychologically basic it is the explanatory principle for complex behaviors, from the
tyrant's pursuit of luxury and ruthless political strategy, to the just person's cowardice. On
my reading of the elenchos, Socrates tries to exploit Thrasymachus' commitment to
thinking of agents as idealized users of technai to cast doubt on the assertion that
pleonektic desire is psychologically basic. The knowledgeable practitioner acquires
accidental advantages in relation to non-practitioners on account of the skills (technai) he
has, but the pleonektic actions of non-practitioners in relation to practitioners and other
non-practitioners are not acquired by knowledge. Thus the unjust person is “ignorant”
because his pleonektic actions are not caused by knowledge. Thus, on Socrates' analysis,
it is pleonektic desire which actually needs explaining, since that is what appears
mysterious from the perspective of knowledge; and if pleonektic desire needs explaining,
then Socrates has derived a contradiction with one of Thrasymachus' fundamental
commitments.
There are no indications of a reconciliation of these two incompatible perspectives
in Book I. Thus, the aporia of the third elenchos runs deeper than most scholars have
appreciated. Rather than merely sophistical refutation on Socrates' part, we discover a
fatal limitation of the technē model of agency. On the technē model, it becomes difficult
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to understand how desire and knowledge cohere in the same person. Thrasymachus and
Socrates present two extremes of the technē model in their attempt to account for the
factors that determine a person's actions. For Thrasymachus, wisdom amounts to insight
into (a) the psychological basicality of pleonexia and (b) the artificiality of norms. This
insight results in the deliberate practice of injustice. But if Socrates' third elenchos is
correct, then pleonektic violation of the constitutive norms of technai is not action from
knowledge. Rather, pleonektic action appears to stem from a mode of desire. For
Thrasymachus, the unjust person exhibits a desire to “have more,” and this desire appears
incompatible with the demand that we think of agents as users of knowledge in the “strict
sense,” for the unjust person is unjust precisely by exceeding the “strict sense” in which
agents use knowledge. Thus, it becomes unclear how agents whose primary motivation is
pleonexia can also be described as users of knowledge—and yet the founding insight of
the technē model of justice is that agents are primarily users of knowledge. On the other
hand, when Socrates carries the same demand to consider agents as idealized users of
technai to its logical extreme, he seems to neglect the legitimate role that desire plays in
self-beneficial action. The ends that agents desire are fragmented among the many
technai, while desires related to self-interest are accounted for by the awkward proposal
of a misthōtikē technē. Desire appears to be swallowed up in a description of the ends of
various technai, rather than allowed a role in the psychology of the agent. As a result,
desires lack unity in an overarching prioritization, since in the “strict” sense that
Thrasymachus demands, we can speak of the ends that agents have as musicians, as
shepherds, or as wage-earners, but not of the ways agents prioritize these ends. Thus,
from the perspective of agents as knowledge-users, desires appear as accidental features
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of the agent, as though they were inexplicable appendages to rational action.

§5. Provocative Aporia in Republic 1: Turning towards a Virtue Model of Justice and
Agency
The preceding analysis of the causes of aporia in Socrates' conversations with
Polemarchus and Thrasymachus had two purposes. The first was to uncover three crucial
assumptions about justice and agency on the technē model:
1. The artificiality thesis (first elenchos). Justice is an instrument of
individuals who are experts in the politikē technē. As in any other
relationship of the user to an instrument, the ends of the user direct the use
of the tool. Thus, if justice is an instrument for making political subjects
obey, those rules do not deserve unconditional respect from the rulers,
since showing such respect would be akin to letting the tool dictate the
ends of the user, as if hammers demanded that carpenters ought to build
houses.
2. Instrumental rationality as enlightened self-interest (second elenchos). On
Thrasymachus' account, the unjust are wise because they realize that
justice means serving the interests of another rather than themselves.
Practicing justice is therefore irrational because it is premised on a failure
to understand one's true interests. Conversely, rationality is the
exploitation of normativity for one's own benefit.152
3. Pleonexia as psychologically basic (third elenchos). Since all normativity
is artificial and instrumental to one's own benefit, the only source of value
152 See Santas, Understanding Plato's Republic, 94; Burnyeat, “The Truth of Tripartition” 13. Both
identify this premise as a key premise that Plato intends to prove false.
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is the satisfaction of one's own desire. Thus, pleonexia is psychologically
basic, and manifests itself in both desire and action. First, since justice
restrains desire by demanding a limit on one's share in goods, and the
rational person rejects justice, it is also rational to reject all limits on
desire; therefore, desire is pleonektic. Second, since the rejection of limits
on one's share of goods puts one in irreconcilable conflict with others who
desire those goods, one must “out-do,” or obtain an advantage over others
by any means possible; therefore action is pleonektic.
In the foregoing, I will argue that a significant portion of Plato's argument in the
Republic is devoted to demonstrating the falsity of these assumptions. Although Book I
does not yet offer arguments against these assumptions, it at least offers reasons to think
that the technē model has shortcomings, and that we ought to seek the nature of justice on
a different model. Thus, the first purpose of the preceding analysis was to show that an
unacknowledged dispute about the correct model of agency for discovering the nature of
justice was responsible for each moment of aporia. This dispute became apparent in
disparity between (a) the limitations that the technē model encounters when accounting
for the roles that such terms as “friendship,” “interest,” and “self-care,” and (b) Socrates'
attempts at overcoming these limitations by means of the technē model. For example,
Polemarchus discovered that on the technē model, a person might set out to practice
justice according to the technē he defined at the outset, and yet actually practice injustice
on account of being ignorant of who his true friends and enemies are. Socrates tried to
remedy this problem by proposing that justice is a virtue, but an (unfulfilled) result of this
proposal was that he and Polemarchus would have to revise their conception of agents as
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users of morally-neutral technē, because justice appears to require an interest in
knowledge of what makes those with whom one hopes to be friends good people.
In the elenchoi with Thrasymachus, Socrates continually pushes the limits of the
technē model in order to reveal incoherencies in its conception of agency. Most notably,
the requirement that we think of agents as users of technai in the “strict sense” results in
(1) the awkward bifurcation of purpose-driven behavior and self-care, and (2) a mystery
about how desire and reason can cohere in the same person. Socrates tries to remedy this
problem by introducing the misthōtikē technē as a gloss for the activity of self-care, but
the proposal construes the self-beneficial as a consumable product, while leaving
unspecified an account of the fit between the nature of the thing that benefits and the
nature of the self or soul that is benefited. Finally, while Socrates produces a verbal
contradiction in the third elenchos, he obscures the role of desire with his analogy
between the just person and the expert practitioner, and the unjust person and the nonpractitioner. From the perspective of expert knowledge in the “strict sense” that
Thrasymachus demanded, pleonektic actions appear to stem from ignorance because they
do not require any expertise to perform. In this sense, we might attribute the cause of
pleonektic actions to the mode of desire that Thrasymachus himself champions, i.e., the
desire always to have the greater share. But if that is true, then desires appear useless for
agents qua idealized users of technai. This is an odd result, however, because it implies
that desires would be useless for those expert practitioners of the misthōtikē technē, the
art which Socrates reserves for self-beneficial activity. In other words, Socrates'
adherence to the demand that they conceive of agents as idealized users of technē results
in the exclusion of desire from the soul, as though it were a useless appendage to reason.
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I suggest that Plato leaves these perplexities as invitations to readers to examine
the insufficiency of the technē model's conception of agency for an account of justice.
Simply put, all of the aporiai concern questions crucial to the notion of agency, such as
the role of knowledge in action and the proper methods of self-care—and as we ponder
these perplexities, we find the nature of justice eludes us all the more. The failure of the
technē model explains why Socrates proposes, just after the third elenchos, to ask “the
same thing as before,” namely, “what kind of thing justice really is in relation to
injustice”—as if the preceding conversations made little or no progress on that
question.153
Thus, with a capitulating Thrasymachus as interlocutor, Socrates steers the
conversation towards the notion that justice is a virtue (ἀρετή) of the soul—rather than a
technē. Contrasting his own position with that of Thrasymachus, he says that “for it was
said that injustice was both more powerful and stronger than justice; but just now I said
since (εἴπερ) justice is wisdom and virtue (ἀρετή), it will easily appear stronger than
injustice as well, because injustice is ignorance.”154 That Socrates presents justice as
virtue should not appear as a surprise, since the same assertion appeared as early as his
elenchos of Polemarchus. We should therefore appreciate the fresh start in the inquiry, as
is indicated by Socrates' abandonment of analogies with technical expertise.155 Socrates
focuses on three points from Thrasymachus' arguments about the superiority of injustice:

153[…] τοῦτο τοίνυν ἐρωτῶ, ὅπερ ἄρτι, ἵνα καῖ ἑξῆς διασκεψώμεθα τὸν λόγον, ὁποῖόν τι τυγχάνει ὄν
δικαιοσύνη πρὸς ἀδικίαν (349e8-350a1).
154Ἐλέχθη γάρ που, ὅτι καὶ δυνατώτερον καὶ ἰσχυρότερον εἴη ἀδικία δικαιοσύνης: νῦν δέ γ', ἔφην, εἴπερ
σοφία τε καὶ ἀρετή ἐστιν δικαιοσύνη ῥᾳδίως, οἶμαι, φανήσεται καὶ ἰσχυρότερον ἀδικίας, ἐπειδήπερ
ἐστὶν ἀμαθία ἡ ἀδικία (351a2-5).
155Socrates uses the example of the pruning knife (353a1), which would seem to indicate a return to the
technē model. But as Santas observes, the purpose of this example is to make an argument about
exclusive and optimal functions rather than about the expertise of the user of the tool (Understanding
Plato's Republic, 65)
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1. Justice is stronger (ἰσχυρότερον, 351a4) than injustice;
2. Justice, rather than injustice, makes its possessor happy;
3. Justice is a virtue or excellence of soul, not a vice.
(1) Justice stronger than injustice. The argument that justice is stronger than injustice is
the first indication that Socrates is offering an alternative conception of agency.
Foreshadowing the city-soul analogy, Socrates argues that justice is more powerful in
both groups and individuals. Justice produces “oneness of mind and friendship”
(ὁμόνοιαν καὶ φιλίαν, 351d3-4), and this cohesion permits coordinated action; injustice,
however, produces “faction and hatred” (μίση καὶ μάχας, 351d3), and these significantly
hamper—if they don't altogether preclude—coordinated action.156 Concerning group
action, this proposal is quite plausible, but it requires a re-conception of community. On
Socrates' analysis, individuals compose groups, and justice is the principle of unity: by
permitting coordinated action, justice lets the group be something more than an arbitrary
aggregate of individuals.
Socrates then suggests that this same type of analysis applies to the individual.
Though he does not explain himself here, he appears to rely on a generalization to draw
the conclusion: since injustice makes “a city, a clan (γένος) and army-camp
(στρατόπεδον)” incapable of action, it must do the same when “in one” (ἑνὶ, 352a4).
Thus, injustice will make a person “incapable of action” (ἀδύνατον αὐτὸν πράττειν,
352a5) and “not of one mind with himself” (οὐχ ὁμονοοῦντα αὐτὸν ἑαυτῷ, 352a6). What
should be clear by now is that if injustice has the same effect in the individual as it has in
groups, then the individual must also be a complex whole of parts. Although Socrates will
156Achilles' quarrel with Agamemnon provides an example of this truth that the ancient Greeks would
recognize. As a result of the quarrel, Achilles retires from battle, and as a result the Achaean camp is
nearly destroyed.
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not argue for the complexity of the soul until Book IV, we can at least note the contrast
with Thrasymachus' “idealize user” theory: for Socrates, agents are complex, and justice
coordinates the parts of the agent; for Thrasymachus, agents are simple “users,” and
justice is a tool for use.
(2 - 3) Justice makes its possessor happy; the function argument. To make the
argument that justice is an excellence of soul that makes its possessor happy, Socrates
relies on a method for discovering the function (ἔργον, 352e1) of any object whatsoever.
He begins by differentiating between exclusive functions and optimal functions,157 so that
we may discover the functions in different types of objects, i.e., natural and artificial
objects. We can say an object performs some function if one of the following conditions
holds: if the object is the only one that can do the work in question, or if it is the object
that does that work best.158 Socrates then provides examples from different part-whole
complexes to make his point. The eye's exclusive function is to see, because no other
organ is specialized so as to perform just that function. A horse's work is to carry riders
into battle. Even though this might not be a horse's exclusive function, it may be its
“optimal” function in the sense that the horse is best suited to the task. Finally, the
pruning knife is best for tending to vines, not because it cannot cut anything else, but
because it is optimally suited for that task.
Socrates' use of the pruning knife of as an example of a thing's function resembles
a return to the technē model, since a craftsman must make the knife for a gardener to

157 I rely on Santas for this distinction (Understanding Plato's Republic, 30).
158 Socrates asks, “Would you define this as the function of a horse and of anything else, as that which
someone does either through that thing alone, or best?” (...τοῦτο ἄν θείης καὶ ἵππου καὶ ἄλλου ὁτουοῦν
ἔργον, ὅ ἄν ἤ μόνῳ ἐκείνῳ ποιῇ τις ἤ ἄριστα; 352e1-2) Thrasymachus agrees to this definition of
function.
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use.159 But his use of the eye—a bodily organ—should dissuade us from this view. Santas
uses these examples to argue that Socrates is in fact offering a new method to investigate
the nature of justice:
(1) Find out what the functions of such objects are; (2) determine (by observation,
experiment, or even thought experiment) cases where objects of such a kind
perform their functions well and cases where they perform them poorly; and (3)
finally find out the qualities that enable them to perform such functions well
(and in the absence of which they perform poorly), and these are their virtues.160
A crucial difference between this method and technē model of justice lies in the
interpretation that each assigns to the realm of human artifacts. Polemarchus and
Thrasymachus both assume that the technē is unique as a form of knowledge for the
power and control that it offers users. In Polemarchus' case, the technē of justice,
“helping friends and harming enemies,” may be interpreted as a description of a method
for gaining political power within a traditional framework of communal life, which
assumes the oikos as the basic unit of power. Those families that help their friends and
harm their enemies thrive. Thrasymachus, on the other hand, emphasizes the ways that
technai grant users the power to exploit nature to further their own, distinctively
individual ends. Thus, the shepherd exploits the sheep to make a livelihood for himself.
Socrates' approach differs from these by re-casting “mastery” over nature as submission
to norms that structure the natural world. For example, many factors contribute to making

159 This points to a distinction Socrates draws in Book X between producers and users of artifacts. He uses
the example of the blacksmith who makes a bridle and the horseman who uses the bridle to argue that
production and use correspond to two gradations of knowledge (601c). The ultimate purpose of the
example is to provide a metaphor—using the craft analogy—for identifying gradations of knowledge on
a copy-original paradigm of the form-participant relation.
160Santas, Understanding Plato's Republic, 66.
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the pruning knife the optimal tool for cutting vines: the shape of the human hand, the
thickness and shape of the vines, and the metal of the blade. Likewise, in order for horses
to optimally perform their “work,” they must be healthy and strong. The conditions that
bring about their health and strength are not up to us, however; “control” only comes
about through the recognition of natural norms. Thus technē is a type of knowledge that
coordinates structures in nature; it is not an unlimited source of power.
Socrates' inclusion of the human soul among those things that have a function is
the more controversial aspect of function argument. Socrates says that the functions of
the soul are “to engage in care-taking, ruling, and deliberation” and, later, simply “to
live” (τὸ ζῆν, 353d6).161 But the difficulty seems to be this: the functions of pruning
knives, horses, and bodily organs are determined with respect to a limited and fairly
unambiguous context that is already defined for them. But what is this context with
respect to the soul of a human individual? One answer might be that the social world—
politics—provides the context that defines the soul's function, just as the needs of the
human organism define the context in which the eye can perform a function. But here a
challenger might reply that in aristocracies, oligarchies, and democracies, “care-taking,
ruling, and deliberation” are utilized for different ends; in these contexts, individual souls
might have different functions, according to the “needs” that these different regimes
have. Alternatively, one might deny altogether that the human soul has a function: the
distinctive feature of human beings might be their position “outside” of nature. Thus,
even if Socrates' description of the soul's function is accurate, it is too general to be really
informative; Socrates must offer more details for the function argument to be convincing.
Nonetheless, the idea that justice is a condition that lets the soul perform its functions is a
161[…] τὸ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ βουλεύεσθαι (353d3).
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significant departure from the technē model of justice, and one that will remain
throughout the argument of the Republic. As far as Book I is concerned, “justice”
functions as a placeholder for that condition of soul which permits the soul to perform its
functions well. What that condition is, however, remains unknown.
I suggest that for this reason Plato has Socrates concludes the book by likening
himself to a “glutton” (ὥσπερ οἱ λίχνοι, 354b1), who takes another dish before
“moderately enjoying the previous” serving (πρὶν τοῦ προτέρου μετρίως ἀπολαύσαι,
354b2-3). For Socrates wanted to know what effects the optimal condition of soul would
bring about before knowing what the condition itself is. Thus Book I concludes in aporia,
but not, as has been suggested, in a way that betrays the dialogue's lack of unity.162 To the
contrary, the aporia clearly foreshadows the argument that Socrates will make about the
soul in Book IV, namely, that the soul is a complex whole of parts (an unstated
implication of the “justice is stronger” argument), and that justice is the condition that
allows this complex whole be integrated to a superlative degree. Thus, Book I does not
conclude negatively, but rather provides the resources for going beyond the technē model
of justice, which is the primary cause of Polemarchus and Thrasymachus' encounter with
aporia in Book I.163

Copyright © Peter Nielson Moore 2018
162 The “separatist” thesis concerning Book I goes back to K.F. Hermann's work Geschichte und System
der Platonischen Philosophie (Heidelberg, 1839). Most recently, Vlastos has argued on behalf of the
“separatist” view as well. See Gregory Vlastos, Socrates: Ironist and Moral Philosopher (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 1991), 250. Charles Kahn argues against the separatist thesis, but provides
a good summary of the evidence in favor of the separatist thesis. See Charles H. Kahn, "Proleptic
Composition in the Republic, or Why Book 1 Was Never a Separate Dialogue," in The Classical
Quarterly 43, no. 1 (1993): 131-42.
163See also Weiss, “Wise Guys and Smart Alecks in Republic 1 and 2,” 93. Weiss argues that throughout
conversation of the Republic, Socrates does not really alter the arguments he gave for justice in Book I,
but rather states them in a different way.
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Chapter III: Moments of Capitulation in Republic II and III
In the preceding chapter, I argued that Thrasymachus and Socrates disagree about
certain fundamental assumptions concerning the nature of agency. More specifically,
these assumptions concerned (1) the relation between reason and desire; (2) the
normative status of nomos; and (3) the psychological foundations of happiness. I then
characterized this dispute as one between two models of agency, each with its own
corresponding notion of what justice is, as well as about what value justice has for
individual agents. On the Technē Model, (T1) reason stands in an instrumental relation to
desire, in that its primary function is to calculate the means for achieving the objects of
desires; (T2) nomoi do not deserve respect because they are human artifacts (the
artificiality thesis) and (T3) pleonektic desire is the psychologically basic, and therefore
the authentic mode of human desire that, when satisfied, brings happiness. On the Virtue
Model, (V1) Justice is a “power” that produces “oneness of mind” and “friendship”
among the parts of the soul, and cooperation is best promoted when reason rules
desire;164 (V2) nomoi deserve respect because their function is to habituate individuals
into certain patterns of behavior, and habituation is an essential aspect of education;165
(V3) egoism, or some form of eudaimonism, is psychologically basic: the soul's ergon is
“to have care over, rule, and deliberate” (τὸ ἐπιμελεῖσθαι, καὶ ἄρχειν καὶ βουλεύεσθαι
353d3-4), and the excellence of this function brings happiness.
In this chapter, I continue a provocative-aporetic reading of the Republic by
studying three aspects of Books II-III. First, I begin by explaining the significance of

164In Book IV these functions will be assigned “the calculative part” (λογιστκόν, 439d4).
165It is not possible to deduce this answer form Socrates' arguments in Book I. This premise of the virtue
model of justice will become apparent in the discussion of the musical and physical education in Books
II-III.
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Glaucon's renewal of the argument for injustice as a response to the aporia of Book I. As
we saw in the preceding chapter, Socrates admits that his treatment of the arguments on
behalf of justice was too hasty—he was acting like a “glutton” (ὥσπερ οἱ λίχνοι, 354b1)
and not really savoring these arguments. This also suggests that Socrates was not
practicing sophrosunē, or moderation, following his dispute with Thrasymachus.166 Since
sophrosunē concerns the pleasures of “food, drink, and sex,”167 we might put the point
this way: Socrates wanted to experience the pleasure that the arguments bring, but
because he was too hasty, he scarcely enjoyed any of the arguments.168 From a dramatic
perspective this suggests that the way out of aporia in Book I is to correct Socrates' lapse
in virtue by forcing him to “savor” the arguments he impulsively “devoured.” Glaucon
and Adeimantus perform this role by presenting a new, more sophisticated argument on
behalf of injustice, along with specific counterarguments to Socrates' arguments for
justice. In this sense, they recognize that Socrates' haste resulted in aporia concerning the
nature of justice, despite the fact that Socrates has both silenced Thrasymachus and
offered some arguments for the virtue model of justice. Thus they compel both Socrates
and readers to endure the “pain” of examination in order to overcome this aporia. As we
shall see, Socrates' arguments from Book I contain flaws that Glaucon and Adeimantus
recognize and exploit in order to raise their challenge. In reviving Thrasymachus'

166Richard Patterson also notes the significance of this lapse in sophrosunē and suggests that it brings
akrasia “within the sphere of reason itself,” in the sense that reason's own desire for the truth and
intellectual pleasure needs regulating (“Plato on Philosophic Character,” in Journal of the History of
Philosophy 25, no.3 [Jul 1, 1987]: 326; 330). For other views regarding the desiring aspect of reason,
See James Robert Peters, “Reason and Passion in Plato's Republic,” Ancient Philosophy 9 (Mathesis
Publications), 181-182; Charles Kahn, “Plato's Theory of Desire,” The Review of Metaphysics 41, no.1
(Sept. 1987): 101-102.
167389e1.
168Socrates describes the gluttons as people who “always taste and grasp what is set before them, before
they enjoying what preceded [thing they tasted] in due measure.” […] ἀεὶ παραφερομένου απογεύονται
ἁρπάζοντας, πρὶν τοῦ προτέρου μετρίως ἀπολαύσαι (354b2-3).
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argument and identifying the flaws in Socrates' argument, they perform the same role for
Thrasymachus as Thrasymachus performed for Polemarchus; i.e., they try to correct the
former's account in order to overcome Socrates' elenchos. This moment of aporia also
functions as a provocation for readers, because from the reader's perspective there is a
question concerning Plato's reasons for reviving the argument for injustice: why didn't
Socrates' arguments against Thrasymachus suffice for Glaucon and Adeimantus?
Second, I carry out a provocative-aporetic reading of Books II-III by identifying
and examining moments of capitulation—moments at which Glaucon and Adeimantus
concede some fundamental premise of their challenge, and which they ought not to
concede if they are to defend their challenge properly. At these moments in the
conversation they ought to resist some suggestion or inference, because the claim for
which Socrates is arguing directly contradicts some aspect of the Technē Model of justice,
which, as we shall see, they adopt whole-heartedly in their defense of injustice. By
studying these moments of capitulation, we gain insight into which theoretical
commitments Glaucon and Adeimantus give up, and which they adopt, in the process of
hearing Socrates’ argument. More specifically, I argue that in Books II and III, Glaucon
and Adeimantus give up the theses that pleonexia is psychologically basic and that nomoi
do not deserve moral respect because they are artificial.169 I suggest that these moments
function as moments of aporia for readers as well because they elicit a response that
mimics Glaucon and Adeimantus' response to the elenchos of Thrasymachus. After
hearing both Thrasymachus' arguments and Socrates' elenchoi, Glaucon says that

169Cf. Weiss, “Wise Guys and Smart Alecks in Republic 1 and 2,” 93. Weiss argues that Socrates does not
refute the “new points” that Glaucon and Adeimantus make. I am arguing that he does precisely this
throughout Books II-IV.
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Thrasymachus was “bewitched by [Socrates], just as a snake is.”170 Thrasymachus, in
other words, did not put up enough of a fight. As spectators of the conversation in Book I,
the brothers were able to evaluate the quality of the arguments on both sides, and their
judgment that Thrasymachus had not adequately defended the argument for injustice
prompted their revival of his position. Readers, who in Book II stand as spectators to the
conversation between Socrates, Glaucon, and Adeimantus, stand in a similar position:
they too are able to identify moments at which Glaucon and Adeimantus failed to defend
their own position. However, the reader's study of these moments must attend to a crucial
difference in the brothers' performance of this corrective role: they revive Thrasymachus'
argument not to refute Socrates, but in the hopes of being persuaded “truly” that “in every
way the just man is better than the unjust man.”171 Therefore, the assistance that readers
must give to Glaucon and Adeimantus is not to defend their position against Socrates'
elenchos, but rather to explain the reasonableness of their capitulations, which is not
apparent to the brothers themselves.172
Third, I offer an argument for a way in which the discussion of musical education
in Books II-III can have a protreptic effect on readers, who are not receiving the
170[…] ὕπο σοῦ ὥσπερ ὄφις κηληθῆναι (358b1).
171Glaucon opens Book II by saying “Socrates, do you want to seem to have persuaded us, or to persuade
us truly that in every way a just man is better than an unjust man? Ὦ Σώκρατες, πότερον ἡμᾶς βούλει
δοκεῖν πεπεικέναι, ἤ ὡς ἀληθῶς πεῖσαι ὅτι παντὶ τρόπῳ ἄμεινόν ἐστιν δίκαιον εἶναι ἤ ἄδικον (357b1-2).
172One question that might be asked of my reading is the following. If Glaucon and Adeimantus are
unaware of what is at stake at these moments when they concede some point to Socrates, is it accurate
to say that they are “really persuaded” by the end of the argument? Isn’t the case rather that they have
been led to a certain conclusion—Socrates’ conviction about the superiority of the just life—without
properly understanding all the reasons for adopting that conclusion? How could that be “true
persuasion”? This is a point where I must state my hermeneutical principles for reading Plato. Glaucon
and Adeimantus may be “really persuaded” in the sense of having adopted Socrates’ conviction about
justice, without having understood all the reasons for it. A typical feature of Plato’s writing is the
appearance of unexplained inferences, which the reader then has the opportunity to investigate. I believe
something like that is going on in the Republic. Glaucon and Adeimantus are not aware of all the
reasons that stand behind their new conviction that justice is superior to injustice, but we may study
their responses to controversial steps in Socrates’ reasoning in order that we ourselves may be “really
persuaded,” precisely by having tested every step of the argument for ourselves.
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education described. For although the moments of capitulation I identify represent the
gradual erosion of the brothers' commitment to the premises that define the Technē Model
of justice, the concessions occur in the context of an outline of the beliefs and behaviors
they think ought to be instilled in people from the earliest age, because these behaviors
and beliefs have social utility. This feature of the concessions points to a tension between
musical education—which is primarily habituative—and protreptic. Glaucon and
Adeimantus demand to be truly persuaded that justice is better than injustice, not simply
told that it would be socially useful to inculcate certain virtuous behaviors and beliefs
about justice, such as the belief they hope to be persuaded of, i.e., that “the just man is in
every way better than the unjust man.” The tension here concerns the role of receptivity
in persuasion: musical-habituative education is a receiving of norms and moral
convictions, but it is not a receiving that Glaucon and Adeimantus would consider an
instance of “true persuasion.” Habituative education resembles the type of indoctrination
of which Thrasymachus disapproves, because it keeps people in ignorance of their true,
pleonektic nature. Protreptic, other hand, should effect a re-orientation of perspective by
getting the recipient to see for himself the truth of the perspective which he is to adopt; it
should be in some sense critical, not merely receptive. I will argue that the discussion of
habituative education has a protreptic effect on Glaucon and Adeimantus because in this
discussion Socrates re-frames the artificiality thesis in a way that emphasizes the
reflexive relation that Glaucon and Adeimantus have with respect to their own
habituation: in this discussion, they are both recipients and designers of a habituative
education. Once they recognize their position, they can accept that musical-habituative
education does not merely indoctrinate. Rather, because musical education is supposed to
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instill a love for the “well-formed” (εὐσχήμονα, 401d6), and an ability to “keenly
perceive deficiencies and what is not well-crafted,” a musical-habituative education must
also provide the tools for recognizing which habits one has received are “deficient.”173
Glaucon and Adeimantus carry out this exercise in recognizing deficiencies by critiquing
their own education in music and poetry. Readers, on the other hand, participate in a kind
of “musical exercise” too by receiving Socrates' argument and correcting what is
“deficient” in Glaucon and Adeimantus' responses to this argument.

§1. Glaucon and Adeimantus' Challenge: the Revival of the Technē Model of Justice
Several problematic inferences in Socrates' elenchoi may cause Glaucon and
Adeimantus to hesitate in their acceptance of Socrates' refutation of Thrasymachus. In the
second elenchos, Socrates argued that every practitioner of a technē, considered as a
practitioner in the precise sense, considers only the good of the object under the care of
their respective technē. This restriction on their thinking about technical practice in Book
I led to difficulties in Socrates' ability to account for self-interested action. Socrates
proposed that the misthōtikē technē accounts for self-interested action, but this proposal
does not answer the question concerning the prioritization of the different ends which
agents may pursue as practitioners of multiple technai. Thrasymachus can easily reply
that the ends of the misthōtikē technē necessarily supersede the ends of the other technai
that agents may practice, because no agent can be so committed to the good of the object
of the technē he practices that he neglects his own interests. The awkwardness of this
account of self-interested action also exposed a problem in unity of reason and desire in

173καὶ ὅτι αὖ τὦν παραλειπομένων καἶ μἦ καλῶς δημιουργηθέντων ἤ μὴ καλῶς φύντων ὀξύτατ' ἄν
αἰσθάνοιτο ὁ ἐκεὶ ταφεὶς ὡς ἔδει […] (401e1-3).
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the third elenchos. There Socrates argued, in essence, that pleonektic actions are not
caused by knowledge of any technē; rather, they are caused by a particular mode of
desire. This contradicted Thrasymachus' assertion that the pleonektic person—identified
earlier with the unjust person—is “wise and good;” since pleonektic actions are not
caused by knowledge, the pleonektic person is not “wise.” On this account, however,
desire appears to play no real function in the psychology of the agent, since technical
knowledge accounts for the just agent's non-pleonektic actions. Thus, if the misthōtikē
technē accounts for self-interested actions, it apparently does so without reference to the
agent's desires. This is an odd conclusion, since prima facia self-interested actions would
seem to stem from desires.174 Finally, the third elenchos contains the invalid inference
from likeness to being. Socrates used the premise that “if some X resembles Y in respect
a, and Y has qualities b and c, then X also has qualities b and c” to show that the unjust
person is “ignorant and bad.”175 Even if Glaucon lacks the dialectical finesse to expose
this fallacy, he likely intuits something strange, and perhaps recognizes the haste of the
argument as a sign that Socrates' intended only to produce a verbal contradiction to which
Thrasymachus has no immediate counter-argument.
Plato has constructed Glaucon's challenge so as to provide counterarguments to
the three premises of the virtue model of justice mentioned above. As I recapitulate
Glaucon's challenge, I will show how each of Socrates' proposals about justice from
Book I is undermined. Glaucon begins by arguing against the claim that justice is the

174 If Socrates claims that self-interested actions are caused by a person's judgment of what is best for
himself, and not by desires, then he still must argue for this position. We do not receive a proper
argument for Socratic intellectualism until the arguments for tripartition in Book IV.
175 See Chapter 1, footnote 44, for a detailed treatment of this fallacy.
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power that produces “cooperation and friendship,” (V1).176 He argues against this claim
by offering a prototype of a social-contractarian account of the origin of justice. On this
view, justice is an “in-between” (μεταξύ, 359a6), a compromise that people make to
avoid the extremes of suffering wrongdoing and committing wrongdoing. To make this
argument, Glaucon must assert that pleonexia is psychologically basic, which he indicates
by saying that it is “by nature good to commit wrong (ἀδικείν), but bad to be wronged
(ἀδικεῖσθαι).” Glaucon provides no argument for this claim, but instead presents it as the
assertion of an anonymous “myriad of others” (μυρίων ἄλλων, 358c7) who argue like
Thrasymachus. Nonetheless, the connection with pleonexia is clear: committing injustice
would be “good” by nature because people by nature desire to maximize their possession
of available goods, and maximizing the size of one's share requires taking from the share
others have in the available goods. But “as a result” (ὥστε, 358e5) of the greater
desirability of committing injustice, people “wrong each other and are wronged, and get a
taste of both” (ἀλλήλους ἀδικῶσί τε καὶ ἀδικῶνται καὶ ἀμφοτέρων γεύωνται, 358e5359a1). Glaucon then compares the “measures” of both extremes, and concludes that
“being wronged, to the extent that it is worse, exceeds committing wrong, to the extent
that it is good (πλέονι δὲ κακῷ ὑπερβάλλειν τὸ ἀδικεῖσθαι ἤ ἀγαθῷ τὸ ἀδικεῖν 358e45).”177 This consideration, it seems, compels the agreement that Glaucon says results in

176 The interpretation of Glaucon's arguments that I propose here does not exclude other readings. Reeve
reads this argument about the origin of justice as an argument for the claim that injustice is
intrinsically desirable even when stripped of its consequences, while justice is intrinsically undesirable
and only desirable for its consequences (Philosopher-Kings, 27). This reading nicely connects the
argument with Glaucon’s division of goods at the opening of Book II (357b4-358a2). For a discussion
of the division of goods, see Annas, Introduction, 60-61; Reeve, 25-25; Santas, Understanding Plato's
Republic, 46-47. Santas imposes a Hobbesian interpretation on the state of affairs before the contract:
(1) the competition for goods was a zero-sum game; individuals were “self-seeking;” and individuals
were equally able to achieve their aims (38-39).
177 Reading the datives as a “measure of difference” (Smyth, 348; [1513]). The translation is a bit
awkward, but it should be clear that Glaucon is saying that the measure by which being wronged is
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the creation of justice. A specific group of people decides to make an agreement
(ξυνθέσθαι, 359a2): those who are not able to escape the one (suffering wrongdoing) and
commit the other (injustice) find it more “profitable to reach an agreement” not to
commit injustice and not to be treated unjustly (λυσιτελεῖν ξυνθέσθαι, 359a2).178
Although Glaucon omits the specifics of the rules of the agreement, at the very
least he seems to be proposing rules that will guarantee the security of one's person and
property. On this account, the agreement to establish security creates a context of noninterference in which individuals may pursue their aims without fear of sabotage. But
non-interference is a far cry from the highly coordinated actions of, say, an army or a
ship's crew, that Socrates cited as paradigmatic cases of the greater “capability for acting”
(δυνατότεροι πράττειν οἱ δίκαιοι, 352δd6-7) that justice produces in comparison to
injustice. These cooperative efforts require the apportioning of functional roles,
responsibilities, and authority in addition to the pledge not to harm others in the group; in
other words, justice is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for concerted action.
Nothing in Glaucon's scenario suggests the establishment of the other conditions for
higher-order organization. That Glaucon offers a genuine alternative here can also be seen
in the way it mediates between the extremes that Thrasymachus and Socrates represent.
Thrasymachus boasted that the unjust person would seek to outdo everyone, and thereby
sabotage any cooperative effort; Socrates, on the other hand, attributes more power to
justice than it actually has, saying that it is a sufficient condition for cooperative effort.
With this prototype of contract theory, Glaucon can explain how justice may provide a

worse is greater than the measure by which committing wrongdoing is good.
178 Santas takes this statement as an indication that at least one group, those who do have the power to
commit injustice and escape suffering injustice, are effectively forced into a political context. In other
words, the agreement is not unanimous (Understanding Plato's Republic, 40).
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loose cohesion among a group,179 even as it maintains a background of competitive
pleonexia.
The second stage of Glaucon's challenge consists in reaffirming that pleonexia is
psychologically basic (T3) and re-establishing the artificiality thesis (challenges V2).180 To
show this, he uses the example of Gyges' ring. What is striking about this argument is not
only its reassertion of a fundamental premise of the Technē Model of justice, but its
position in the order of Glaucon's challenge. First, Glaucon re-establishes the artificiality
of justice; then, in this next argument, he subtracts this artificial layer in thought in order
to show that pleonexia is psychologically basic. To subtract the influence of nomos,
Glaucon proposes that we “give authority [ἔξουσίαν] to each—to the just man and the
unjust man—to do whatever he pleases, and then follow and look where desire [ἐπιθυμία]
will lead each one.”181 The rest of the thought-experiment consists in supplying both the
just and the unjust man with a ring that makes them invisible. The ring, which conceals
them from the scrutiny of others, functions as a symbolic representation of exousia.
Although exousia primarily represents political power and authority, Glaucon's choice of
this word suggests that he associates political power with freedom from the scrutiny of
others. This is not an unreasonable association if we consider the hostility governments
have shown toward transparency throughout history.
179 The agreement requires some minimal cohesion, because individuals must at least identify as members
of this group, which has these rules.
180 Reeve interprets the story of Gyges' ring as an argument that simply reinforces the claim that injustice
is intrinsically preferable to justice if we subtract the consequences from each (Cf. Philosopher-Kings,
27). I suggest his view overlooks the significance of the power of exousia to undo habituation. Annas
asks why Socrates does not reject the story about Gyges as “avowedly unreal or fantastic,” and suggests
that Socrates would be within his rights to reject the demand that he show that just person would behave
justly even if he had Gyges' ring (Introduction, 69); Also Santas, who questions the extremity of this
example (Understanding Plato's Republic, 47). On my reading Socrates must answer this demand
because the ring is really a metaphor for the invisibility that political power (exousia) affords.
181[…] δόντες ἐξουσίαν ἑκατρέρῳ ποιεῖν ὅ τι ἄν βούληται, τῷ τε δικαίῳ τῷ ἀδίκῳ, εἶτ' ἐπακολουθήσαιμεν
θεώμενοι ποῖ ἡ ἐπιθυμία ἑκτέρον ἄξει (359c1-2).
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Glaucon argues that if both the just man and the unjust man received the same
type of ring, their actions would be indistinguishable. Gyges, a simple shepherd,
functions as the story's “everyman,” the average person who has been habituated to act
justly.182 When Glaucon advises us to follow the desire (ἐπιθυμία) of both the just and
unjust man, he indicates that the nature of the soul lies somewhere in its desire, a desire
whose authenticity we must discover by abstracting away the artificiality of nomos. He
claims that if we carried out the test he recommends, “we would catch the just man
pursuing the same thing as the unjust man because of his pleonexia, which is wholly
natural to pursue as good, but by force of convention he is diverted towards the honor of
equality.”183 According to Glaucon's method, we are to strip away the artificiality of
nomos “in thought” (τῇ διανoίᾳ, 359c1) by giving each exousia—power, authority, and
license—to do whatever he pleases. The “everyman” who receives such exousia, he
claims, will soon forget all the habituation that caused him to act justly, and act on his
“true” desires—desires which he might not have even known he possessed. Thus, like
Thrasymachus, Glaucon suggests that we must become enlightened about our true nature;
it is the lack of exousia that conceals our true desires and true inclinations from us—
conceals the fact that pleonexia is psychologically basic.
Glaucon's first and second arguments, then, reassert both the artificiality thesis
and the basicality of pleonexia (T2 and T3). The third part of the challenge contains an
argument for the instrumentality of reason (T1) in the revival of Thrasymachus' claim that
182The flaw in Glaucon's use of an “everyman” type story is that it neglects a third type of person, the
exceptionally virtuous person. Socrates can easily admit that the average person will commit injustice
when he or she has the chance. But the person whom Glaucon must test is not the average person, but
the exceptionally virtuous person. If it turned out that the behavior of even this person was
indistinguishable from the behavior of the unjust person, the Glaucon could justifiably claim that, given
exousia, the just person will inevitably revert to his “authentic” desires and inclinations.
183[…] ἐπ' αὐτοφόρῳ οὖν λάβοιμεν ἄν τὸν δίκαιον τῷ ἀδίκῳ εἰς ταὐτὸν ἰὸντα διά τὴν πλεονεξίαν ὅ πάσας
φύσις διώκειν πέφυκεν ὡς ἀγαθόν νόμῳ βίᾳ παράγεται ἐπὶ τὴν τοῦ ἴσου τιμὴν (359c3-6).
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justice itself is the instrument of the politikē technē. Glaucon first proposes a test in
which we imagine the “perfect” (τέλεον, 360e4) examples of the just and the unjust man,
for determining whether the just life is preferable to the unjust life. We are to imagine
these two individuals receiving the reputation for the opposite quality of their true
character: the unjust person will have the reputation for perfect justice, while the just
person will have the reputation for perfect injustice. He then recalls the discussion of
technē from Book I by suggesting that we think of the unjust man as we think of “skilled
craftsmen” (ὥσπερ οἱ δεινοί δημιουργοί, 360e6-7), such as a ship's captain or a doctor.
With this reference to the craftsman (δημιουργοί), Glaucon clearly flags technical
knowledge in a way that challenges Socrates' elenchoi from Book I. There, Socrates
argued that injustice could not really be a technē, because injustice consists in the
betrayal of the constitutive norms of any particular technē; moreover, any technē benefits
the “weaker,” or the object under its care. This elenchos succeeded because
Thrasymachus held that the technē that qualifies individuals for rule is the knowledge
about which laws are truly advantageous for oneself. But here, Glaucon suggests that the
unjust person practices a different technē: he commits unjust acts and gets away with
them by disguising them as just acts (361a). To practice injustice, then, one needs a
technē for disguising unjust acts as just acts—something like the “shadow-painting”
technique that makes images in two-dimensions appear three-dimensional.184 Defined this
way, the technē of injustice does appear to have success and failure conditions, and hence
a kind of constitutive norm: a good practitioner of injustice gets away with wrongdoings,
while a bad practitioner of injustice fails to get away with wrongdoings. Finally, Glaucon
presents a set of virtues that are supposed to compliment the practice of dissemblance:
184 Socrates likens poetry to this painting technique in Book X (602d1).
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rhetorical skill (λέγειν τε ἱκανῷ ὄντι πρὸς τὸ πείθειν, 361b2);185 “strength” (ῥώμην,
361b4), when necessary; and “courage” (ἀνδρείαν, 361b3).186
Before proceeding to Socrates' response to the revival of the Technē Model, I
would like to compare the positions of Thrasymachus and Glaucon, so that it may
become clear how the fundamental assumptions of the Technē Model underlie both
positions, despite the difference between these positions.187 Consider how Thrasymachus
and Glaucon assert different versions of the artificiality thesis (T2) On Thrasymachus'
view, justice is the artifact that rulers create, while on Glaucon's view, justice is an artifact
that results from an agreement that many individuals make, prior to any distinction
between ruler and ruled. Thrasymachus' definition of justice thus lends itself to an
authoritarian style of politics, while Glaucon's lends itself to democratic politics.
Nonetheless, both assert that justice is an artifact that conceals some more fundamental
aspect of human nature. This more fundamental aspect of human nature is, of course,
pleonexia. Thus both assert that pleonexia is psychologically basic (T3), though they
differ in the evidence they offer for this view. This difference becomes clear from the way
that each construes how justice conceals one's true nature by means of habituation and
social conditioning. On Thrasymachus' view, it is primarily the ruled who acquire the
belief that it is just to obey the rulers, while on Glaucon's view, anyone who participates
in the community founded on agreement will be habituated to believe that the rules of
that agreement are just. These different accounts of habituation also entail different
accounts of how individuals overcome their habituation and realize their “true” nature.
185 Glaucon says that “if the unjust man makes any mistake, it is necessary to allow for him to be able to
correct it, and to be capable of speaking with the goal of persuading” (361a6-b2, Griffith).
186 Like Thrasymachus, Adeimantus claims that the lack of courage explains why people are just rather
than unjust (366b).
187 Cf. Weiss, “Wise Guys and Smart Alecks in Republic 1 and 2,” 100-102.
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For Thrasymachus, it is the exceptional individual who realizes his true nature—the
tyrant who has both the insight in to the artificiality of justice, and the “courage” to
commit injustice. For Glaucon, however, overcoming one's habituation for justice does
not require an exceptional character; it may require some luck in gaining exousia and the
supplementary virtues mentioned above, but these virtues and exousia are in principle
available to anyone participating in democratic politics. Moreover, neither courage or nor
exceptional character undid Gyges' habituation for justice; rather, exousia did.
Presumably, anyone who possesses exousia will experience the same change, not only
exceptional individuals. Finally, the reassertion of the instrumental role of reason (T1)
appears in need for technai to practice justice. For Thrasymachus, the politikē technē is
the knowledge of truly advantageous legislation; for Glaucon, reason plays an
instrumental role in the form of rhetoric, which the unjust person uses to portray his
unjust deeds as just.

§2. First Capitulation: Pleonexia not Psychologically Basic
Socrates begins his response to Glaucon and Thrasymachus by proposing the citysoul analogy as a method for discovering the power that justice has in the soul by
itself.188 Socrates justifies his use of this analogy by likening the difficulty of their

188 The interpretive challenges that this analogy poses are well-documented. It is not necessary for my
purposes to defend the city-soul analogy because what matters for the protreptic effect of the Republic
is that Glaucon, Adeimantus, and readers come to be persuaded of the virtue model of justice. Socrates
accomplishes this goal by (a) arguing against the model of agency that grounds the Technē Model of
justice, and (b) providing a new model of agency that grounds the virtue model of justice. The
arguments against these models of agency can be isolated from the interpretive challenges that have
commonly been raised against the city-soul analogy. Norbert Blössner argues that Socrates does not use
the city-soul analogy consistently. On his reading, the isomorphism of city and soul is introduced as
“hypothesis” to be tested, but is taken as a fact in Book IV, despite not having been established (“The
City Soul Analogy,” in The Cambridge Companion to Plato's Republic, ed. G.R.F Ferrari [New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2007]: 347). Equivocation is another charge commonly made of this
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inquiry to the difficulty that someone who has poor eyesight faces when trying to read a
word written with very small letters.189 This grammatical aspect of the city-soul analogy
immediately suggests a crucial difference in the way Socrates will analyze the city. The
city-soul analogy asks readers to consider justice as a unity of functional parts that are fit
for interplay, just as a word is a unity of grammata that have their own rules governing
their combinations. On Glaucon's account of the origin of justice, individual agents are
something like the monads of political community—not inherently fit for interplay, but
rather showing a tendency toward disunity—and communities arise only as a result of
agreements between these monads. In the following chapter, I will argue that this
functional analysis of the parts of the city and soul is instrumental in persuading Glaucon
that reason ought to rule the soul (V1). In this chapter, however, I examine the means that
Socrates uses to persuade Glaucon and Adeimantus that egoism—rather than pleonexia—
is psychologically basic (refutes T3), and that nomoi deserve respect because they
habituate individuals into certain patterns of behavior (Refutes T2 and establishes V2).
The initial construction of the city, up to the discussion of the Guardians'
education (369b-376e), contains their first, and perhaps most important, concession.190
Socrates' first step is to explain the reasons people have for associating and cooperating—
to a minimal extent—in their city. The reason, we learn, is that no person is totally selfanalogy. For this type of argument, see Gregory Vlastos, “Justice and Psychic Harmony in the
Republic,” The Journal of Philosophy 66, No.16 (Aug. 21, 1969): 505-521 and “The Argument that
Justice Pays,” The Journal of Philosophy 65, no.21 (Nov. 7, 1968): 672-73. See also David Sachs, “A
Fallacy in Plato's Republic,” in The Philosophical Review, Vol.72 No.2 (April, 1963): 141-158.
Circularity is a third criticism made of the analogy. Stanley Rosen argues that Socrates' use of the citysoul analogy to argue for the conception of justice as psychic harmony is ultimately circular, in that he
must already assume that justice is psychic harmony in order to argue that political justice is harmony
among the parts of the city (Plato's Republic: A Study [New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2005],
147-148).
189 368c-d.
190 Annas argues that Plato fails to give the first city “a clear place in the Republic's moral argument”
(Introduction, 78). In reaching this conclusion, however, she overlooks the difference between
pleonexia and egoism.
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sufficient (οὐκ αὐτάρκης, 369b6) in his ability to procure for himself all the material
goods necessary for life, and everyone is “in need of many things” (πολλῶν ἐνδεής,
369b5). Thus “one person associates with another for one purpose, and another with
another for a different purpose” (παραλαμβάνων ἄλλος ἄλλον ἐπ' ἄλλου, 369с1) in order
to meet their many needs. Socrates concludes from this that people in this city share
(μεταδίδωσι, 369c4) with others and receive shares (μεταλαμβάνει, 369c5) from others
because they “think it better for themselves” (οἰόμενος αὐτῷ ἀμείνον, 369c5). If Glaucon
and Adeimantus are paying attention, however, they ought to raise some questions about
this account of the origin of the city. They may accept the premise that individuals are not
self-sufficient, but reject the inference that individuals will cooperate voluntarily, and on
equal terms, to meet all their needs. For example, they might propose instead that in such
a situation, people will take what they need—and more—from others by force and theft.
They might reply that the fact that individual agents are not self-sufficient does not imply
anything about how agents do in fact associate, or how they ought to associate with each
other in order to satisfy their wants. Therefore, we should notice here that Socrates wants
Glaucon and Adeimantus to accept that egoism, rather than pleonexia, is psychologically
basic; that is, people are motivated by desire to do what they judge is best for themselves
(egoism), not by the desire to have the greater share than everyone else (pleonexia).191
Finally, another difference between the two accounts of the origin of the city is reflected
in the difference between (limited) cooperative association and non-interference. On
Glaucon's account of the origin of justice, individuals do not agree to a reason for
191 Cf. Santas, who says that when interpreting Glaucon's picture of the state of nature, we must “infer […]
at least predominant psychological egoism” (Understanding Plato's Republic, 39). The point for which
I am arguing here is subtle, but crucial: Socrates introduces egoism as psychologically basic, while
Glaucon presumes pleonexia to be psychologically basic. No inference is necessary to attribute this
presumption to Glaucon, because he himself endorses it.
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association so much as they agree to follow certain rules of non-interference. He might
maintain instead that families are self-sufficient, but need only security to keep the
material goods they need. Why, then, do the brothers agree to this founding moment of
the city, given what's at stake for their own position?
On a provocative-aporetic reading, this question presents readers with an
opportunity to think of reasons why Glaucon and Adeimantus accept egoism as
psychologically basic. One reason I suggest is that they may recognize pleonexia as a
version of egoism either (a) subjected to extreme circumstances or (b) gone
psychologically awry. According to Glaucon's account of the origin of justice, the
competition for goods appears to be a zero-sum game; that is, agents can acquire goods
for themselves only by taking goods from others.192 But there is no reason to think that
the competition for goods is a zero-sum game; a zero-sum game of competition for goods
could very well be an exception rather than a rule. Moreover, agents motivated by
pleonexia can easily create an artificial shortage of goods, since nothing short of all
available goods would satisfy such a person's pleonexia. In this sense pleonexia becomes
a self-fulfilling prophecy, creating the very scarcity which the pleonektic person says
necessitates his pleonexia. Pleonexia may also result if an egoist thinks that what is “best
for himself” is the possession of an unlimited amount of the available goods. But this
argument begs the question as to whether the absence of an upper limit on one's
possession of goods really is best for oneself.
A second reason for the brothers' acceptance of egoism as psychologically basic is
that self-interest remains (so far, at least) the chief motivation and reason for association

192 Santas also suggests this interpretation of the “state of nature” in Glaucon's account of the origin of
justice (Understanding Plato's Republic, 38).
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in Socrates' city, and this preserves the intuition behind Glaucon's claim that people think
that it is by nature better to commit injustice.193 But in accepting egoism as
psychologically basic, they take a step away from pleonexia as the allegedly “natural” or
authentic mode of desire. Moreover, egoism allows for a more rational foundation of the
city. If an inescapable feature of human nature is that no individual is self-sufficient, and
egoism is psychologically basic, then mutually-beneficial cooperation looks like a quite
reasonable arrangement for individuals to adopt in order to supply their material needs.
After proposing the mutually-beneficial activity of trade as the reason for
association in the most basic form of “cohabitation” (ξυνοικίᾳ ἐθέμεθα πόλιν ὄνομα,
369с3-4), Socrates proposes a principle for the division of labor known as the “one man,
one task” principle. He later identifies this way of life organized by this principle as an
“image” (εἴδωλον, 443c3) of justice in Book IV.194 According to the principle, each
individual ought to devote himself exclusively to one task, the one to which his talents
are best suited.195 Socrates argues for this principle by a straightforward appeal to
efficiency: presumably, individuals will produce one good in both greater quantity and
better quality if they devote themselves solely to the production of that good, than if they
divide their efforts and produce multiple goods.196 As with the reason for association in

193 Annas overlooks the subtle but crucial concession that Adeimantus is making in accepting egoism as
the reason for association in the first city. She (wrongly, I think) proposes that “the first city adds
nothing, except a context in which the Principle of Specialization is introduced in a plausible way”
(Introduction, 79).
194 Rep., 443c3
195There is some uncertainty about how to interpret this principle. Reeve helpfully distinguishes between
two readings, a “unique aptitude doctrine” (UAD) and the “unique upper-bound doctrine” (UBD) On
the former reading, the “one man, one task” principle posits that each person is born with a natural
aptitude for a unique craft or type of work. On the latter, the principle posits that “a person's ruling
desires set a unique upper limit to his cognitive development.” Reeve rejects the argues for the UBD
because Plato proposes selecting the guardians on the basis of cognitive powers that they might have in
addition to an aptitude for some craft (Philosopher-Kings, 172-174). Annas leans toward the UBD in
her reading as well (Introduction, 76-79).
196 “It follows from this that in any enterprise more is produced—and that it is better and more easily
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the city, however, Glaucon and Adeimantus might raise an objection to the division of
labor. They might say that they disagree with the way Socrates construes the “one man,
one task” principle, and propose instead that someone might have the idea that it is better
for himself to enslave some people to provide material goods for him. This proposal
would be consistent with both egoism in the sense Socrates means it, and the “one man,
one task” principle, since one person would be the master, and one person would be the
slave. Glaucon and Adeimantus' failure to raise this objection presents us with an
opportunity to consider some reasons why they might be persuaded by Socrates' principle
for the division of labor. To begin, while the person who decides to enslave others judges
that doing so will be “better for himself,” and thus appears to act consistently with
egoism, it is almost certainly false that the people enslaved will think it is better for them
to be enslaved. This consideration points to a similarity between the “one man, one task”
principle and the Glaucon's social-contractarian account of justice, which may explain the
brothers' acceptance of the principle. Both principles limit the liberty of individuals for
the sake of the common good. Since the enslaved would not agree to “suffering
wrongdoing,” and the division of labor that Socrates proposes would not allow for
slavery, we must discover a principle for the division of labor that would be consistent
with egoism. The “one man, one task principle” is consistent with egoism because (1) the
restriction it places on liberty is one to which most people would agree, and (2) one could
argue that it really is better for oneself if every individual maximizes his productivity by
devoting himself to just one task.197

produced—when one person does a single task which is suited to his nature, and does it at the right
time, keeping himself free from other tasks” (370c, Griffith).
197 I am relying on Glaucon's implicit denial that unanimous consent is necessary to make the contract. A
majority might very well agree to the “one man, one task” principle, and that would suffice for Glaucon.
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§3. Second Capitulation: Philia
On the basis of the two reasons for association—egoism and the lack of selfsufficiency—discussed above, Socrates and Adeimantus build a city that has moderate
prosperity, avoids poverty and war, and provides a stable future for its children.198
Socrates calls this city “healthy” (ὑγιὴς, 372e7) and “true” (ἀληθινὴ πόλις, 372e6), and
suggests that Adeimantus look for justice in it. Adeimantus guesses that justice may come
about “through some sort of need which those elements have of one another,”199 but
before they can explore this idea, Glaucon interrupts and calls this city a “city of pigs”
(ὑῶν πόλιν, 372d4). His chief complaint is that the city lacks the luxuries that “people
today have” (οἱ νῦν ἔχουσι, 372e2), such as couches, cooked dishes, and deserts. Socrates
only comments that the city Glaucon wants to build is “luxurious” (τρυφῶσαν πόλιν,
372e4) and “inflamed,” (φλεγμαίνουσαν, 372e8) but proceeds to build such a city
anyway, which they will fill with “things which are no longer what cities must have as a
matter of necessity.”200
Socrates tries to explain the emergence of the “sick” city out of the “healthy” city
by saying that “for some, these things will not be enough” (ταῦτα […] οὐκ ἐξαρκέσει,
373a1). This explanation, though brief, is crucial for understanding the difference
between the healthy and the unhealthy cities. Socrates does not clarify who the “some”
are for whom “the necessary” (τἀναγκαῖ, 373a4) will not be enough. Nonetheless, the
necessary psychological conditions for the perception that something is “not enough” are
available to us from the story of Poros and Penia in the Symposium, which Socrates uses

198 Socrates says that the inhabitants of this city will “have no more children than they can afford, and they
will avoid poverty and war” (372c1-2, Griffith).
199 […] εἰ μή που ἐν αὐτῶν τούτων χρείᾳ τινὶ τῇ πρὸς ἀλλήλους (372a2-3).
200 […] καὶ ἅ τὸ πρῶτον ἐλέγομεν οὐκέτι τἀναγκαῖα θετέον (373a5).
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to explain the origin of eros. The parents of eros are Poros (resource) and Penia
(poverty), and eros, as the child of these parents, is mixture of both. More specifically,
Eros lacks what it desires (is impoverished), but does not remain entirely impoverished
because it is aware of its lack, and has some idea of how to acquire what it lacks (thus it
has some “resource” or “means”).201 What I would like to suggest here is that while it is
true that Glaucon complains of the absence of luxuries—items that satisfy unnecessary
desires—in the city, he contributes something more than just unnecessary desires; he also
contributes the psychological conditions for Eros to the city. In contrast, Adeimantus
helped construct a city whose activities are oriented around necessary desires, but the
problem is that it is artificially idyllic. The healthy city perpetuates itself through the
generations, and maintains moderate prosperity, but it does so only because it seems to be
unaware of other possibilities. The citizens in Adeimantus’ city acquire the material
possessions that they lack, but they remain unaware that they lack anything else, and this
is why they perceive their possessions as “enough.” We might say that the appetite of
citizens in Adeimantus' city functions according to the paradigm of depletion and
replenishment. Many appetitive desires function according to this model: hunger and
thirst communicate the lack of food and drink, and a person fills this lack by eating or
drinking, until the point when satisfaction sets in. The perception of satisfaction thus
functions as an internal regulator of the amount one consumes to fill the lack. If one
lacked perception, that is, if one continued to remain aware of a lack even when one had
consumed an amount that would normally provide satisfaction, then one would desire
more than is necessary. Glaucon thus introduces a type of perception which is essential to

201 I rely on Frisbee Sheffield's interpretation of this story (Plato's Symposium: The Ethics of Desire [New
York: Oxford University Press, 2006] 46-48).
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erotic desire, i.e., the perception of lack beyond the necessary.
But the contribution of eros to the city comes with the cost of a new kind of
vulnerability. The city now acquires a competitive relation with its neighbors (previously
they only traded), and thereby opens itself to attacking and being attacked.202 The
necessity of the Guardians stems from the vulnerability that Eros impinges upon the
city.203 Not only can the city attack, but it can be attacked for the wealth that other cities
covet. This latter possibility necessitates the introduction of the guardians. Someone must
defend the city, and Glaucon agrees that the “one man, one task” principle dictates that
one group of people, whose character best suits warfare, ought to take up the task of the
city's defense. As such, the guardians must be aggressive and spirited in nature. But the
introduction of a class professional soldiers with this characteristic poses a new problem:
the guardians might turn their aggression against their own, prey upon the citizens, and
enjoy the wealth for themselves. The guardians must also, therefore, be “gentle” toward
the citizens. We should notice here, however, that the threat of predation is also a threat
of the guardians' own eros. The proposed function of the guardians is to act as protectors
from the eros of other cities, but to do so perfectly, without posing a threat to the city, the
guardians would have to have an utterly non-erotic way of life; that is, they would have
to experience no feeling of lack with respect to their share of the goods that the city has to
offer. Socrates, however, raises the crucial question as to whether such a type of guardian

202 Socrates asks “Do we need, then, to care ourselves a slice of our neighbours' territory, if we are going
to have enough for pasturage and ploughing? And do they in turn need a slice of our land, if they too
give themselves up to the pursuit of unlimited wealth, not confining themselves to necessities?” (373d,
Griffith).
203 Cf. Reeve, Philosopher-Kings, 178; Tad Brennan, “The Nature of the Spirited Part of the Soul and its
Object” in Plato and the Divided Self (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 105-109.
Brennan imagines the perspective of a hypothetical demiurge in order to argue that thumos is a
necessary feature for a being that finds itself in competition for resources. Thumos helps mitigate this
competition by way of honor, which creates a system for distributing appetitive goods.
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is even possible—they are, after all, only human, and their characteristic mixture of
aggressiveness and gentleness is difficult to achieve.204
The solution that Socrates proposes to avoid the threat of predation is a new form
of association for the city, namely, philia. This becomes apparent when Socrates likens
the guardians to “noble hounds” (γενναίων κυνῶν, 375e2) and “lovers of wisdom by
nature” (φιλόσοφος τὴν φύσιν, 375e8-9). If the guardians are like philosophers, and
distinguish friend from enemy by whether they know the person or not,205 there is a better
chance they will be gentle toward those who are “their own and familiar” (πρὸς τοὺς
οἰκείους καὶ γνωρίμους πρᾶὸς 376b8-9). Without this bond, it is difficult to imagine that
individuals would willingly sacrifice their lives so that others may enjoy prosperity.
Philia, a sense of love and fondness for one's own, is the new bond that will unify the
city, rather than mutually-beneficial self-interest.206

204 There are other reasons, not immediately apparent in Book II, why the solution to the threat that the
guardians pose is not to neuter them, so to speak, of their Eros. Doing so would also foreclose the
emergence of the love of wisdom. David Roochnik emphasizes eros' willingness to encounter the
unknown “other,” and argues that this willingness is what makes philosophical eros is open to the
possibility that what is “one’s own,” e.g., the forms, might at first appear strange and unfamiliar
(Beautiful City: The Dialectical Character of Plato's Republic [Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press,
2003], 54). Book V is relevant here, as it details the process by which the Eros of the guardians is
utilized for public benefit. For instance, soldiers who show exceptional courage are allowed to kiss
whomever they like. This policy, Socrates says, “should make anyone who is in fact in love with
someone else—whether that someone is male or female—all the more determined to win a prize” (468c,
Griffith). Paul Ludwig argues that Book V shows the separation of thumos from eros, and that this
separation is crucial for the development of non-possessive, philosophical Eros. Thumos, Ludwig
argues, “seems to be at the root of all possessiveness,” and is responsible for the failure of philia to
attain “perfect justice” (“Eros in the Republic,” in The Cambridge Companion to Plato’s Republic, ed.
G.R.F Ferrari, [New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007], 224).
205[…] Οὐδενὶ ἄλλῳ φίλην καὶ ἐχθρὰν διακρίνει, ἤ τῷ τὴν μὲν καταμαθεῖν, τὴν δὲ ἀγνοῆσαι (376b2-3).
206 Cf. Gregory Vlastos, “The Individual as an Object of Love in Plato,” in Platonic Studies (Princeton,
NJ: Princeton University Press, 1973), 12-15. Vlastos argues that philia is perfectly suited to the
definition of justice that eventually emerges in the Republic. However, he relies on the Lysis to extract a
Platonic conception of philia, which he summarizes with the formula that “you will be loved if and only
if you are useful” (12). Philia under this description suits the definition of justice in the Republic
because the one’s “usefulness” is determined by one’s fulfilling some task that was specified as
necessary to the good of the whole. Vlastos, however, alleges that philia in the Republic eventually
becomes oppressive, on the grounds that Socrates callously disposes of those who can no longer
perform their function because they suffer from illness (410a). On Vlastos’ reading, philia in the
Republic just postulates that one will receive affection from another on the condition that one fulfills
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Here we find a second moment at which Glaucon and Adeimantus should object if
they are to properly defend the unjust life. They should reply here that exploiting the
citizens is exactly what the guardians should do: they should, for example, enrich
themselves by demanding tribute for protecting the city, and then run a public-relations
campaign to convince the citizens of the justice of this policy. So why doesn't Glaucon
interrupt here? First, I suggest that Socrates' use of hounds as an example of the
combination of gentleness and aggressiveness in the same nature is convincing because it
shows that associations based on philia are in fact a natural phenomenon. Although
cultivating such a bond of association may be more complex in human beings than in
hounds, the bond itself is not against nature. Second, Glaucon may agree to the instituting
of guardians because he still identifies with the erotic and appetitive part of the city; that
is, he imagines himself primarily among the citizens who will be living in luxury, rather
than as a guardian type.207 From this perspective he can recognize both the threat that the
guardians pose, and the need to keep them in check. As in Book IV, where Glaucon likens
thumos to desire, so too here he holds the conviction that the function of thumos is to
serve the eros.208 One of Socrates' lessons for Glaucon in the Republic concerns the
proper function of thumos as subordinate to reason rather than desire, and at this early
stage in the dialogue it is clear that Glaucon still adheres to the subordination of thumos
to appetite.

one’s function. I suggest that the “conditional affection” Vlastos describes is better suited to the city
before the introduction of the guardians.
207 See also Reeve, who argues that the “First Polis is that part of the Kallipolis in which money-lovers,
and only money-lovers, are made as happy as it is possible for them to be” (Philosopher-Kings, 176).
208 439e3-5; Socrates corrects Glaucon's thinking and persuades him that thumos is properly subordinate
the logistikon. I will discuss this argument in more detail in the next chapter. Cf. Ludwig, who argues
that the conversation of the Republic unveils the danger of the bond between eros and thumos: Glaucon
experiences this bond himself and thus risks becoming a tyrant (“Eros in the Republic,” 225-230).
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§4. Third Capitulation: Musical Education and the Refutation of the Artificiality Thesis.
The hound analogy presents the need to describe a program for educating and habituating
the guardians—a task that Adeimantus and Socrates immediately pursue.209 Hounds must
be trained to perform certain behaviors, and habituated regularly in the presence of
certain people in order to recognize those people as “familiar” and “friend” on the one
hand, and consider other people “unfamiliar” and “enemy” on the other hand. Socrates
uses this analogy to make a quite limited—though crucial—point for eventually refuting
the artificiality thesis: he means only to persuade Glacuon and Adeimantus that the
plasticity of human character is natural because other natural species are receptive to
habituation.210 Accepting this retrieves human nomoi from a domain somehow “outside”
of nature. The musical and physical education of the guardians, which Glaucon and
Adeimantus begin to describe here in Book II, performs this habituative function, as is
clear from their explicit acknowledgment that they are designing the “molds” or
“patterns”(τύπους, 379a2) of stories that will be told to children, who are most
susceptible to habituation, and not capable of philosophical reasoning.211 More
specifically, the patterns will define the ways that stories may portray paradigmatic
instances of the virtues of wisdom (377e-385e), courage (386a-389d), and moderation

209 Θρέψονται δὲ δὴ ἡμῖν οὗτοι καὶ παιδευθήσονται τίνα τρόπον (376c5-d1);
210 Annas overlooks the importance of this analogy for refuting the artificiality thesis; she describes the
analogy as “odd” on the grounds that the analogy seems to exclude the possibility that guardians might
have the type of conversation that Glaucon, Adeimantus, and Socrates are having in the Republic
(Introduction, 81).
211 Plato's choice of metaphor is apt here; a τύπος typically refers to a seal for imprinting an insignia in
wax, or a mold or some sort (LSJ, “τύπος”). The suggestion that they are “molding” children with these
stories is unmistakable. One reason that Socrates forbids the telling of certain stories is that “the young
are incapable of judging what is allegory and what is not, and the opinions they form at that age tend to
be ineradicable and unchangeable” (378d, Griffith). Thus, children are most susceptible to habituation,
and least capable of exercising critical reasoning about whatever they receive as true. There is a
tendency among commentators to ignore the account of the τύποι. The unfortunate result is a loss of
perspective on the emergence of the more subtle psychological features of the virtues and the gradual
erosion of Glaucon and Adeimantus' commitments to the Technē Model of justice
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(sophrosunē, 389d-392a).
Early in this discussion, however, Socrates and Adeimantus encounter a sort of
paradox in the nature of education itself. When they arrive at the stories that they will tell
about mankind and the virtue of justice—the other stories having been about “the gods,
about daemones, heroes, and those in Ηades”212-- Socrates steers the discussion away
from stories about mankind because:
[…] poets and speech-makers speak badly concerning the most important things
about mankind, [saying] that many people are unjust and happy, that the just are
miserable, that committing injustice is profitable—if it goes unnoticed—and that
justice is another person's advantage and damaging to oneself.213
Socrates then points out to Adeimantus that if they decide that the pattern of stories about
humankind would forbid them to repeat what the poets (typically) say, they will have
effectively answered the question as to whether the just life is better than the unjust life.
Thus, they must postpone a discussion of the stories about humankind until they “have
discovered [εὐρῶμεν] what sort of thing justice is, and shown that by nature it is
profitable for the person who possesses it, whether it seems or does not seem to be this
sort of thing.”214
I suggest that we read this passage as another provocative-aporetic moment for
several reasons. First, accepting Socrates' proposals about the stories the poets should tell
about humankind would amount to accepting a form of indoctrination that Thrasymachus

212 […] περὶ γὰρ θεῶν ὡς δεῖ λέγεσθαι εἴρηται καὶ περὶ δαιμόνων τε καὶ ἡρώων καὶ τῶν ἐν Ἅιδου (392a4).
213 […] ὡς ἄρα καὶ ποιηταὶ καὶ λογοποιοὶ κακῶς λέγουσιν περὶ ἀνθρώπων τὰ μέγιστα, ὅτι εἰσὶν ἄδικοι μέν
εὐδαίμονες δὲ πολλοί, δίκαοι δὶ ἄθλιοι, καὶ ὡς λυσιτελεῖ τὸ ἀδικεῖν ἐάν λανθάνῃ, ἡ δὲ δικαιοσύνη
ἀλλότριον μὲν ἀγαθόν, οἰκεία δὲ ζημία (392a7-b4).
214 Οὐκοῦν περὶ ἀνθρώπων ὅτι τοιούτους δεῖ λόγους λέγεσθαι, τότε διομολογσόμεθα, ὅτα εὕρωμεν οἷόν
ἐστιν δικαιοσύνη, καὶ ὡς φύσει λυσιτελοῦν τῷ ἔχοντι, ἐάν τε δοκῇ ἐάν τε μὴ τοιοῦτος εἶναι (392c1-4);
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criticized for keeping people ignorant about their true—pleonektic—nature. Second,
Socrates has raised several questions concerning the nature of habituation in general and
the protreptic function of the company's inquiry into justice. With regard to the nature of
habituative education, a few alternatives are at stake: either (a) habituative education is a
form of indoctrination that imparts false beliefs that have social utility; (b) habituative
education is a form of indoctrination that imparts true beliefs that simply lack
justification; or (c) habituative education imparts characteristics that prepare students for
eventual insight into the beliefs they in fact hold, but of which they are not yet aware.
Τhroughout the discussion of the τύποι, Adeimantus appears to hold position (a).
Acknowledging that the beliefs that these stories inculcate have social utility does not
require him to hold that justice in fact has intrinsic worth for the soul. It may be true that
there is social utility in peoples' believing that justice has intrinsic worth, but the fact that
these beliefs have social utility does not prove that justice is beneficial for the individual.
This view would, in fact, conform more closely to both Thrasymachus' and Glaucon's
insistence on the need for “simpletons” so that others may practice injustice. An unjust
person would want others to act as if justice were profitable for the individual, since they
would be easier to manipulate and less likely to compete with him.
There is also in this dilemma something at stake for the protreptic function of the
inquiry into justice. Whether habituative education imparts true or false beliefs, Socrates
and Adeimantus both proceed on the assumption that habituation demands un-resisting
receptivity to certain practices and beliefs—much like wax receives an imprint. But this
assumption seems to counteract the educational aim of making philosophers critically
examine their beliefs, indeed precisely those which they have received from the nomoi.
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Thus the receptivity of habituative education seems to be at odds with the very
conversation which Socrates, Glaucon, and Adeimantus perform. This raises the question
as to whether the education that Glaucon and Adeimantus design for the guardians’ lives
up to the same protreptic they receive from Socrates. If it does, then their new-found trust
in nomoi might be strengthened by the conviction that habituative education is not simply
another form of indoctrination.215
At this point Socrates returns to the grammatical aspect of the city-soul analogy,
and suggests a way in which this analogy might refute of the artificiality thesis. Socrates
draws an analogy between reading and education in the virtues, saying that the purpose of
musical education is to teach the guardians to “read” (διαγιγνώσκειν, 402b1) the virtues,
as if they were “letters.” The significance of this analogy with letters and reading is that
Socrates relies on an implicit distinction between the authentic “original” of a virtue and
the inauthentic distortion of the original. Thus he points out that we will not recognize
(οὐ πρότερον γνωσόμεθα, 402b4) the “images of letters” (εἰκόνας γραμμάτων, 402b3)
until we know the “letters themselves” (πρίν ἄν αὐτὰ [τὰ γράμματα] γνῶμεν, 402b5). We
are encouraged to conceive of our education into virtue in the same way that we conceive
learning how to read: first we have to receive images of well-formed letters, and learn to
recognize such letters, before we can recognize letters that are ill-formed. We need to be
familiar with the good model, or παράδειγμα, before we can recognize poorly formed
“images” or “copies” of the original.
If we extend this analogy include the position of Glaucon and Adeimantus as
designers of the guardians' education, then we may discover a provisional answer to the

215 See Annas, who rightly identifies the risk that this education will create “a Polemarchus, with rigid
principles and no real understanding of them” (Introduction, 84).
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question of the protreptic function of the tension between the two goals of education.
When Socrates reviews stories from Greek mythology, with which Adeimantus and
Glaucon are undoubtedly familiar, he in effect asks them to review their own musical
education to see whether it was well-designed, that is, to see whether they received wellformed paradigms of the virtues. I suggest that this grammatical metaphor, which
Socrates uses to describe the stories about the virtues, also describes the reader's position
with respect to the Republic: as readers we are receiving an account about how to design
an education that would impart virtue. To participate in this inquiry, it would be
irresponsible of readers to assume that they had already received the virtues properly
formed; therefore, they must turn a critical eye toward their own habituation.
So, while Glaucon and Adeimantus are being shown that habituation is an
unavoidable aspect of education, they are also being shown a way to think critically about
their habituation without categorically rejecting what they have received from their
habituation (though they reject much of it). They themselves are not being habituated in
the process of the conversation; rather, they are exercising a kind of critical reflection on
whether their own education has provided them with the characteristics that they truly
value, and how they might instill those characteristics in themselves and others. But in
accepting this task, they are also admitting that the artificiality of the nomoi that effect
this habituation does not provide a reason for thinking that nomoi do not deserve respect
and the individual's compliance. The artificiality of nomoi does not provide a reason to
dispute the normative status of the nomoi; rather, nomoi that fail to instill truly virtuous
qualities do not deserve a normative status because they fail to achieve their pedagogical
aim. Thus, Socrates has persuaded them to give up the artificiality thesis (T3). Laws,
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despite being human artifacts, deserve respect because they provide habituation into a
preliminary sort of virtue.
In what follows, I point out several important capitulations that Glaucon and
Adeimantus make as they take the role of “recipients” and “designers” in the discussion
of the musical and poetic education. I organize these capitulations by virtue, and provide
the definition of each virtue in the political sense, as is given in the Book IV.216 The
essence of the point that I will make here is that Glaucon and Adeimantus concede nearly
the entirety of Socrates' position in the course of this discussion: almost everything they
idealized in the unjust person, they admit to be somehow vicious. In a sense, the
argument for the intrinsic worth of justice in Book IV simply re-describes the concessions
they have already made. However, because they concede these points under the
assumption that they are discussing a purely habituative stage of education—a stage that
is justified because of its social utility—Socrates has not yet answered their demand to
know the power of “justice itself” in the soul. Nonetheless, their concessions may be
interpreted as the process by which Socrates releases them from the illusion that injustice
is better for a person. Finally, I shall point out ways in which the virtues described in
books II-III function as preliminary virtues for eventual philosophers.

§5. Piety and the Simplicity of the Divine: Preliminaries to Wisdom
Socrates and Adeimantus agree on two “patterns” that will guide the poets' compositions
216 It is uncommon for scholars to examine the virtues in this way, by starting from their preliminary forms
in the habituative education. Santas argues that Plato distinguishes the virtues of wisdom, courage, and
sophrosunē by identifying each as the excellence of one of the functions of the city. The functions of the
city on his analysis are provision, defend, and rule itself (Understanding Plato's Republic, 68-71). It is
clear how courage and wisdom could count as the virtues of the function of defending and ruling, but on
this analysis sophrosunē seems not to fit because it is not clear how it is the excellence of the function
of provisioning. This sort of analysis also overlooks the subtler psychological features of these virtues,
such as the ways that they regulate pleasure and pain.

123

of stories about the gods. The first pattern stipulates that (a) “the god is good in reality,
and it is necessary to say so” (ἀγαθός ὅ γε θεός τῷ ὄντι τε καὶ λεκτέον οὕτω, 379b1); (b)
“he [the god] […] could not be the cause of bad”; and (c) the good is cause of things
holding well, but not the cause of bad things” ([…] τῶν μὲν εὐ ἐχόντων αἴτιον, τῶν δὲ
κακῶν ἀναίτιον, 379b6-7). In this sense Socrates construes god as an agent that has the
power to “do” (ποιεῖ) and “be responsible for” (αἴτιον) good. The second pattern
stipulates that divinity is “simple” (ἁπλοῦν, 382e5) and “wholly undeceptive” (πάντῃ ἄρα
ἀψευδὲς, 382e4). These patterns explain in what ways various famous stories from Greek
mythology wrongly portray the nature of divinity,217 while the justification for censoring
the stories from Homer and Hesiod lies in the social utility of the behaviors that the
correct portrayals of divinity allegedly encourage. The first pattern excludes stories about
Kronos' castration of Ouranos (378a); in-fighting among the Olympian family;218 and
Zeus' distribution of both goods and evils in different proportions to individuals.219
Censoring stories like these will allegedly prevent citizens from believing that by
committing horrible crimes “they wouldn't be doing anything out of the ordinary, not
even if they inflicted every kind of punishment on a father who treated them badly”
(378b, Griffith), while portraying unity among the family of the gods will convince
people that “no citizen has ever quarreled with another citizen” (378d, Griffith). Finally,
regarding divinity as the cause of solely good things will help convince people that when

217 Socrates likens the poets who portray the gods badly to painters (γραφεύς) “who pain things that in no
way bear resemblance to whatever things they wanted to paint” (ὅταν εἰκάζῇ τις κακῶς τῷ λόγῳ περί
θεῶν τε καῖ ἡρώων οἷοί είσιν, ὥσπερ γραφεὺς μηδὲν ἐοικὸτα γράφων οἷς ἄν ὅμοια βουληθῇ γράψαι,
377e2-3).
218 Socrates has two stories in mind here: (1) Hephaestus' binding of Hera and (2) Zeus' hurling
Hephaestus from mount Olympus (Iliad, I.586-5940).
219 Achilles' lament at Iliad, XXIV.527-532.
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they are punished, they are at fault, and the punishment is good for them (380b).220 The
second pattern, on the other hand, excludes stories about the gods disguising themselves
as humans or as other beings,221 or changing form, either because something else causes
them to, or from their own initiative.
Socrates argues that a god would not deceive us by disguising itself because the
gods, as well as mortals, hate “the true falsehood,” i.e., having mistaken notions about
“the chiefest matters” (περὶ τὰ κυριώτατα, 382a4-5) in “the chiefest part of himself” (τῷ
κυριωτάτῳ, 382a4). Disguising oneself would be structurally similar to “the false in
speech” (τὸ ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ψεῦδος, 382с4), a use of falsehood that Socrates calls an
“image” (εἴδωλον, 382с1) of the “unmixed falsehood” (ἄκρατον ψεῦδος, 382с2). It is not
clear in what sense verbal falsehoods are an “image” of the more primary falsehood, but
some speculation may shed light on the matter. Socrates defends the use of “the false in
speech” by pointing out that lies may be useful “just as medicine is useful” (ὡς φάρμακον
χρήσιμον, 382d1), and the myths they have discussed may convey some truth, even if the
people and events they describe are not real.222 Verbal falsehoods may imitate the
unmixed falsehood because they do not concern the most important things and do not
take root in the most important part of oneself. Although the question of justice is still
undecided, it seems correct to include beliefs about justice among the “most important”
things. Beliefs about justice can be said to take root in the most important part of a person

220 A claim that has some precedent on Homer. In the Odyssey Zeus laments that mortals blame the gods
when things go badly, when they ought to blame their own recklessness (Od., I.30-35).
221 Socrates mentions Proteus, who has an episode in the Odyssey (IV.412).
222 Kamtekar interprets this passage as an indication that Plato was willing to accept tripartite psychology
as a kind of useful “falsehood in words” (“Speaking with the Same Voice as Reason,” in Plato and the
Divided Self, eds. Rachel Barney, Tad Brennan, Charles Brittain [New York: Cambridge University
Press, 2012], 199). This interpretation is questionable, however, because tripartite psychology might be
one of the things that takes root in “the most important part” of oneself, and it is in this “place” of
oneself that Socrates says one must guard against falsehood.
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because they dictate the whole of a person's conduct, and ultimately his or her character.
Verbal falsehoods misrepresent certain facts, but they do not misrepresent truths about the
“most important things;” moreover, they do not take root in the “most important part” of
oneself, as they may be fairly easily discarded.
Adeimantus agrees that any stories told contrary to these patterns would not be
“pious” (οὔτε ὅσια ἄν λεγόμενα, 380c2-3)—an agreement that suggests piety as the
operative virtue in this discussion.223 If we look carefully, Adeimantus has conceded two
quite significant points in this discussion. First, he concedes that skill in dissemblance—
at which Glaucon says the unjust person must excel—is not really a virtue. This
concession becomes apparent when he agrees that the social utility of the second pattern
lies in its potential to make the guardians “god-fearing and godlike, to the greatest extent
possible for a human being” (383c3-4).224 But divinity was just described as “simple”
(ἁπλοῦν 382e5) and “wholly undeceptive” (382e5); the gods do not deceive others or
disguise themselves. In striving for this simplicity of character, the guardians must refuse
to engage in dissemblance, and therefore could not practice the virtue that is necessary to
commit injustice and maintain a reputation for perfect justice. Second, Adeimantus gives
up his view of the traditional representation of the gods that he held in his portion of the
challenge. There he observed that if the gods exist and are interested in human beings,
then “our only knowledge or hearsay of them comes from custom and the poets who sing
of the gods' family histories” (365e, Griffith). But according to the traditional
representation, the gods “give many good people unhappiness and a wretched life, while
223 The prohibition of stories about intra-familial violence among the gods will allegedly prevent intrafamilial conflict among those in the city. These stories recall the context of the Euthyphro, in which a
conflict between father and son introduces the question about piety.
224 […] εἰ μέλλουσιν ἡμῖν οἱ φύλακες θεοσεβεῖς τε καὶ θεῖοι γίγνεσθαι καθ' ὅσον ἀνθρώπῳ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον
οἷόν τε (383c3-4).
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to their opposites they give a life which is quite different” (364b, Griffith), and are in fact
so inconstant that one may bribe them with sacrifices to dole out either good or evil to
whomever on wishes.225 Adeimantus argued that these characteristics of the gods imply
that the best policy for a person to follow is to act unjustly, because any way one looks at
it, there appear to be ways for the unjust person neutralize divine powers. Why, then, does
Adeimantus agree to Socrates' portrayal of the nature of divinity? I suggest that one
reason he agrees is that he in fact disrespects the hypocrisy of those who subscribe to the
traditional portrayal of the gods. The traditional conception does not give people a reason
to respect justice, even though the poets who represent that tradition pay lip-service to
virtues by portraying rewards for the virtuous in the afterlife. The reward for those who
practice just and piety, for instance, is “perpetual drunkenness” in Hades.226 But if that is
the greatest good for human beings, then why wait for the afterlife to partake in it?
Adeimantus thus approves of Socrates' arguments for the simplicity of both the divine
and the guardians who are properly educated, because this education may prevent the
duplicity of those who subscribe to the traditional Homeric conception of the gods.
Finally, I would like to point out ways that the two patterns anticipate some of
Socrates' descriptions of the virtue of wisdom. The simplicity and causal power (for
good) of the divine anticipates the form of the Good, which receives the same description
in Book VI, and mimics other standard descriptions of forms in Plato's dialogues. In the
Republic, the good is the “cause of knowledge and truth” (αἰτίαν δ' ἐπιστήμης οὖσαν καὶ
ἀληθείας, 508e3) and the “first principle of everything” (παντὸς ἀρχὴν, 511b6); in the

225 Cf. Annas, Introduction, 65. Annas may be right to describe Adeimantus' contribution to Glaucon's
challenge as “minor,” but I suggest his dissatisfaction with the hypocrisy of the poets is crucial to
understanding how Socrates exerts a protreptic effect on him.
226 Rep., 363c3-d2
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Symposium, the form of the beautiful is neither beautiful nor ugly either in part, or at one
point in time but not another, but rather appears as an unadulterated simple.227 Thus we
may view these two patterns about the divine as mythological placeholders for the forms.
In yet another way, the behaviors that these stories encourage help develop the virtue of
the logistikon, which in Book IV Socrates describes as “forethought over the good of the
whole.”228 Although these stories might not develop the virtue of forethought, they at
least instill a sense of reverence for the good as a demand that supersedes all other
interests.

§6. Courage
Socrates eventually defines courage as the “preservation of the opinion that has
come about by education, under the power of law, about fearful things, what sorts of
things they are. By 'preserving [of this opinion] through everything' I meant really
preserving the opinion among pains, pleasures, desires, and fears, and not casting it
out.”229 In what follows I will explain how the patterns regarding courage anticipate and
elucidate this definition. The patterns that guide the poets' composition of stories for
courage are two: (a) they must say something “positive,” rather than “negative” about the
underworld and (b) they must portray courageous people as emotionally centered, prone
neither to excessive grief when experiencing personal loss (377d-378e), nor to “being
overcome by laughter” (κρατουμένους ὑπὸ γέλωτος, 388e6). The social utility of the first
pattern is grounded on the assumption that the traditional form of courage is an ability to
227 Sym., 210e5-211b6
228 Rep., 441e.
229 Τὴν [σωτηρίαν] τῆς δόξης τῆς ὑπὸ νόμου διὰ τῆς παιδείας γεγονυίας περί τῶν δεινῶν, ἅ τε ἐστι καὶ
οἷα· διὰ παντὸς ἔλεγον αὐτῆς σωτηρίαν τὸ ἐν τε λύπαις ὄντα διασῴζεσθαι αὐτὴν καὶ ἐν ἡδοναῖς καὶ ἐν
ἐπιθυμίαις καὶ ἐν φόβοις καὶ μὴ ἐκβάλλειν (429c5-d2).
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endure the prospect of sudden death in battle. If guardians believe that something more
glorious awaits them in the afterlife, then they will be less afraid to confront the prospect
of death. The social utility of the second pattern, however, is not quite so clear. For
example, one might argue that grief is an indication of one's love for another person, and
thus an indication of one's commitment to that person. How could someone risk his life
without this feeling of commitment? Grief might also spur the desire for revenge, which
might make the guardians fiercer in battle. It is also not clear why easy amusement would
threaten the guardians' cultivation of courage—surely amusements and laughter provide
relief from the horror of war.
The social utility of the second pattern does not become apparent until later in
Book III, when Socrates discusses the influences that cause people to change their
convictions (413b). Two of these causes are “magic” and “force” (413b1): people give up
their convictions under the influence of “magic” when they experience pleasure, and
under the influence of “force” when they experience “pain or grief” (413b6).230 Socrates
then proposes that they test an individual's ability to maintain his or her convictions in the
midst of pains and pleasures that accompany different emotional states before they make
that person a guardian. More specifically, they will test for a conviction that qualifies a
person to be a guardian, i.e., the conviction to act in the best interests of the city as a
whole. Evidently, the purpose of this test is to gauge a person's ability to maintain a sort
of emotional centeredness under certain stresses, lest they give up this guardianqualifying conviction. In light of these considerations, the desirability of emotional
centeredness becomes more apparent and, as a result, Socrates overturns some of the
Homeric qualities of courage. For example, a guardian who experienced excessive grief
230 The third cause, “theft,” is persuasion and forgetfulness.
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over a personal loss might fail to fulfill his duties to others. Achilles' reaction to
Patroklos' death in the Iliad provides a good illustration of this danger. In one particularly
brutal scene, Achilles kills Lycaon, even though the latter has clasped Achilles' knees in
religious supplication.231 Thus, one might argue that a kind of emotional derangement
caused Achilles to commit an impiety. On the other hand, a person who was easily
overcome by laughter might fail to perceive what is at stake in a situation that calls for
seriousness. For example, in his work on Greek comedy, Stephen Halliwell observes that
ancient Greek humor typically features an object of derision, so that humor may be
predicated on a differentiation between superior and inferior.232 A guardian who is too
easily overcome with laughter might become captivated by this dynamic, and secretly
despise the citizens whom he is supposed to defend.
The repetition of the portrait of emotionally centered individuals shows that
courage performs the function of maintaining the diachronic identity of the guardians, by
preserving their characteristic conviction as they experience pleasure, pain, and different
emotions. Thus, the prohibition of stories that portray as courageous those individuals
who experience emotional extremes is consistent with the definition of courage that
Socrates later provides. In accepting these patterns for the stories about courage,
however, Glaucon and Adeimantus effectively reject their assertion that just people fail to
practice injustice only because of their cowardice. The greatest injustice that the
guardians risk committing is the plundering of the citizenry, but the identification of
pleasure and pain as the causes of a kind of false courage help explain why true courage

231 Iliad, XXI.1-200.
232 For a more detailed discussion of the relation of laughter to sophrosunē, See Stephen Halliwell, Greek
Laughter: A Study of Cultural Psychology from Homer to Early Christianity (New York: Cambridge
University Press, 2008), 23-27.
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could not commit injustice against the city. For example, a guardian who took excessive
pleasure in the material wealth of the laboring class might be tempted by that pleasure to
take an undeserved share of the wealth. On the other hand, a guardian who experienced
excessive grief over the loss of a friend in battle might feel resentment toward citizens
who did not fight on the city's behalf, and lay claim to a greater share of the city's wealth
than they deserve—or worse, come to see the citizens as unworthy of defense.233 Here
Glaucon and Adeimantus have acknowledge that courage in the conventional sense
requires accepting constraints on one's experience of emotions; there are, in other words,
norms that indicate the appropriateness of the type or quantity of emotion to a
circumstance.234 The failure to observe these norms may directly interfere with a
guardian's ability to properly act in the city's best interest. Therefore, they must admit the
falsity of the Thrasymachus' assertion that people fail to commit injustice because they
are cowards.
Nonetheless, the conviction which defines the guardians' courage falls short of the
demand to be “really persuaded” that justice is intrinsically desirable. Presumably,
guardians must go through some form of training to acquire a sense of these norms. But
this only means that they have aligned their emotional life with their duty; they have
minimized the conflict between what their duties demand and whatever resistance their
emotions may offer to fulfilling these demands. So, while they avoid practicing injustice,
they may still lack a positive sense of the worth of justice. On the other hand, the courage
233 These dangers also point to the great care which must be taken not to waste the Guardians' courage in
pointless wars. It may be that the only way to guarantee that they act with the courage Plato describes is
by limiting their combat to the defense of the city. Although Socrates seems to describe offensive
campaigns in Book V (στρατεύσονται, 466e2; a word that describes marching and camp-making), he
also proposes that these campaigns will be training exercises for the young, and not reckless offensive
exploits.
234 Another point that Halliwell discusses at length; see his discussion of the philosophical “agelast,”
Greek Laughter, 39-40; 271-274.
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describe here appears to be preparatory for the philosopher's courage in the practice of
dialectic in that both require the same emotional centeredness. Socrates says that the
philosopher must “fight through all attempts to disprove his theory in his eagerness to test
it by the standard of being rather than the standard of opinion” (534c1-3, Griffith). The
two extremes of rage and grief seem possible in relation to this defense of one's theory:
(a) one might become so disheartened at suffering a defeat that one ceases trying to argue
for one's ideas; (b) one might become so enraged at one's interlocutor that one derides
him and refuses to recognize that one's theory has been refuted.235

§7. Sophrosunē
When Socrates defines sophrosunē in Book IV, he begins by describing it as
something “more like to a harmony or musical mode”236 than the other virtues (courage
and wisdom). He then defines the virtue as agreement among the parts of the city and
soul about which part is to rule, and which part is to be ruled.237 Before defining
sophrosunē as an “agreement,” however, he first describes it as “being obedient to the
rulers (ἀρχόντων) and being a ruler with respect to the pleasures of food, sex, and
drink.238 Superficially, then, it is not apparent how the stories about sophrosunē in the
musical education promote “harmony” and “agreement” among the parts of the city and
soul. Although we will not receive a full account of the agreement about which part in the
soul is to rule, and which to be ruled, until Book IV, I suggest an interpretation of the

235 It takes no stretch of the imagination to recognize Thrasymachus as a good illustration of the latter
extreme.
236 […] ξυμφονίᾳ τινὶ καὶ ἁρμονίᾳ προσέοικεν μᾶλλον ἤ τὰ πρότερον (430e1-3).
237 431e; 442d.
238 Σωφροσύνης δὲ ὡς πλήθει οὐ τὰ τοιάδε μέγιστα, ἀρχόντων μὲν ὑπηκόους εἶναι, αὐτοὺς δὲ ἄρχοντας
τῶν περὶ πότους καὶ ἀφροδίσια καὶ περὶ ἐδωδὰς ἡδόνων, 389d8-e2.
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stories about sophrosunē and the purging of the city of musical and dietetic luxuries in
Book III that shows how they anticipate and elucidate the definition from Book IV.
Finally, I argue that Glaucon and Adeimantus give up some of their prior commitments in
this conversation because they see an essential connection between sophrosunē and
philosophy.
The patterns for this virtue appear to require that the stories depict two sorts of
behaviors: (1) actions that are paradigmatically sophron, and (2) the use of persuasion as
the proper means for dealing with behavior that exceeds proper measure, or is aphron.
The first point appears in the suggestion that they forbid stories like the one Homer tells
about Zeus in the Iliad, in which Zeus is so overcome with sexual desire for Hera that he
forgets about his plan to help the Achaeans. Although this episode deals with sexual
desire, Socrates extends the lesson beyond appetitive pleasures to corruption and avarice,
suggesting that sophrosunē lessens the likelihood that the citizens will take bribes and be
swayed by gifts. In connection with this point, he suggests that they must censor
numerous episodes from the Iliad about Achilles, such as his acceptance of gifts from
Agamemnon and his killing of live prisoners at Patroklos' funeral. In a similar vein,
Socrates forbids the poets to say that gods or descendants of the gods commit abductions
and other crimes. The problem with these sorts of stories, Socrates points out, is that they
encourage people to forgive themselves for doing wrong, and may “implant a proclivity
for wickedness in the young.”239
The use of persuasion in the stories about sophrosunē is apparent in Socrates’s
approval of another episode from the Iliad, involving Diomedes and Sthenelus. The

239 […] ὧν ἕνεκα παυστέον τοὺς τοιούτους μύθους, μὴ ἡμῖν πολλὴν εὐχερείαν ἐντίκτωσι τοῖς νέοις
πονηρίας (391e11-d1).
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context of the episode is a scene in which Agamemnon is exhorting the troops to fight,
and suggests that Diomedes is not living up to the courage of his own father.240 Sthenelus
replies to Agamemnon and boasts that they are better men than their fathers,241 but
Diomedes rebukes Sthenelus, saying that it is entirely understandable that Agamemnon
should exhort the soldiers by shaming them,242 since whether they succeed or fail,
Agamemnon will take the responsibility. In other words, if the Achaeans lose, no one will
fault the soldiers because they held back from the fray—but everyone will blame
Agamemnon for losing the battle. In this sense, Diomedes is rebuking Sthenelus for
questioning his archon. With this story Socrates wants to demonstrate that sophron
actions display an obedience that comes about by persuasion rather than by force. The
point, it seems, is that the virtuousness of a moderate action consists in part in one's
heeding logos.243
Socrates' insistence on the rule of persuasion in paradigmatically sophron actions
is pivotal in revealing the depth of Adeimantus' as yet unacknowledged commitment to
sophrosunē. Since Glaucon and Adeimantus have already conceded that pleonexia is not
psychologically basic, they need an account of how the guardians' desires will be
conditioned. The stories about sophrosunē have the superficial function of conditioning
the appetitive desires (i.e. for food, drink, and sex) by providing details about what sorts
of appetites are appropriate to satisfy, and in what quantities. But the specific requirement
that the stories portray the virtue of obeying persuasion (as in the episode with Sthenelus
and Diomedes) suggests that sophrosunē has a deeper function, in that it conditions the
240 Iliad, IV.368-400.
241 Iliad, IV.404-411
242 Iliad, IV.412-418
243 In Chapter 4 I argue that thumos performs this function of representing accountability to authoritative
persons, but not yet to reasons or logoi.
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guardians to be receptive to logos. The logos that they receive, however, may not be
wholly rational, and their way of receiving it might not be wholly reason-responsive;
rather, it might be necessary that the logos come from a particular person, such as a
figure of authority, in order to have a compelling effect. Nonetheless, the figure whose
logos the guardians heed may function as a surrogate for the authority of reasons, which
are internal to logos.
Sophrosunē remains under consideration as the discussion proceeds to the
question of musical modes, rhythms, and narrative styles. In this portion of the
discussion, Glaucon and Adeimantus capitulate on their claim that the satisfaction of
appetitive desires and desires for luxuries is a constituent of the virtuous life. They make
this concession when they purge the city of both poetic and dietetic luxuries—a purging
that is not without some irony, since they remove the very luxuries that initiated the
construction of the “inflamed” city. As I suggest below, the reason for this concession is
not simply that they agree that the pleasures that accompany such desires are bad (though
they may be); rather, they come to see that sophrosunē regulates the pleasures that
accompany these desires because it promotes pleasure in the kosmion, or the “wellordered.” This pleasure in turn makes available the intellectual pleasure of philosophical
argument—a pleasure which Glaucon's practical commitment to the very conversation of
the Republic presupposes.
Socrates proposes that they should ban poets who use too much imitation, and
prefer poets who use mostly direct narration and imitate only the good man, and, quite
amazingly, Adeimantus agrees to this restriction, even though Socrates points out that the
“mixed variety [of narration] is also pleasant” (ἡδύς γε καὶ ὁ κεκραμένος, 3974-5).
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Socrates then notes the irony in Adeimantus' willingness to accept such restrictions on the
arts by saying that “we have gone undetected in purging again the city which we just said
was luxurious!”244 Adeimantus' reply to Socrates' irony is telling: they were “acting with
sophrosunē [or showing soundness of mind],” he says, in so purging the city
(σωφρονοῦντες γε ἡμεῖς, 399e6). Likewise, Glaucon commits another act of “purging,”
this time related to diet and physical education, when he agrees to forbid the guardiansoldiers eat such foods as Sicilian cuisine (Σικελικήν ποικιλιάν ὄψου, 404d2). The
moment is not only comic for its portrayal of Glaucon's about-face on his original
demand for luxurious foods; it also drives home the concession that the brothers have
made with respect to their views on the need of the pleasures that attend such luxuries.
The satisfaction of such appetites is not necessary, and perhaps even inimical to, the
virtuous life.
Why don't Glaucon and Adeimantus resist these concessions, which represent
clear reversals of their position in Book II? I suggest that the reason Glaucon, in
particular, revokes his demand for luxuries is that he eventually realizes the necessity of
sophrosunē for philosophy. This connection between sophrosunē and philosophy appears
in the intrusion that eros makes in the conversation when Socrates describes the type of
character that musical education will create. Such a person will be “well formed”
(εὐσχήμονα, 401d6) and kalos te kagathos, (καλὸς τε κἀκαθὸς, 402a1), a colloquial
phrase that might be translated as “a noble gentleman.” And it is this type of person that
“the musically-educated would love most of all,”245 but not someone who is “out of tune”
(ἀξύμφονος, 402d6). Socrates employs affective means of persuasion by teasing Glaucon

244 λελήθαμέν γε διακαθαίροντες πάλιν ἥν ἄρτι τρυφᾶν ἔφαμεν πόλιν, (399e5).
245 Τῶν δὴ ὅ τι μάλιστα τοιούτων ἀθρώπων ὅ γε μουσικός ἐρᾠη ἄν (402d6-7).
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with the rumor that Glaucon was a lover of a boy who had a beautiful soul, but a “defect”
in body.246 The two conclude that “the right love is by nature to love the well-ordered
(κόσμιον) and beautiful” (403a4-5)247 and that “the musical must end in erotics of the
beautiful.”248 These agreements represent a concession on Glaucon's part. When Glaucon
insisted on a luxurious city, he expressed his desire and appreciation for the products of
the technai that the city of pigs lacked. His desire for luxuries stemmed from a love of the
kosmion in crafts and cuisine, but as they discuss musical and physical education,
Glaucon comes to realize his greater esteem for the soul that is kosmion. Among the chief
benefits of the musical education is the guiding of students into “friendship and harmony
with the beauty of speech and thought” (401d). It is these characteristics of the soul that
Glaucon must value more than Αttic pastries, since he himself is a formidable speaker
and appreciates the company of other formidable speakers, such as Socrates and
Thrasymachus.
The censoring of famous stories from the Iliad that portray the gods being
overcome by sexual desires reinforces this connection between sophrosunē and
philosophy by calling our attention to distinctions among pleasures. We might interpret
the prohibition of stories about gods experiencing sexual pleasures as an introductory
lesson about pleasures that have a “lesser share of being,” which form a crucial part of
Socrates argument for the greater pleasantness of the philosophical life in Book IX.249 It
would be wrong to portray the gods succumbing to sexual pleasure because it would
246 402e1-2.
247 Ὁ δὲ ὀρθὸς ἔρως πέφυκε κοσμίου τε καὶ καλοῦ σωφρόνως τε καὶ μουσικῶς ἐρᾶν (403a4-5)
248 “δεῖ δέ που τελευτᾶν τὰ μουσικὰ ἐις τὰ τοῦ καλοῦ ἐρωτικὰ (403c4-5). An excessively literal
translation, but one that may preserve the intellectual character of the educated person's “love” of the
beautiful. Τά ἐρωτικά invokes a passage from the Symposium where Socrates says “I claim to know
[about] nothing other than love-matters” (οὐδέν φημι ἄλλο ἐπίστσθαι ἤ τὰ ἔρωτικά, 177e1).
249 Socrates discusses the three types of pleasures corresponding to the three types of lives (philosophical,
honor-loving, and money-loving) at 581c-587a.
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suggest that sexual pleasures are the best of all available pleasures, without even raising
the question as to whether intellectual pleasures are better or more satisfying. The very
fact that Glaucon participates in the conversation of the Republic, and is instrumental in
propelling the conversation, attests to the sincerity of his commitment to intellectual
pleasure and the beauty of speech and thought, since otherwise it would be difficult to
account for his carrying on the conversation for so long, when he might have retired, as
Cephalus did. Thus, what Glaucon realizes through the discussion of education is not
only his own commitment to the “beauty of speech and thought,” and greater esteem for
the pleasure that comes from engaging with a kosmia psuchē, but also the recognition that
the condition of soul that allows for this comes about through an educational program
that imposes limits on the appetites and pleasures of its pupils. He realizes, in other
words, that sophrosunē regulates the pleasures of food, drink, and sex, but only by
cultivating greater esteem for intellectual pleasure and the kosmia psuchē.

§8. Reading the Virtues as Musical Exercise: The Protreptic Function
of Republic II and III
Τhe accumulation of concessions that Glaucon and Adeimantus make in Books IIIII results in a near reversal of their position regarding justice and injustice, even before
Socrates has defined justice as a virtue of the soul and argued for its intrinsic worth. This
is apparent in the way that their concessions imply, on the one hand, the contradiction of
fundamental premises of the Technē Model of justice, and on the other hand, the
recognition of certain characteristics of the perfectly unjust person as vicious. With the
founding of the city according to the “one man, one task” principle, the brothers concede
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that egoism, not pleonexia, is psychologically basic. The introduction of the Guardians
implies the need for laws that deserve respect not simply because they are artifacts, but
because they play a necessary role in habituative education. And when the brothers
discuss the specific patterns of habituation that they think the guardians should receive,
they concede that simplicity, not duplicity, is a virtue; that courage does not assist the
practice of in injustice; and that the acceptance of limits on one's appetites and
reorientation of eros toward the kosmia psuchē produces exceptional character.
These concessions do not yet furnish an argument that justice is a good desirable
both for its own sake and for its consequences, but they perhaps offer a kind of proof of
the negative, i.e., that injustice is not “good” by nature. Although we do not yet have a
view of the effect of injustice on the soul, we have an account of the damage that
pleonexia may inflict on a polis, and of the ways different vices might compromise the
ability of the guardians to act as true defenders of the city. But as we noticed, these
moments of capitulation occur in the discussion of a habituative education—a stage of
education that relies on uncritical receptivity. On the one hand, education has a purely
habituative portion, which consists in using what Socrates calls “the false in words” (τὸ
ἐν τοῖς λόγοις ψεῦδος 382с4) to inculcate beliefs and behaviors that have social utility; on
the other hand, Socrates says that the goal of philosophical education is the “turning of
the soul from becoming to being,” a turning that must occur spontaneously because it is
not possible to “put knowledge in” (ἐντιθέναι, 518c2) the soul, as one might “put sight
into blind eyes.”250 The tension between these two goals of education becomes apparent
when we consider the kind of attitude that habituation demands in contrast with
philosophical inquiry. Habituation in early education requires that one inhabit a receptive,
250 […] οἷον τυφλοῖς ὀφθαλμοῖς ὄψιν ἐντιθέντες, (518c2).
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rather than critical, attitude. A person who played the moral skeptic, demanding at every
turn a justification for the moral rules that comprise early education, might fail to become
habituated in the way the educational program intends. But on the other hand, a receptive
attitude counteracts the goal of a philosophical education, which is to demand a rational
justification for those rules. This same tension is reflected in the conditions that Glaucon
and Adeimantus set upon their inquiry into justice, and the subsequent line of argument
that they pursue in Book III. Glaucon and Adeimantus demand to be truly persuaded of
the superiority of the just life, and challenge Socrates with an argument that exposes the
hypocrisy of the arguments that the poets and traditional authorities offer for justice.251
More specifically, they would be satisfied if they knew what power justice has in the soul
“by itself,” and if they could be persuaded that justice is the type of good that is desirable
both in itself and for its consequences. But habituative education does not meet their
demand because it shows only that the behaviors and beliefs that people receive are
socially useful, not that these beliefs and behaviors have intrinsic worth for the soul.
The question we must now pose and try to answer is whether the program of
habituative education that Socrates describes in Books II-III lives up to Plato's own
provocative-aporetic model of protreptic; that is, whether it provides the tools for
superseding itself. In order to answer this question, we must draw on the distinctions we
made in Chapter One regarding the means and the recipients of protreptic. In what
follows I shall argue that two aspects of musical education qualify habituation as a
provocative-aporetic means of protreptic: (a) the practice of imitation and (b) the
development of an intellectual capacity to perceive incompleteness and deficiency in an
object. The combination of these two aspects allows us to interpret as instruction in a
251 Especially Adeimantus' portion of the challenge (363a-367e).
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protreptic education those moments at which Socrates discloses the fact that Glaucon and
Adeimantus are conceding points of their challenge. However, we must take care to
distinguish between readers and interlocutors in order to determine for whom the
discussion of habituation may have a protreptic effect. As I have argued throughout this
chapter, Glaucon and Adeimantus remain unaware of the concessions they make in the
course of the discussion in Books II-III, and the inadequacies of their own answers to
Socrates' questions. They receive arguments—of a sort—from Socrates, but precisely
because they fail to take up the provocation of Socrates' disclosure of their concessions,
the means by which Socrates “turns” them are intellectual rather than provocativeaporetic. As I shall argue below, Glaucon and Adeimantus receive Socrates' argument “on
trust,” rather than critically. For readers, on the other hand, Socrates' argument may have
a protreptic effect by provocative-aporetic means: the observer-position that readers
occupy in relation to interlocutors allows for the critical distance which prompts their
recognition of Socrates' disclosures of the concessions as provocations.
To begin, I would like to point out the significance of the lesson that Socrates
teaches by disclosing to Adeimantus the concession he would be making if he allowed
Socrates to define the patterns for stories about mankind. This disclosure provides
instruction in the type of philosophical inquiry that Glaucon and Adeimantus demand
from Socrates, because it reveals that they have been failing to provide answers to
Socrates' questions that are consistent with their challenge; in fact, they seem to be
answering in ways that directly contradict some of the fundamental assumptions of their
challenge. Thus they are operating in a receptive, rather than critical, mode with respect
to Socrates' own proposals. However, their trust in Socrates, and thus their receptivity to
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Socrates' arguments, is also a quality that makes Glaucon and Adeimantus more
appropriate interlocutors than Thrasymachus. This suggests that receptivity itself is not
the problem with habituative education, but rather receiving in the wrong way. This casts
the moment discussed above in a new light, as it suggests that to properly conduct the
inquiry into justice, Glaucon and Adeimantus must receive Socrates' argument in the right
way.
Naturally, this raises the question as to the right way of receiving. To answer this
question, I suggest that we examine Socrates' statements about the effects of musical
education on the soul. After restricting the modes of narration and variety of imitation
that poets will be allowed to practice (394d-401d), Socrates explains that the effect of
musical education is to “make a person graceful” (ποιεῖ εὐσχήμονα, 401d6) and able to
“most keenly perceive deficiencies and things not well-crafted, or not fine by nature.”252
One way of construing the ability to perceive “deficiencies” might be as the ability to
perceive incompleteness in an object. For example, a well-trained composer might
perceive that a particular orchestration of a melody lacks the right “texture” of sound-perhaps the trumpets ought to play with mutes in order to produce the right texture. In
this sense, the composer who hears the bad orchestration has the feeling that something
that ought to be there is missing.
Thus, while musical education demands receptivity of its students, its goal is
actually to encourage creativity and spontaneity, in the sense that what is lacking from an
object may require some imagination to specify.253 With this in mind, we can return to the

252 [...] καὶ ὅτι αὖ τῶν παραλειπομένων καὶ μὴ καλῶς δημιουργηθέντων ἤ μὴ καλῶς φύντων ὀξύτατ' ἄν
αἰσθάνοιτο (401e1-3).
253 This proposal may assuage Annas' worry that Plato's education is authoritarian because it demands
receptivity without developing critical faculties (Introduction, 90).
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question of the significance of Socrates' disclosure to Adeimantus that if they define the
patterns for stories about humankind, then he and Glaucon will have conceded the
argument about justice to Socrates. In making this disclosure, Socrates is asking the
brothers to receive his argument in a “musical” way. When Socrates points out that
Glaucon and Adeimantus are conceding key premises of their challenge in their
discussion of habituative education, it is as if he is beckoning them to perceive that
something is missing from their answers to his questions—something that would
transform these answers into a real argument against their challenge if they supplied it.
This exercise in perceiving deficiencies helps us utilize the grammatical analogy for the
virtues, with which Socrates began the discussion about habituative education. In asking
Glaucon and Adeimantus to think of themselves as students learning to read, Socrates
was putting them in what seemed to be a receptive position: they would seem to be
receiving well-formed images of the virtues from Socrates, just as students receive wellformed images of the letters they must learn to read. As they continued the conversation,
they did not really perform this relation; Socrates did not simply give them images of the
well-formed virtues, but instead asked them to reflect on stories that they would prohibit
on account of the “distorted” images of the virtues that these stories contain. They agree
to these restrictions, and in the process give up key premises of their challenge. But they
make these concessions without recognizing that their prohibition of distorted images of
the virtues must rely on some comprehension of the properly-formed virtues. The
“musical” exercise that we are now asked to carry out by recognizing deficiencies in
Glaucon and Adeimantus' answers structurally compliments the first analogy by helping
us explain why the “molds” (τύποι) that Socrates recommends produce well-formed
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images of the virtues. This exercise has a protreptic effect for readers because we gain
this explanation not by merely receiving Socrates' argument, as if our souls were wax
being poured into the mold, but by perceiving and correcting deficiencies in the argument
for ourselves.
An essential feature of this musical exercise, then, is that it demands that readers
mimic the receptivity of their habituative education by receiving the argument about
justice from Socrates. But the purpose of this imitation is not simply to receive, but rather
to supersede a merely receptive attitude by exercising one's ability to perceive
deficiencies. This exercise, I suggest, also functions as a preliminary to the intellectual
exercises that Socrates says comprise philosophical education “proper,” particularly with
regard to the exercise of hypothesizing.254 Socrates identifies geometry as a preliminary
to dialectic because those who engage in it posit things such as “odd and even, figures
and the three types of angles” as simply “known,” and “see no need to justify them either
to themselves or to anyone else” (510c3-4, Griffith). We might, then, distinguish this
“musical” exercise from the way geometrical reasoning posits assumptions in the
following way. The assumptions that geometers make about lines and angles appear to be
“self-given,” in the sense that the evidence for their truth does not depend on any
traditional or cultural authority.255 In contrast, Glaucon and Adeimantus receive Socrates'

254 My proposal contains a reply to Christopher Gill's complaint that the musical and philosophical
portions of education are discontinuous. More specifically, he claims that Plato fails to explain how the
logistikon is educated, because the first portion of education developed only “the passive capacity of the
mind to absorb correct opinions” (See “Plato and the Education Of Character,” Archive für Geschicte
der Philosophie 67 [1985]: 14). On my reading, the musical education in fact prepares the guardians for
the kind of “musical exercise” that I discuss in this paper. If this musical exercise relies on a kind of
hypothesizing, then it is a kind of training for the logistikon. In the following chapter I will suggest
other ways in which the logistikon receives training in hypothesizing even before it engages in the more
disciplined hypothesizing that philosophers practice.
255 I rely on Mitchell Miller's insightful discussion of mathematical education for this point. See Mitchell
Miller, “Beginning the Longer Way” in The Cambridge Companion to Plato's Republic, ed. G.R.F.
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argument, and treat his claims as “hypotheses” on the basis of their trust in his wisdom.
Thus their relation as interlocutors with Socrates still mimics the relation of a young
student to a cultural authority; they accept Socrates' arguments on trust. What
distinguishes the readers' reception of Socrates' argument as “musical” is their
recognition of Socrates' disclosure of his interlocutors’' concessions as a provocation, a
moment for critical reflection on the argument that grounds the concession. In this way,
the habituative and musical education that Socrates describes in Books II-III can live up
to Plato's provocative-aporetic ideal of education when readers take up the same
discussion as a “musical” exercise.

Copyright © Peter Nielson Moore 2018
Ferrari (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 310-342; 318.

145

Chapter IV: Tripartite Psychology and the Virtue Model of Justice
In the preceding chapter I argued that Glaucon and Adeimantus conceded two
primary commitments of the Technē Model of justice and moral agency. Specifically,
they conceded that the artificiality thesis concerning nomoi (T2) and the psychological
basicality of pleonexia (T3) are false. In this chapter, I argue that the tripartite psychology
of Book IV targets the assumption that reason stands in an instrumental relation to
appetite (T1), an assumption the falsity of which Glaucon admits when he agrees that “it
is appropriate for the calculative part to rule, on account of its being wise and having
forethought over the whole soul.”256 Socrates' arguments for tripartite psychology are
crucial to his protreptic efforts because they perform two logical functions. First, they
force Glaucon's concession that the instrumentality thesis is false; second, they also
persuade Glaucon to accept that justice and the virtues are conditions analogous to the
health of the soul.257 In other words, tripartite psychology plays the dual role of
overturning Glaucon's former commitments to the Technē Model of justice and replacing
them with moral commitments that stem from a new conception of agency. More
specifically, Glaucon's former commitments are replaced by the project of psychic
integration. This project becomes apparent in the way that the arguments for tripartite
psychology identify threats to the coherence of appetitive and thumotic interests, and
show that the logistikon is crucial to integrating these two interests. Thus on the virtue
model, the distinctive feature of justice is its promotion of the project of psychic
256 […] λογιστικῷ ἄρχειν προσήκει, σοφῷ ὄντι καὶ ἔχοντι τὴν ὑπερ ἁπασης τῆς ψυχῆς πρμήθειαν (441e34). In this chapter I will refer to “appetite” as the epithumotikon.
257 Rep., 444e1; Glaucon agrees that “life is not worth living” when “the nature of that very thing by
which we live is disturbed and corrupted, even if someone does whatever he wishes.” […] τῆς δὲ αὐτοῦ
τούτου ᾧ ζῶμεν φύσεως ταραττομένης καὶ διαφθειρομένης, ἐάνπερ τις ποιῇ ὅ ἄν βουληθῇ (445a8445b2). Santas also identifies the instrumentality of reason as a chief point of dispute (Understanding
Plato's Republic, 123).
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integration, inasmuch as it demarcates the proper functions of thumos and epithumotikon,
and prepares the way for the exercise of other virtues—courage and sophrosunē--that
contribute to the project of psychic integration.
Tripartite psychology also functions as a provocative-aporetic means for
persuading readers of the assumptions of the Virtue Model of justice and agency. As we
read Socrates arguments for dividing the soul and assigning the functions he assigns to
each part, we notice in particular that Glaucon grants two points to Socrates that
contradict his commitments to the Technē Model of justice: that the logistikon rules the
soul and is not instrumental to desire, and that thumos is properly subservient to the
logistikon. But because Socrates qualifies this psychology as provisional and imprecise,
and because it is essential to answering Glaucon's challenge, we must ask whether Plato
intends some other protreptic effect by offering us this psychology.258 Thus, we must
inquire more generally about the conception of philosophy into which Plato means to
initiate us.259 Is it the protreptic function of tripartite psychology to issue in a practical
commitment to certain dialogical and epistemic virtues, and is this psychology
preparatory for a more “advanced” stage of philosophy? Or does this psychology only
encourage enthusiasm for philosophy “proper,” so that its arguments are only rhetorical
rather than educative, and the virtues it imparts “spurious” rather than true? My aim in
this chapter is to argue for a third option concerning the protreptic function of tripartite
psychology: Glaucon is persuaded to adopt the project of psychic integration as a new
practical commitment because of a genuine insight he gains into moral agency, and his
commitment to the project of psychic integration will help prepare him for the study of

258 For Socrates' claims about the inadequacy of tripartite psychology, see Republic, 506a4-b8.
259 I am referring to the methodological and metaphysical interpretations discussed in Chapter 1.
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dialectic described in Book VI. In this way, I will have identified what Glaucon is
persuaded of and the learning that persuades him. Stated briefly, I argue that the
logistikon in Book IV has a power of hypothesis—a power that opens up the possibility
of self-opposition within reason, and that is continuous with the portrayal of reason in
Book VII.260 This possibility of self-opposition, however, threatens the soul with
disintegration of a kind fundamentally different from the disintegration which the poor
managing of thumos and epithumotikon threatens. The commitment to psychic integrity
in the face of division within reason itself stands as the contribution that justifies the
characterization of Glaucon's accepting the virtue model of justice as a “turn from
becoming to being.”261

§1. Tripartite Psychology and The Principle of Non-Opposition
Interpreters of tripartite psychology often express doubts about the explanatory
power of tripartition on account of its disanalogies with the tripartite city and
discontinuity with both the portrait of the philosopher in Books V-VII.262 The problem of
260 To avoid confusion, I will use the term “logistikon” when referring to the deliberative and calculative
power portrayed in Book IV, while I will use the term “reason” when discussing the portrait of a
philosophically mature individual who possess phronēsis.
261 This commitment is crucial for the eventual engagement with philosophy, since philosophical thinking
requires inhabiting perspectives that may fundamentally contradict one's own commitments, but which
must be tolerated for the sake of pursuing truth. The Republic in fact provides an example of this aspect
of philosophical inquiry when Glaucon prefaces his revival of Thrasymachus' position by denying a
commitment to what Thrasymachus “and thousands like him” say about justice, but that for the sake of
argument he will make the argument for injustice as strong as possible (Rep., 358d).
262 A common criticism of the explanatory power is found in the infinite regress or “homunculus”
problem. Socrates divides the soul to explain psychic conflict, but attributes desires and motivations to
the different parts. As a result, the parts resemble autonomous agents in their own right, susceptible to
their own tripartite divisions. For a discussion of this problem see Irwin, Plato's Ethics, 217-218;
Annas, Introduction, 144-146; Bobonich, Plato's Utopia Recast, 221-28; Kamtekar, “Speaking with the
Same Voice as Reason,” 174-176. Another issue of concern is the discontinuity between the logistikon
of tripartite psychology and the reason of the philosopher portrayed in Books V and VI, who seems to
have distinct interest and eros of his own (480a; 485b). Ferrari argues that Socrates' examples fail to
draw a sharp distinction between thumos and reason, and suggests that “for the motivations of nonphilosophers a bipartite psychological analysis would suffice. There are the goals of self-respect and
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most immediate concern for my project lies in the apparent discontinuity between the
logistikon's function in tripartite psychology and reason's philosophical interests in the
central books. A common worry is that the logistikon lacks philosophical interests, and
functions only as an algorithm for ordering the priorities of thumos and epithumotikon.
This concern about the function of the logistikon relates to the protreptic effect of
Socrates' arguments on Glaucon because Socrates needs to show that reason rules the
soul, and “ruling” ought to mean more than simply managing the interests of the other
parts of the soul. If reason is to rule the soul, it ought to have interests of its own, and
these interests ought to regulate a person's life.
To address this problem, I will show how, for each division of the soul, the
hypothesizing power of the logistikon maintains psychic integration when the satisfaction
of the interests of thumos and epithumotikon threatens those same parts with selfannihilation. I argue that this observation allows us to attribute a unique—even if
limited—interest of the logistikon in maintaining psychic integration. This interest in the
project of psychic integration will answer the worry that the logistikon functions as a
mere manager of other interests of the soul. Second, I will explain how each division
refutes the assumption of the Technē Model of justice, viz., that the logistikon is
instrumental to the epithumotikon. In this way we will see how Socrates completes the

there are material goals, and reason is a mere executive, balancing the two for their mutual benefit, but
without goals of its own.” (City and Soul in Plato's Republic, [Chicago: University of Chicago Press,
2005], 112). Annas argues that the argument for the first division between reason and appetite “gives an
inadequate and potentially misleading characterization of reason” (Introduction, 140; 135-140).
Roochnik argues that the addition of the love of learning “Powerfully revise[s] and enrich[es] the
tripartite psychology of book 4. There reason was reduced to calculation and radically separated from
desire. There the 'love of learning' (435e7) was mentioned but could not be fully accounted for. Here
reason has expanded and has itself become animated by Eros.” (Beautiful City, 20; 63). Finally,
regarding the disanalogies between tripartite city and tripartite soul, see Bernard Williams, “The
Analogy of City and Soul in Plato’s Republic” in Kraut, 1997, and David Sachs, “A Fallacy in Plato's
Republic,” in The Philosophical Review 72, No.2 (Apr., 1963): 141-158.
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refutation of the Technē Model of justice. However, as one feature of my position is that
Glaucon's turn from becoming to being entails that Glaucon positively learns something,
I must show that Socrates' arguments against the instrumentality of the logistikon have
some plausibility, and avoid construing them as ad hoc, or rhetorically useful but
unsound. Since a significant hurdle to understanding the division arguments lies in
explaining the function of the Principle of Non-Opposition that Socrates states, I provide
a reading of this principle that is consistent with the examples that Socrates uses to draw
his division. In this section I will argue that in addition to being crucial to Socrates'
arguments for dividing the soul, the PNO functions as a provocative-aporetic means for
getting readers to re-conceptualize the way they think about psychic integration. The
PNO applies this provocative-aporetic means to readers by compelling readers to engage
in hypothesizing, a power that Socrates attributes exclusively to the logistikon. Readers
thus exercise their logistikon in a setting where neither the interests of thumos nor the
interests of epithumotikon are the terms to be hypothesized about.
Socrates begins the argument for the division of the soul by positing the Principle
of Non-Opposition (PNO):
It is clear that the same thing will not be willing to do or undergo opposites, in the
same part, in relation to the same thing, at the same time; so that if we find these
[conditions] coming to be in these [autois], we will know that it is not the same
thing but rather more [than one].
δῆλον ὅτι ταὐτὸν τἀναντία ποιεῖν ἢ πάσχειν κατὰ ταὐτόν γε καὶ πρὸς ταὐτὸν οὐκ
ἐθελήσει ἅμα, ὥστε ἄν που εὑρίσκωμεν ἐν αὐτοῖς ταῦτα γιγνόμενα, εἰσόμεθα ὅτι
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οὐ ταὐτὸν ἦν ἀλλὰ πλείω. 263
Two questions about this principle are have defined much of the scholarship about
the tripartite soul: (1) what kind of requirement does the principle actually express, and
(2) does the PNO suffice to both differentiate the parts of the soul and justify what
Socrates calls the proper hierarchy of those parts, or does it only suffice to differentiate
the parts of the soul?264 The first question focuses on whether Socrates' principle is a
straightforward principle of non-contradiction, or a principle of non-opposition. The
interpretation as a principle of non-opposition emerges from the argument that Socrates'
examples of psychic conflict cannot actually differentiate psychic elements if we read the
principle as a principle of non-contradiction. Smith articulates this problem in the
example of a person who “wants to drink, but refuses” (Rep., 439a1-e1). He argues that
reading the principle as a principle of non-contradiction would not yield the description
of the kind of conflict that Socrates intends. For the proposition that contradicts “X

263 436b8-436c1
264Santas argues for the latter option (Understanding Plato's Republic [Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell
Publishing, 2010], 80). He reasons that the PNO differentiates different psychic activities, but fails to
say which activities are the “exclusive functions” of a certain power. For example, the PNO
differentiates anger from the desire for a drink, but when we attribute anger to the “spirited element,”
we also grant the power to “restrain” to that element. But why should “getting angry” belong
exclusively to thumos, and not also to the epithumotikon? Glaucon, after all, initially supposes that the
spirit is not really a distinct element, since its nature is the same as desire (Rep., 339e). Socrates,
however, corrects this mistake with the example of Leontius. It seems to me that Santas actually means
to find some argument for the hierarchy of the parts of the soul. On his reading, if we can show that an
element, whether of the city or the soul, can perform some function best, then it ought to perform that
function. Consequently, Santas reconstructs Socrates' argument for the virtue-bestowing hierarchy of the
soul's elements by trying to show that psychic activities, such as calculating, getting angry, causing
“motion toward,” can belong only to an element that has a certain nature. If these activities are
exclusive to certain elements of the soul, then no other hierarchy of the soul's parts is possible. Irwin
argues that the PNO (which he calls the “Principal of Contraries”) fails to capture “asymmetries”
between the parts of the soul, and for this reason is not the most convincing principle to use to divide
the soul. A symmetrical opposition is one in which A opposes B and B opposes A—for example, when
statements p and q contradict each other. An asymmetrical opposition is one in which only A opposes B,
such as when a political party opposes the government, but the government does not oppose that
political party. Irwin argues that the opposition between the epithumotikon and the other two parts of the
soul—thumos and logistikon—is asymmetrical because the epithumotikon does not oppose reason and
thumos, while reason and thumos actively oppose the epithumotikon (Plato's Ethics, 217).
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desires Y” is “X does not desire Y,” and “X does not desire” could mean “X lacks a desire
for Y.” Thus, if the principle describes a rule about non-contradiction, then a case in
which a person simultaneous desired and lacked a desire for some object should be the
paradigmatic case of conflict. Socrates does not appear to have this sort of description in
mind; rather, Smith suggests that he has in mind “the person seems to have two desires,
which appear to oppose on another.”265 Presumably, the person wants to drink and wants
not to drink. Indeed, what Socrates seems to have in mind as a demonstration of his
principle is the scenario in which a person desires A and desires ~A. In this scenario, the
person hosts two desires for mutually exclusive states of affairs or objects. This reading
conforms with what we commonly mean when we speak of our desires and aversions:
when I say I “don't want” something—say, perhaps, dressing on my salad—I don't mean
that I lack the desire for dressing, but, more commonly, that I desire that there not be
dressing on my salad. Of course, the ambiguity that when I say “I don't want X,” I could
mean that I simply lack the desire for X remains. Smith simply points out that Socrates'
first example does not demonstrate a straightforward contradiction, and for this reason we
ought to reject a reading of the PNO as a principle of non-contradiction.
However, when we examine the way that Socrates groups variations of desiring
and variations of not desiring and unwillingness, we see that the principle actually
resolves into a principle of non-contradiction. I argue that this is evident in the way that
readers are encouraged to utilize the principle to differentiate the parts of any spatiotemporal object whatsoever. Quite strikingly, Socrates justifies his reliance on the PNO
by citing an example of a geometric figure, namely a spinning top:

265 See Nicholas Smith, “Plato's Analogy of Soul and State,” in The Journal of Ethics, Vol. 3, No.1 (1999):
35.
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If he said, of a spinning top with its centre fixed in one place, or of anything else
rotating on the same spot, that the whole thing is both at rest and in motion,
we would not accept that. In cases like this, the parts in respect of which they are
both stationary and in motion are not the same parts. We would say they possess
both a vertical axis and a circumference. With respect to the axis they are at
rest, since they remain upright. With respect to the circumference they are
rotating.266
Considering this example is useful for answering Smith's interpretation because it shows
how Smith's conclusions follow from hypothesizing about the example using a principle
of non-contradiction. The challenge concerning the spinning top comes from someone
who claims that the top as a whole is both in motion and at rest. Prima facie, this claim
represents the top as being in two mutually-exclusive states: in motion and not in motion
(at rest). Socrates asks us to consider whether we would let this assertion stand in order to
help us see the need to posit the condition “in respect to the same.” When we add this
condition, the prima facie contradiction disappears. If we consider the soul as a whole in
like manner, without any conviction about whether it has parts or not, we could say that
prima facie, when a soul experiences psychic conflict, it both desires and lacks a desire
as a whole soul. But just as in the example of the top, so too with respect to the soul does
the PNO give us reason to seek a resolution of the prima facie contradiction: it is not that
the whole soul both desires and lacks a desire, but rather that it seems to desire with
266 436e, Griffith. This passage is of considerable importance to interpretations of the PNO. Bobonich
helpfully differentiates the possible views on this passage. One is that the principle lets us resolve
instances of apparent contrariety by “distinguishing two different subjects for complete contraries that
are non-coinstantiable.” On this view, the apparent contradiction in the top's being at motion and at rest
is resolved by differentiating between two distinct subjects: the axis and the circumference
(Philosopher-Kings, 223). Another view is that the PNO does not differentiate subjects, but rather
“different ways in which the same subject is qualified” (224). Bobonich settles on the first view (232234).
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respect to A and desire with respect to ~A. The “with respect to” clause thus puts us in the
territory that we typically have in mind when we think of examples of psychic conflict:
cases in which a person seems to have a desire and an aversion to the same object.
In thinking through this use of the PNO, we should notice that we are taking up a
question which Socrates poses to Glaucon, but which Glaucon fails to take up; namely,
whether we engage in learning, spirited activities, and desires “with our entire soul,” or
with a separate part for each.267 In this sense, Socrates' arguments about the PNO function
as provocative-aporetic means for getting readers to re-conceptualize psychic
integration—acting as a whole person—in terms of a more abstract discipline, such as
geometry. Moreover, we seem to be exercising the logistikon by hypothesizing about the
possible states of the parts of the soul rather than about the implications of satisfying the
practical interests that thumos and epithumotikon provide for us.
Locating examples of psychic conflict by use of the “with respect to” condition of
the PNO helps explain the next phase of Socrates' argument. Socrates proceeds by
categorizing variations of desiring and aversion under the more general actions of
“drawing toward oneself” (προσάγεσθαι) and “pushing away from oneself”
(ἀπωθεῖσθαι):
saying yes [together] with saying no, and trying to grasp something with refusing,
and drawing towards oneself [together] with pushing away--all these sorts of
opposites would you not place with each other, whether they are doings or
undergoings [activities or states] ?
τὸ ἐπινεύειν τῷ ἀνανεύειν καὶ τὸ ἐφίεσθαί τινος λαβεῖν τῷ ἀπαρνεῖσθαι καὶ τὸ
προσάγεσθαι τῷ ἀπωθεῖσθαι, πάντα τὰ τοιαῦτα τῶν ἐναντίων ἄν ἀλλήλοις θείης
267 436b2
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εἴτε ποιημάτων εἴτε παθημάτων (437b1-4);
In other words, Socrates wants to pair mutually exclusive actions (ἐνάντια) with each
other (ἀλλήλοις) as a preliminary to dividing the logistikon from epithumotikon. These
opposites then form the general category to which variations of desiring and not-desiring
belong:
[…] to feel thirst and to feel hunger, and desires generally, and again wanting and
wishing, would you not place all these among those types which we just
mentioned?
διψῆν καὶ πεινῆν καὶ ὅλως τὰς ἐπιθυμίας, καὶ αὖ τὸ ἐθέλειν καὶ τὸ βούλεσθαι, οὐ
πάντα ταῦτα εἰς ἐκεῖνά ποι ἄν θείης τὰ εἴδη τά νῦν δὴ λεχθέντα (437b7-437c1);
Socrates then makes the crucial classification of “desires generally” as a type of
“reaching out” or “drawing towards oneself.” He indicates this by repeating the verb
προσάγεσθαι:
[…] for example will you not say that the soul of the one who desires always
either pursues after that which he desires, or draws towards himself that which he
wishes to come about for himself […]?
οἷον ἀεὶ τὴν τοῦ ἐπιθυμοῦντος ψυχὴν οὐχὶ ἤτοι ἐφίεσθαι φήσεις ἐκείνου οὗ ἄν
ἐπιθυμῇ, ἤ προσάγεσθαι τοῦτο ὅ ἄν βούληταὶ οἱ γενέσθαι […] (437c1-4);
We see Socrates use the same procedure, this time repeating the verb ἀποθεῖν (here in the
active rather than middle voice), to indicate that he places rejection and unwillingness in
a common class:
Not wanting, being unwilling, and not desiring, will we not place with [the soul's]
thrusting and driving away from itself, and with all the opposites to those
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[ekeinois refers to the class of desires grouped according to the verb
προσάγεσθαι].
τὸ ἀβουλεῖν καὶ μὴ ἐθέλειν μηδ' ἐπιθυμεῖν οὐκ εἰς τὸ ἀποθεῖν καὶ ἀπελαύνειν ἀπ'
αὐτῆς καὶ εἰς ἅπαντα τἀναντία ἐκείνοις θήσομεν; (437c6-437d1)
There might be shades of difference between the three expressions of not-wanting that
Socrates lists.268 However, differentiating them would be unnecessarily speculative.
Socrates' point here seems to be quite simple: while there might be a complex
phenomenology to the ways we refuse or express aversion, Socrates' point is that they all
fall under a certain “action” of the soul, namely, “thrusting away.” Likewise, the
variations of desiring and being willing fall under the opposite action that is, “drawing
toward oneself.” Since these actions are mutually exclusive under the clause “with
respect to the same”—one cannot “reach out” and “thrust away” with respect to the
same—we could read the principle as a principle of non-contradiction that grounds the
variations of willingness and unwillingness, desire and aversion, that Socrates
mentions.269
To see why this is the case, consider Smith's example of the person who lacks a
desire for something, and consider what actions this person might take in comparison to
the person who has a desire for the same thing, and the person who has an aversion to the
268 Irwin claims that Plato means to separate βούλεσθαι and ἐθέλειν from ἐπιθυμεῖν as modes of desiring
distinct from appetitive desire (Irwin, Plato's Ethics, 205). I see little evidence that Plato is drawing this
distinction here, but even if it is true, what matters is that ἀβουλεῖν and μέ ἐθέλειν imply “thrusting
away,” or commitment to a certain course of action so as to “refuse” something. At the end of Book IV
Glaucon uses the verb “βούλεσθαι” in reference to the vice of doing “whatever one wishes” (Rep.,
445b2). Βούλεσθαι in that passage appears to refer to wishes and desires of any sort, whether appetitive
or thumotic, rather than rational desires exclusively.
269 Bobonich rightly notes that these metaphors, “pushing away” and “drawing near,” help Plato
“redescribe the opposition between desiring and not-desiring in terms of the logical and psychological
opposition between assent and dissent” (Philosopher-Kings, 236). He argues that noticing this redescription, in combination with Plato's apparent commitment to differing “strengths” among desires
and aversions, is crucial for akratic action (240-242).
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same thing. Imagine that the action in question is whether or not to cross the street to pet
a dog. The person who desires to pet the dog will cross the street; the person who has an
aversion to petting the dog will stay on his own side of the street; and the person who
lacks both the desire and the aversion could either cross the street or stay on his own side.
Clearly, the first and second person's actions are mutually exclusive. But the action of the
third person is under-determined, because a plethora of actions are consistent with
lacking a desire for something. The cause of this result is that a person who lacks a desire
cannot fulfill the “in relation to the same” clause of the principle Socrates states. If a
person lacks a desire for something, then there is simply no appetitive relation we can
describe between that person and the object.270
An objection that one might raise against Socrates' use of the terms προσάγεσθαι
and ἀποθεῖν to describe actions of the soul is that the verbs actually describe actions of
bodies, not of souls. The thrust of this objection follows another common objection about
tripartite psychology, namely, that Socrates relies on the category of agent-individuals to
describe parts of the soul, which are themselves supposed to compose an agentindividual.271 This objection does not defeat my reading of the PNO. Rather, by
considering a reply to the objection, we will actually discover the insight that explains

270 Apathy might become a source of psychic conflict if the logistikon determined that apathy is not a good
condition for the epithumotikon to be in. The view I am advocating could be clarified by a distinction
Bobonich draws between “complete” and “incomplete” contraries (Bobonich, Utopia, 226). A complete
contrary is one in which every aspect of the PNO is violated: something is undergoing contraries with
respect to the same thing, in the same part of itself, at the same time. An incomplete contrary is one in
which fewer than all of the aspects of the PNO are violated: something is undergoing contraries in the
same part, but perhaps not with respect to the same thing. On my reading, Socrates argues for divisions
in the soul by showing that the phenomenon of psychic conflict would require instantiating complete
contraries.
271 See Bernard William's well-known argument that Socrates' commitments in Book IV seem to require
that he attribute an “extra little logistikon” to the epithumotikon (“The Analogy of City and Soul in
Plato's Republic” in Plato's Republic: Critical Essays, ed. Richard Kraut [New York: Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, 1997], 53). See also Annas, Introduction, 144-146, and Bobonich, Plato's Utopia
Recast, 222 for discussions of the Homunculus problem.
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why the PNO is in fact based on a principle of non-contradiction. Although the verbs
describe actions of the bodies, they constitute evidence for attributing mental states to
individuals. More importantly, however, “reaching out” and “thrusting away” represent
the types of bodily actions one would have to carry out to actually satisfy variations of
desire and aversion. This shows how the different shades of wanting and not wanting fall
into mutually exclusive categories, despite the more complex phenomenology that they
might have: the actions we would have to take to satisfy either the desiring or the not
desiring would be mutually exclusive; that is, I could not perform them “in the same part,
at the same time, with respect to the same object.” It is in this sense that I suggest the
PNO ultimately rests on the principle of non-contradiction. So, on my reading, the
various expressions of desire and willingness, refusal and non-willingness, are ultimately
categorized as opposites because they rely on a more basic contradiction in action that
would occur if a person had both desires and decided to satisfy both.
A second objection is the following. Someone might point out that my
interpretation of the PNO would force a division in the soul even when we experience
desires that conflict with each other on account of external limitations.272 For example,
suppose that I desired a cup of coffee, but had an aversion to the bitterness of the only

272 Santas considers this kind of example and proposes the same solution: “It should be noted that no
every kind of conflict seemingly within our souls forces us to divide the soul. Some conflicts we can
explain by appealing to facts in the external world: I want to eat caviar and drink champagne and I
cannot have both, but this maybe so only because I cannot afford both. Or, I might both hate and love
my car, but this conflict does not force us to divide the soul, if we can explain it by dividing the object
of my love and hate: I love its power but hate its gas consumption” (Understanding Plato's Republic,
81). Smith suggests that these sorts of examples may compel us to draw more divisions than three in the
soul. He denies that this is a problem for Plato, however, because the city-soul analogy does not
stipulate that city and soul are limited to a 3-3 correspondence of parts (“Plato's Analogy of State and
Soul,” 38). Reeve deals with this objection by arguing that when we experience desire and aversion to
different aspects of the same object, we can reach a “compromise” attitude toward that object (Reeve,
Philosopher Kings, 125). He likens the two desires to “forces that form a resultant force;” they do not
pull the soul in the opposite direction (i.e., away from the object altogether), but rather in a new
direction “determined by both of them working together” (125).
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available roast of coffee. In order to satisfy the desire and avoid the thing to which I'm
averse, I would have to drink and not drink the coffee. This contradiction would justify a
division within the epithumotikon. This objection can be answered by pointing out that
we commonly differentiate between aspects of objects. In this case, I might say that I
desire the caffeine and the warmth in the coffee, but not the bitterness. In this way I could
explain my simultaneous desire and aversion by differentiating between aspects of an
object, and thereby resolve the apparent violation of the PNO. If I had the power, I would
separate these the bitterness from the coffee and consume the beverage without the
bitterness: this would be like “drawing in” the part of the coffee that I liked, and “pushing
away” the part of the coffee that I disliked. These are not incompatible actions, because
by differentiating aspects or parts of an object, we can prevent the motions of “moving
toward” and “drawing in” from violating the with respect to the same condition. In this
way the answer to the objection conveys something important about the type of conflicts
Socrates wants to identify: desire and aversion must conflict in such a way that the thing
with respect to which they are desires and aversions could not be parsed into different
qualities. For example, consider someone who abuses alcohol, and who wants to quit.
Although this person may have an aversion to the painful effects that alcohol has on the
body, the power to separate the psychotropic effects of alcohol from all its harms would
be of little use, because the psychotropic effect is the very thing whose influence this
person wants to escape. Thus, whatever aversion “wanting to quit” instills in the person,
it is an aversion to that very thing for which the addict has a desire, i.e., the psychotropic
effect. As I discuss Socrates' examples below, I will use this strategy as a test to see
whether the apparent conflicts in the examples can be resolved. If they fail this test, then
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we know that the PNO justifies our drawing a division.273
The second question concerns whether the PNO suffices to explain why the parts
of the soul should align according to the hierarchy that Socrates gives them, i.e., with the
logistikon ruling, and thumos assisting the logistikon in restraining epithumotikon. Santas,
for example, argues that the PNO only suffices to differentiate psychic activities, not to
pair such activities with a place on a hierarchy.274 Annas also expresses doubts about the
power of the PNO to justify a hierarchy of the parts of the soul.275 In essence, her
criticism is that Plato relies on a more robust notion of reason in Book IV than mere
calculation, and the PNO cannot identify this more robust feature. If we rely strictly on
the notion of the logistikon that the PNO identifies, then there appears to be nothing
preventing the logistikon's subordination to either thumos or the epithumotikon, as we see
in Socrates' description of the timocratic and oligarchic individuals.276 Ferrari argues that
since the logistikon in Book IV lacks real interests of its own, a “bipartite psychology”
would suffice in Book IV.277 On his reading, the logistikon in book IV contributes little in
the way of interests that actually have motivating force, but is rather posited as a
necessary arbiter for the competing interests in self-respect and appetitive goods. These
criticisms highlight the difficulty in explaining why the logistikon should rule the soul,
273 Kamtekar overlooks the possibility of differentiating between aspects of objects in her claim that the
epithumotikon might undergo divisions within itself (“Speaking with the Same Voice as Reason, in
Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy, 31 (2006): 177).
274 See footnote 7 for a summary of Santas' argument.
275 See footnote 1.
276 Annas addresses Hume's competing account of reason and desire by pointing out that “'Humean reason
is passive and leaves unquestioned the status of the desires which it efficiently fulfills, but Platonic
reason does not. Reason is thus being thought of as critical of the other motivations in a way that they
are not critical of themselves or of each other” (Introduction, 135). In her discussion of the PNO,
however, she argues that the example of the person who is thirsty but refuses to drink only identifies
restraint as a feature of reason, and the ability to restrain oneself in situations that thwart one's primary
goals belongs to the non-virtuous individuals that Socrates discusses in Books VIII and IX
(Introduction, 140).
277 See G.R.F. Ferrari, City and Soul in Plato's Republic (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005):
112.
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since it doesn't appear to be leading the soul according to some determinate interest. To
answer this worry, I will argue in the following sections that while it is true that the
logistikon in Book IV lacks an overarching philosophical interest or project, the absence
of philosophical interests does not prevent it from being the “rightful” ruler of the soul.
The logistikon could have a positive interest in the project of psychic integration, and this
interest would differentiate it from functioning as a mere arbitrator or algorithm for
managing the interests of thumos and the epithumotikon.

§2. First Division: Logistikon and Epithumotikon
Socrates' arguments for the division between logistikon and epithumotikon are of
particular importance for two reasons. First, it is in these arguments that we glimpse the
logistikon's power of hypothesis. Second, these arguments test Socrates' competitor
theory—the Technē Model of justice—for its success in accounting for the phenomenon
of psychic conflict. On the Technē Model of justice, the logistikon stands in an
instrumental relation to epithumotikon (assumption T1). Acknowledging the refutation of
this commitment signals a capitulation on Glaucon's part, because his former position
was that the logistikon lacks interests of its own and serves pleonektic desire. I identify
two moments in particular at which Socrates appears to be testing the Technē Model's
assumptions concerning the relation between logistikon and the epithumotikon. The first
moment occurs when Socrates and Glaucon consider how appetites are individuated
(437d-439a), and the second moment occurs when Socrates considers an objection from
someone who argues that any desire is necessarily for something good (438a1). My
strategy in identifying these moments is to use them to test whether the Technē Model can

161

account for the prima facie character of psychic conflict that we identified above. If the
Technē Model fails to account for the character of psychic conflict, then we have good
reason to abandon its thesis concerning the subordination of the logistikon to the
epithumotikon. Accordingly, I will draw from both of these moments to construct the
most plausible account that the Technē Model can offer to explain phenomenon of
psychic conflict. I will then show why the account fails.
As indicated in my reading of the PNO, my strategy for dealing with Socrates'
examples of psychic conflict is to elicit a contradiction between mutually-exclusive states
of “pushing away” and “drawing near,” because these incompatible actions violate the
with respect to the same condition, and thereby justify our differentiating new parts. Thus
I will examine each of his examples and show how the agent would have to carry out
incompatible actions if he or she were to satisfy both the desire and the aversion with
respect to the same object. Once this is shown, the PNO entitles us to draw a division in
the soul.
With regard to the division between logistikon and the epithumotikon, Socrates'
first and only example of psychic conflict is that of a thirsty person refuses to drink
(439c1-2). Socrates says that this example shows that “there is something in their soul
urging them to drink on the one hand, and on the other hand stopping them, a thing
different and stronger than the thing that urges?”278 Furthermore, he alleges that the
“thing that prevents these sorts of things comes about, when it does come about, out of
rational calculation [ἐκ λογισμού].”279 On my reading, a sort of practical contradiction
would result if one were to satisfy both the imperative of the logistikon and the urging of
278 Οὐκ ἐνεῖναι μὲν ἐν τῇ ψυχῇ αὐτῶν τὶ κελεῦον, ἐνεῖναι δὲ τὸ κωλῦον πιεῖν, ἄλλο ὂν καὶ κρατοῦν τοῦ
κελεύοντος (439c5);
279 Ἆρ' οὖν οὐ τὸ μὲν κωλῦον τὰ τοιαῦτα ἐγγίγνεται, ὅταν ἐγγίγνηται, ἐκ λογισμοῦ […] (439c6-7).
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the epithumotikon. Obeying the imperative of the logistikon requires “withdrawing,”
while obeying the urging of the epithumotikon requires “reaching out.” Since these two
actions are incompatible at the same time, with respect to the same object, and in the
same part of oneself, the conclusion that Socrates draws from this example ultimately
rests on a principle of non-contradiction.
A difficulty emerges, however, when we ask whether Socrates has dispensed with
the Technē Model's alternative account of psychic conflict. If he has not, then he is not
entitled to conclude that the restraint of desire is the exclusive function of the logistikon.
Accordingly, the remainder of this section will be devoted to clarifying and refuting the
Technē Model as an alternative explanation of psychic conflict, so as to show how
Glaucon is persuaded that the assumption concerning the instrumentality of the logistikon
is false. The Technē Model's alternative can be generated by a fairly elementary problem
that arises from the PNO. The satisfaction of two different desires could very well require
me to act in incompatible ways, and if this is true, then on the basis of the PNO it seems
that we should also divide the epithumotikon into “parts” whenever we discover
conflicting desires within it.280 In other words, how do we know that it is really the
logistikon that does the work of “restraining” in this example? In order to show that the
PNO really differentiates the logistikon and epithumotikon in this example, we must ask
why it must be the logistikon that restrains the epithumotikon and not, for instance,
another desire.281 If the Technē Model is to successfully account for psychic conflict, it
280 A re-statement of the problem Smith raises for the PNO. See Smith, “Plato's Analogy of State and
Soul,” 35-37.
281 Irwin rightly identifies this problem when he distinguishes between kinds of opposition. He points out
that Plato's account must hold that “since no appetite can itself be opposed to acting on appetite, the sort
of desire that opposes acting on appetite must be some sort of non-appetitive type of desire” (Irwin,
Plato's Ethics, 207-208). Concerning the question as to how the logistikon opposes the epithumotikon,
Cooper argues that the logistikon must have some kind of desire of its own; otherwise, it could not act
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must explain the restraint that follows on an experience of psychic conflict without
appealing to the Virtue Model's interpretation of the distinctive faculties of the logistikon.
Therefore, if we can show that the Technē Model's alternative cannot account for the
distinctive character of psychic conflict without appealing to the virtue model's account
of the functions of the logistikon, then we will have discovered a reason to abandon its
assertion concerning the instrumentality of the logistikon to the epithumotikon.
Socrates can address the proposal above by demanding from the objector an
account of how desires are individuated. Glaucon and the party receive just such an
account before they consider the example of the person who is thirsty but refuses to
drink.282 Socrates proposes the following schema for understanding appetites. On the one
hand, we have a generic desire for a generic, unqualified object that is naturally suited to
satisfy a desire of that type.283 Using the example of thirst, he points out that thirst, by
itself, is a desire for drink, while the generic object of thirst, is anything that is thirstas an opposing force on the epithumotikon (“Plato on Human Motivation” in Reason and Emotion
[Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999], 125. However, this need not be the case, because
thumos, as I argue below, can generate second-order desires that can function as an opposing force to
the epithumotikon.
282 At 437d5.
283 Rep., 43d5-e7. Irwin interprets this passage as a reference to Thrasymachus' requirement in Book I that
they consider the ruler in the “strict sense.” He also suggests that this passage “confronts an apparently
Socratic thesis,” i.e., the thesis that all desires are for the good. Here various appetites appear to urge the
agent toward certain objects regardless of whether those objects satisfy a desire for the good. Irwin
argues that Plato must demonstrate that agents in fact have such desires, i.e., “thirst qua thirst” rather
than desire for a drink qua good. He then interprets the Socrates' example—being thirsty and refusing to
drink—as a case that is supposed to convince us that there are such generic appetitive desires, and that it
is these desires that act “without regard for the good.” See Terence Irwin, Plato's Ethics (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1995), 206-208. I suggest that this passage is better interpreted as an account
of how desires are individuated. Plato's point need not be that we in fact experience such generic
desires, only that for such appetitive desires to be reason-responsive, they must be individuated
according to reasoned considerations. Reeve holds a view similar my proposal about this passage, i.e.,
that it concerns the individuation of desires. He claims that by the PNO Plato has in mind a “Principle
of Qualification,” which is a logical (rather than psychological) principle concerning formal objects
Philosopher-Kings, 120). He points out that “Indeed, it is always possible to produce the natural object
of a relation simply by modalizing the relation itself-the natural object of a relation R is always,
trivially, the R-able” (121). The more concrete point here is that here is that thirst is for something
drinkable, but because there are many drinkable things, this appetite must be individuated. The
logistikon does the individuating. For a similar proposal, see also Burnyeat, “The Truth of Tripartition,”
19.
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quenching. But Socrates leaves open the question as to how these generic appetites are
individuated, asking “...does the addition of a little bit of warmth to the thirst produce the
desire for cold as well? And does the addition of cold produce desire for warmth”
(437d6-e1, Griffith)? Contained within this question is a proposal on which Socrates does
not elaborate, but that might aid the proponent of the Technē Model's account of psychic
conflict. The proposal is this: maybe some qualification of the generic desire accounts for
the qualification of the generic object, so that psychic conflict arises when two desires
receive contradictory qualifications. In Socrates' example, the qualifications stand in a
converse relation. The opposite qualification of the generic desire accounts for the
opposite qualification of the object: a warm desire accounts for the desire for a cold
drink, and the qualified desire finds satisfaction in the oppositely qualified object.284
To generate an example of psychic conflict on this account, the proponent of the
Technē Model might suggest something like the following. Suppose I have just finished
some vigorous exercise, and I have the following two desires: (1) a desire for a cold
drink, which means I have a “warm” desire; (2) a desire for a hot bath, which means that
I have a “cold” desire. On this account, then, it seems that I have both warm and cold
desires both within the epithumotikon, and since these qualities represent opposite states
in the same part (epithumotikon), we have a candidate for the application of the PNO. We
can easily reply, however, that the example fails to meet one of the conditions of the
PNO, i.e., that the same part cannot be in opposite states with respect to the same object.
Here the objects of the desires are different, and so the PNO does not apply. As a more

284 What is striking about this proposal is the resemblance it bears to Socrates' first definition of eros in the
Symposium, namely, that eros is a desire for what one lacks (200b1-3). Here the qualification of both
desire and object by mutually exclusive opposites would fall neatly under this definition, since a
“warm” thirst would describe a condition in which the soul that excludes—and hence lacks—“cold.”
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formidable example, however, we might consider the following. Suppose that I have a
desire for a sweet drink, which means I have a 'bitter” desire. Now, suppose that I am
sick, and this means that I have a desire for healthy drinks, among which sweet drinks are
not included. This case of conflicting desires better resembles Socrates' example of the
person who wants to drink but refuses. The competitor theory might explain this apparent
“refusal” by the strength of the person's desire for a healthy drink: the desire for healthy
drinks just happened to be “stronger” than the desire for a sweet drink.
Now we must determine whether this second example actually captures the
phenomenon of psychic conflict without appealing to the logistikon. I argue that it
cannot, because without positing the logistikon, the experience lacks the aspect of
evaluation that would make it genuine experience of psychic conflict. To show that the
instrumental role of the logistikon cannot account for evaluation, I will identify the
powers that the logistikon may have on the Technē Model, and argue that these powers
cannot account for the evaluative aspect of psychic conflict. The two powers that the
logistikon may reasonably be said to possess on the Technē Model are hypothesis and the
ability to prioritize ends.285 An agent must be able to hypothesize in conditional form
about the likely consequences of various actions. To experience a conflict between ends,
something must tell the agent “achieve end A first and B second,” or “achieve end A
rather than end B.” On the Technē Model, the logistikon must be able to hypothesize
about the means an agent uses to achieve his ends because that is what is immediately

285 Irwin argues that the epithumotikon shares two features with the logistikon, namely, (1) concern for its
desires over time, in the sense that it wants to see its desires satisfied in the future; and (2) recognition
of “considerations of efficiency” in the sense that satisfaction of an immediate desire might preclude the
satisfaction of some other desire in the future (Plato's Ethics, 220). On my reading, the logistikon's
power of hypothesis communicates facts about efficiency to the epithumotikon, and thereby speaks the
language of desire.
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entailed by placing the logistikon in an instrumental role. The logistikon may also
reasonably be said to be capable of prioritizing ends because it may happen that some
weaker desires, if satisfied, hinder the satisfaction of a stronger desire. For example,
suppose that I have an intense desire to visit a loved-one for vacation. I am running late
and have only thirty minutes to make my flight on time. Suppose I also have not eaten for
twenty-four hours, and would like to stop somewhere to buy a snack. I might reason that I
ought not to satisfy my hunger yet because doing so will cause me to miss my flight. On
the other hand, if I have ample time, I may satisfy my hunger without the risk of missing
my flight. These kinds of decisions reflect the logistikon's prioritization of desires.
We must explain how the logistikon prioritizes desires, however, because in this
explanation we will glimpse a crucial difference between the technē and virtue models'
accounts of the logistikon's powers. On the Technē Model of the relation between the
logistikon and the epithumotikon, we must account for the prioritization of desires in a
somewhat roundabout way. For example, a prioritization of ends might result if an agent
had formed a habit of satisfying one desire before other desires as a result of repeatedly
experiencing one desire “defeat” another. This habit would then be felt as a kind of
prioritization. The Technē Model must explain the cause of prioritization in this way
because it cannot resort to an evaluative function of the logistikon that would be causally
efficacious in producing a certain action; it cannot say that it is better to achieve end
rather than another, only that the agent should accomplish one end before another in a
temporal sequence.
The crucial question is whether this account of the prioritization of ends captures
the distinctive features of psychic conflict. I suggest that it does not, because on this
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account the experience of the “refusal” that ends the conflict lacks an evaluative aspect.
To identify the role that evaluation plays in the work of the logistikon, we must clarify
how the refusal is actually felt when the person in Socrates' example refuses to satisfy
some immediate appetite. I suggest that it is the interaction between the power of
hypothesis and the ability for prioritization that gives rise to an evaluation--that is, a
judgment about which course of action is better. Consider a familiar example of psychic
conflict: someone restrains his desire for a certain food because he judges that eating it
would be unhealthy. The determination of what is healthy for the body is complex enough
to require a significant power of hypothesis. For example, suppose the person must
decide between a number of foods, of which some he immediately desires but considers
unhealthy, and others he considers healthy but does not immediately desire. He might
first hypothesize about the options: “If I eat food X, I will experience immediate pleasure
but be nauseous later; If I eat food Y, I will get iron but very little protein; if I eat food Z,
I will get vitamin B, but likely experience an allergic reaction.” In order for the agent to
experience something like a refusal of his immediate desire, he must have a prioritization
of desires such that one desire precedes his immediate desire for food X in the order of
satisfaction. What I mean is that the person must have a mental schema of the following
sort: “my desire to be healthy must receive satisfaction before my desire for pleasure;
desire X must be satisfied before desire Y is satisfied.” Particular hypotheses would then
be selected according to their proximity to achieving the highest priorities. Such a
contradiction between a high priority and an immediate desire could result if the agent
had acquired a habit in the way mentioned above.
This account does not capture the distinctive character of the refusal in psychic
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conflict because the conflict between habit and an immediate desire is not resolved by
refusing the immediate desire, but rather by defaulting to one's habit.286 If habits are the
actions to which we default, then it is odd to describe the relation between the immediate
desire and a habit as a “conflict” or a “refusal” of a possible course of action, since one is
simply defaulting to the end that has already been assigned the highest priority. Thus, we
do not seem to have an instance of genuine aversion in the habit that overrides an
immediate desire. The issue at hand here is whether the logistikon has an evaluative
function that would have causal efficacy in determining the agent's action. According to
the above analysis, the logistikon does not have such power, because it is the person's
habit that accounts for the cause of the action. What is missing from this account is an
evaluation that would produce a genuine refusal of the immediate desire, rather than a
defaulting to habit. The need for such an evaluation can be seen in cases where the
conflict does not arise between an immediate desire and a habit, but between an
immediate desire and an agent's deliberations about an action for which he has no
precedent; for when actions have no precedent, it is genuinely a question as to which ends
should take priority.
For example, suppose I have an immediate desire for a pleasant but unhealthy
food and drink, but I am deliberating about how I can best prepare for the battle at
Marathon the following morning. Suppose that it is my first time at war, and I have not
formed a habit of refusing pleasant but unhealthy food the night before a battle.

286 This consideration compels me to dispute Bobonich's claim that akratic action is explained by the
greater strength of an appetitive desire in comparison to the strength of a rational aversion to the same
thing: “The misalignment between strength and evaluation is why akratic action occurs: it is because the
causally stronger desire can have as its object something not ranked best overall that akratic action can
occur” (Plato's Utopia Recast, 241). The model represents a Humean model of competition among
desires.
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Nonetheless, I conclude from my deliberations that it would be best for me to stay away
from the unhealthy food and drink because I want to be in optimal condition the next
morning—not simply because I want to survive, but because I also want to show courage.
In this example, it is genuinely a question for me as to which course of action is best for
me because I have no default behavior to fall back upon. Thus, the crucial difference in
this example is that I reach a prioritization of ends in a wholly different way than by
habit: I deliberate about the likely consequences of two courses of action, and prioritize
one end—optimal performance in battle—over another because of a judgment I have
reached. In this case, the only way for me to establish the prioritization of ends is by
hypothesizing and evaluating the available options. It is difficult to see how the Technē
Model could account for the evaluative aspect without attributing a power of
evaluation—with causal efficacy—to the logistikon. If the proponent of the competitor
theory above invokes such a power, then he essentially invokes the virtue model to
account for his own paradigm of psychic conflict.
A more sophisticated proponent of the Technē Model of the relation between the
epithumotikon and the logistikon might try to deny that the logistikon has the power to
evaluate ends and to modify behavior accordingly. In response to the requirement for
evaluation, a proponent of the Technē Model might simply deny that evaluation occurs,
while offering some other explanation for the feeling or appearance of an evaluation.287
We catch a glimpse of this more sophisticated version at a second moment in Book IV,
when Socrates seems to entertain a competitor theory in the form of an interrupting
287 This strategy is consistent with many of Hume's skeptical arguments: show that some fundamental
metaphysical or moral commitment we have must be false, but explain the mechanisms that compel our
irrationally holding that commitment. Hume employs just this strategy in in the section “Of Necessary
Connection” when he suggests “custom” and “habit” as the “solution to skeptical doubts” after he has
argued that we ought to be skeptics about the reality of causal relations. See Hume, Enquiry, IV-V.
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“uproar” (θόρυβος):
Let no one raise an uproar against us for being unthinking, [and object] that no
one desires drink but rather good drink, and not food, but good food. For everyone
desires good things.
Μήτοι τις ἦν δ' ἐγώ ἀσκέπτους ἡμᾶς ὄντας θορυβήσῃ, ὡς οὐδεὶς ποτοῦ ἐπιθυμεῖ
ἀλλὰ χρηστοῦ ποτοῦ καὶ οὐ σίτου, ἀλλὰ χρηστοῦ σίτου. Πάντες γὰρ ἄρα τῶν
ἀγαθῶν ἐπιθυμοῦσιν (438a1-3).
The question is why this proposal counts as an objection, and to what claim, specifically,
it is an objection.288 Socrates does not explain this, but I suggest that the objection is
against the account he gave of how the logistikon individuates desires. The objector
essentially proposes that our desires are more trustworthy that Socrates is willing to
admit. On this proposal desires might come already individuated, but with the guarantee
that because they are desires, whatever they seek must be something good. The proposal
perhaps resembles an affect-theory of value: things are good because—and just to the
extent that—we desire them. This account of value lends itself to the Technē Model
because it allows for a radical equality of the value of ends.289
As far as the evaluative aspect of psychic conflict is concerned, the proponent of

288 James Adams suggests that the objection can be expressed in the form of a dilemma that arises when
we ask what the objector means by “good.” Does he mean the apparent good or the actually good? If he
means that we desire what things appear good to us, then the objector will have difficulty explaining
what confidence we could have that we actually attain what we desire. If we are mistaken about what
appears good to us, then we may attain what we do not desire. If, on the other hand, he means that we
desire what is actually good, then he must explain how we discern what is actually good. In either case,
the objector must refer to something like deliberation to explain how we could succeed at attaining what
we desire, given that the generic desire for good things is present in the epithumotikon. See James
Adams ed., The Republic of Plato, (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 250. Irwin proposes
that Plato may be referring to a “Socratic thesis” here, specifically the thesis that all desires are for the
good (Plato's Ethics, 206).
289 It is worth recalling Hume's declaration that “’Tis not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the
whole world to the scratching of my finger. ’Tis not contrary to reason for me to chuse my total ruin, to
prevent the least uneasiness of an Indian or person wholly unknown to me” (Hume, Treatise, 2.3.3.6).
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the Technē Model can answer that the “feeling” that one end is preferable or better than
another arises when one desire “conquers” another desire, while the logistikon simply
invents a justification for the “victor” post hoc.290 Our attributing causal efficacy to this
power of evaluation would then turn out to be a mistake, as we would be mistaking a post
hoc explanation for a causal power. This answer leaves the logistikon with the powers of
hypothesis and prioritization alone, which is consistent with assigning it a purely
instrumental function. Consequently, the logistikon would play no part in bestowing
value on ends; it would simply calculate the best means for achieving one's ends. On this
view, there would also be no adjudicating which ends are more and which less worthy—
an implication that clearly contradicts Socrates' argument that preserving harmony among
the parts of the soul (justice) is the most worthy end.
The key to answering this objection lies in examining how calculation has
“forethought over the whole soul,” and “knowledge of what is good both for each part
and for the whole community” of the soul, as Socrates later claims.291 I have already
argued that the Technē Model cannot consistently attribute an evaluative function to the
logistikon, but if we can show that its psychological model in fact fails, by its own
standards, to account even for the feeling of evaluation, then we will have shown that
only by positing a logistikon with robust powers of evaluation and hypothesis can we
290 This proposal is just what Hobbes proposes in the Leviathan, and one that suits Thrasymachus’
preference for pleonexia: “I put forth a general inclination of all mankind, a perpetual and restless
desire of power after power, that ceaseth only in death. And the cause of this, is not always that a man
hopes for a more intensive delight, than he has already attained to; or that he cannot be content with a
moderate power: but because he cannot assure the power and means to live well, which he hath present,
without the acquisition of more” (Hobbes, Leviathan, XI).
291 […] ἔχοντι τὴν ὑπὲρ ἁπάσης τῆς ψυχῆς προμήθειαν (441e4); ἐπιστήμην ἐν αὑτῷ τὴν τοῦ ξυμφέροντος
ἑκάσῳ τε καὶ ὅλῳ τῷ κοινῷ σφῶν αὐτῶν τριῶν ὄντων (442c6-8). Irwin argues that this function of the
logistikon represents a distinct “rational desire,” which he suggests amounts to a kind of “rational selflove.” Rational self-love has a connection with practical reason “because it displays no partiality to
some desires or affections, but takes account of them all on their merits” (Irwin, Plato's Ethics, 216). I
suggest that this aspect of “rational self-love” is captured by attributing powers of prioritization and
evaluation to the logistikon.
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account for certain phenomenological features of psychic conflict. We can find the
resources for this sort of argument by considering how the power of “forethought”
(προμήθεια) bestows a comprehensive perspective that is crucial to generating cases of
psychic conflict. The problem for the Technē Model seems to be that if evaluation is
always a post hoc invention, then it is not entitled to claim that the logistikon has any
“forethought” over the soul. But when people restrain their appetites, they restrain them
because they have inferred some likely negative consequence before they satisfy the
appetite, not after. For this reason it is difficult to see how the Technē Model can even
account for the phenomenology of psychic conflict, since it assigns the wrong temporal
order to the aspects of such an experience.
I do not think that the proponent of the Technē Model can have recourse to the
reply that what we call foresight is really just lucky guesswork based on patterns of
habituation. What is conspicuous about the example is Socrates' neglecting to mention
the reasons a person might have for refusing to drink, for this makes available many
interpretations in which a person might exercise foresight without relying exclusively on
some pattern of habituation. Annas, for example, suggests that Plato leaves us to surmise
that the person in the example refuses drink because drinking would be unhealthy.292 The
example certainly lends itself to this interpretation, but what we should notice is that a
variety of reasons—not all of them related to concerns about health—might compel a
person to “restrain” his epithumotikon from drinking. For example, a person might refuse
to drink something because he knows that drinking will kill him (such is the case of
shipwrecked sailors who find themselves surrounded by a sea of water); another person
might refuse to drink some alcohol because the situation demands his or her alertness;
292 See Introduction, 140.
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someone else might refuse to drink because doing so would offend someone he or she
cared about. Regardless of the particular reasons for self-restraint, the same explanation
holds for why the logistikon “rules” the soul in each case: the epithumotikon lacks both
the power of hypothesis and the comprehensive view of the circumstances beyond those
which pertain to the satisfaction of its own particular pleasures.293 Thus it simply cannot
occupy a position from which it could evaluate possible courses of action. Finally,
Socrates' omission of the reason for refusal in fact coheres well with his view about the
individuation of desires. The point is that the epithumotikon communicates rather generic
urges—even if they are not quite as generic as Socrates presents them—that cannot
convey their own importance and priority; hence the necessity of the logistikon's powers
of hypothesis, evaluation, and prioritization.

§3. Second and Third Divisions: Thumos and Epithumotikon, Thumos and Logistikon
The arguments for differentiating thumos from the logistikon and the epithumotikon
(439e-441c) appear slightly more complicated because Socrates in fact has two
argumentative goals. The first is to establish that thumos really is distinct from both the
epithumotikon and the logistikon; the second is to demonstrate that thumos ought to ally
with the logistikon rather than with the epithumotikon. Three examples are of particular
interest for these purposes:
(a) The story of Leontius. Socrates uses this example to divide thumos from the
293 Bobonich argues that the appetitive part “is capable, according to Plato, of means-end reasoning”
(Plato's Utopia Recast, 244). The evidence he offers for this view comes from a passage in Book IX
(580e2-581a7), where Socrates re-describes the life of the appetitive part of the soul as “money-loving”
because money is the chief instrument for procuring the primary pleasures of food, drink, and sex. I do
not think this is very strong evidence for attributing means-end reasoning to the epithumotikon. This redescription is better understood as the life of a particular person—the oligarch—who orients his whole
life, and thus the parts of his soul, around procuring the pleasures of the epithumotikon. It is a discovery
of the logistikon, not the epithumotikon, that money is the chief instrument for procuring these.
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epithumotikon by portraying the self-conflict a person experiences when he
becomes angry at himself for some moral failing. Socrates offers this experience
of psychic conflict as a reason for dividing thumos from the epithumotikon, but as
we shall see, the example does not easily lend itself to an application of the PNO.
(b) The influence of judgment on moral indignation. Judgment--a function of the
logistikon—can affect the willingness or unwillingness to suffer punishment, and
consequently whether one feels resentment and indignation for punishment.
(c) The episode from Odyssey XX.17. The example of Odysseus “rebuking” his
thumos for seeking revenge too soon portrays conflict between thumos and
the logistikon, but Socrates does not clarify how the PNO applies.
To sort out these difficulties, I shall argue that if we read the section with a view to the
two argumentative tasks mentioned above, then we can easily identify the argumentative
functions of Socrates' examples. Doing so will also show that Socrates continues to rely
on the PNO in a manner consistent with the arguments that first divided the logistikon
and epithumotikon.
As I suggested above, Socrates uses three examples to carry out two different
argumentative functions. Identifying the argumentative function of each example will let
us say which rely on the PNO and which do not. Below I have organized the examples
according to their argumentative function. Those that rely on the PNO are intended to
mark a division in the soul; those that do not rely on the PNO offer reasons for assigning
a particular hierarchy to the parts of the soul.
Relies on the PNO:
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5) The example of Leontius (439e6) differentiates thumos from the epithumotikon.294
I suggest that the differentiation between first-order and second-order desires
explains how the argument relies on the PNO, despite appearances to the contrary.
6) Odyssey, XX.17 (441b6) differentiates thumos from the logistikon. The quote
refers to an episode in which Odysseus, still disguised as a beggar, becomes angry
with the maid-servants coming out of the hall, those who were in the habit of
“mingling” with the suitors.295 Here Odysseus’ thumos is “stirred in his own
breast” (τοῦ δ᾽ ὠρίνετο θυμὸς ἐνὶ στήθεσσι φίλοισι, Od. XX.9), and he “rebukes
his heart with a word” (κραδίην ἠνίπαπε μύθῳ, Od.,XX.17). Socrates takes this an
indication that Homer portrayed two elements, the logistikon and thumos, since
“the part that has reflected rationally on what is better and what is worse has some
sharp words to say to the element which is irrationally angry” (441b7-c2,
Griffith). The example appears to make use of the PNO, but, as with the example
of Leontius, the application of the principle is not as explicit as in the division
between the logistikon and the epithumotikon.
Does not rely on the PNO:
5) Anger in response to the perception of deserved and undeserved punishment
(550b-e) shows thumos’ dependence upon, and alliance with, the logistikon.296
This argument does not rely upon the PNO because its purpose is to establish that
thumos is properly subordinated to the logistikon. This example provides evidence

294 The example of Leontius “shows that anger can sometimes be at war with the desires, which implies
that they are two distinct and separate things” (440a4-6, Griffith).
295 ταὶ δ᾽ ἐκ μεγάροιο γυναῖκες ἤϊσαν, αἳ μνηστῆρσιν ἐμισγέσκοντο πάρος περ (Odyssey, XX.6-7).
296 Socrates indicates that he intends for the example to show this conclusion when he says that “In the
civil war of the soul, it [spirit] is far more likely to take up arms on the side of the rational part” (440e34, Griffith).
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for my view that thumos offers a surrogate, in the form of accountability to others,
for the philosophically mature orientation in which a person develops
accountability to reasons. The surrogate role helps clarify how thumos can
generate second-order desires. Such desires can be described as images or
impressions of reason, in the sense that they can represent commitments to
principles of which one might lack an explicit articulation.
In the midst of these arguments we must not, however, lose sight our ultimate
goal, which is to explain how Glaucon's acceptance of the rule of the logistikon in
tripartite psychology indicates a turn from becoming to being. Of particular concern is
our account of the difference between thumos and the logistikon, since showing that the
logistikon ought to rule the soul requires showing that there is a substantial difference
between the logistikon and thumos. An account of the logistikon in Book IV must avoid
two extremes: on the one hand, a characterization of the logistikon that is too robust for
Book IV, and on the other hand, a characterization of the logistikon that does not
significantly differ from thumos. If such a reading can be established, then, in addition to
having answered some of general criticisms about the logistikon in Book IV,297 I will be

297 Ferrari argues that reason in Book IV seemingly lacks goals of its own and functions as a “mere
executive” that balances the goals of “self-respect” and “material goals.” Ferrari even goes so far as to
say that “for the motivations of non-philosophers a bipartite psychological analysis would suffice” (City
and Soul in Plato's Republic [Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005], 112). This claim is too
strong, however. As I shall argue, although it is true that reason lacks its own goals in Book IV, the
differences between reason and spirit are significant enough to require a tripartite structure of the soul.
Irwin also doubts whether thumos is really distinct from the logistikon because thumos has, like the
logistikon, “evaluative attitudes” (Plato's Ethics, 212-213). He maintains a distinction between thumos
and logistikon by proposing that thumotic emotions (such as anger) function as a kind of heuristic that
tends to identify certain actions as approved or not approved. Because these evaluations do not stem
from reasoned considerations, but rather from habituation, they cannot belong to the logistikon. This
conforms closely to my own proposal that thumos captures an enculturated response to various actions,
and thus comprises a sort of “aesthetic” side to moral evaluation. However, I dispute the assertion that
the logistikon does not significantly differ from thumos. Another criticism concerns the discontinuity of
the logistikon with reason in the central books. Roochnik argues that “if reason and desire are counted
as distinct parts, then it becomes impossible to account for the passionate desire for wisdom—that is,
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in a position to argue that only the rule of the logistikon allows both a comprehensive
perspective and stable prioritization of the ends of the different parts of the soul.
Two points in particular about the picture of thumos in Book IV are crucial for my
purposes. First is that thumotic interests are defined by an other-bound consciousness,
specifically in the form of a sense of accountability to other persons.298 The thumotic
emotions of shame, honor, and anger, can be portrayed as mechanisms that support this
form of consciousness. These emotions are complex in that their objects are sometimes
other first-order desires, and sometimes counter-factual states of affairs, as in the
experience of shame that accompanies regret. It is these interests of thumos that Ferrari
identifies as “goals of self-respect,” and that seem to comprise the primary ends of the
soul in tripartite psychology, i.e., those ends that the logistikon assigns the highest
priority in the order of satisfaction. One reason that I shall suggest that this set of interests
is distinct from the logistikon is that it teaches the person accountability to others, but not
full accountability to reasons. This suggestion will help explain why the thumotic
priorities that define tripartite psychology in Book IV fall short of genuine philosophy.
The interest in accountability to others is a thumotic interest that has the potential to resist
the self-opposing activity of reason that eventually characterizes philosophy. The
resistance from thumos is eventually tempered, however, by the virtue of sophrosunē—a
for philosophy itself” (Beautiful City: The Dialectical Character of Plato’s Republic [Ithaca, NY:
Cornell University Press, 2003], 20).
298 See Burnyeat, “The Truth of Tripartition,” 9. Cf. Reeve, Philosopher-Kings, 138, who also notices this
general feature about thumos, but who describes thumos as primarily comprehending the mismatch
between “reality and our ideals.” Cooper argues that thumotic anger is rooted in “competitiveness and
the desire for self-esteem and (as a normal presupposition of this) esteem by others.” See John M.
Cooper, “Plato on Human Motivation,” in Reason and Emotion: Essays on Ancient Moral Psychology
and Ethical Theory (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 134. This description of the
general motivation of thumos is correct, but it remains partial to anger as the defining emotion for
thumos. Shame and anger at oneself are not necessarily born out of competitiveness. Once one
considers emotions like shame, or the experience of directing of anger at oneself, the need to see the
essence of thumos as a generally other-bound consciousness becomes clearer.
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virtue that is crucial to the project of psychic integration. The second point that I shall
make is that thumos, like the epithumotikon, lacks a power of hypothesis, and that the
logistikon's power of hypothesizing in fact saves thumos from thwarting its own
interests—that is, saves thumos from itself. However, since hypothesis plays a role in the
restraint of both thumos and the epithumotikon, and is the primary exercise by which
Socrates characterizes dialectic,299 we can deduce from the arguments regarding thumos
in Book IV that the logistikon has a capacity that is continuous with its philosophical
development in the central books.
The story of Leontius does not—at least not superficially—appear to rely on the
PNO because it does not portray both desire and aversion in relation to the same object or
aspect of an object. Leontius directs his anger not at the dead bodies, but rather at his
desire to look at the dead bodies. In other words, Leontius is attracted to the bodies, but
angry at himself. Clearly, however, a person's having contrary affects (desire for the
bodies, and anger at oneself) for different objects does not qualify as a case for the PNO.
I propose that this apparent inconsistency can be resolved by characterizing the relation
between thumos and the epithumotikon as a relation between first-order and second-order
desires. Thumos somehow communicates a wish about Leontius’ first-order desire to look
at the bodies, and this relation among desires allows for a strict application of the PNO. A
second-order desire about a first-order desire—for example, a desire to be rid of certain
desires, or simply not to satisfy certain desires—can account for an aversion to the object
of the first-order desire. For example, a person trying to quit cigarettes might experience
cravings for cigarettes, along with a desire to be rid of the craving. But how might this
299 Τοῦτον τοινύν νοητὸν μὲν τὸ εἶδος ἔλεγον, ὑποθέσεσι ἀναγκαζομένην ψυχὴν χρῆσθαι περὶ τὴν
ζήτησιν αὐτοῦ (511a2-3). “As regards this type (εἶδος), grasped by the mind (νοητόν), I was saying that
the soul is forced to use hypotheses in its search for it.”
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person rid himself of the craving—that is, how could this person actually satisfy the
second-order desire? The person might succeed if he made the object of the craving
appear as disgusting or as distasteful as possible. In this way the effort to satisfy a
second-order desire to be rid of a certain first-order desire might take the form of creating
an aversion to the very same of object of the first-order desire. Thus, if we have secondorder desires that we hope to satisfy, then we must attribute those second-order desires to
thumos, on pain of violating the PNO.300
This interpretation of thumos finds support in Rana Saadi Liebert's reading of the
story of Leontius.301 Liebert suggests that thumos performs a “second-order”302 function
in relation to the epithumotikon. She offers a unique interpretation that is worth
considering for what it reveals about thumos’ function as a second-order desire. Liebert
rejects the common reading of Leontius as a necrophiliac,303 and instead argues that
Leontius’ thumos reacts to a feeling of unlawful pity for the dead. Her case relies on
Plato’s use of the word “disgust” (δυσχεραίνω) both in the Leontius episode and in other

300 Reeve seems to miss the mark in his analysis of the example of Leontius. Because he is committed to
each part of the soul having a “natural object,” in the same way that the natural object of thirst is
something drinkable (See footnote 28), he must assume that anger has a “natural object.” This might be
true, but it would take significant argument to identify the natural object of anger (Reeve, PhilosopherKings, 131). Moral wrongs seem to be a good place to start, but in the example of Leontius, Leontius is
angry at himself not for having yet committed a moral wrong, but because of his failure to resist a
temptation. Nonetheless, Reeve rightly recognizes that anger, the characteristic emotion of thumos, can
morph into a form of self-disgust (137). It is this possibility within anger which I suggest is crucial for
interpreting the Leontius example.
301 Rana Saadi Liebert, “Pity and Disgust in Plato's Republic: The Case of Leontius in Classical Philology,
Vol. 108, No. 3 (July 2013): 179-201.
302 Liebert, “Pity and Disgust in Plato's Republic,” 185-186.
303 Liebert casts doubt on the common reading by pointing out that the reading relies on a corrupt comic
fragment featuring Leontius that has been amended in light of the episode in the Republic. The attempt
to establish Leontius’ perverse sexuality on the basis of the Republic thus proves to be circular. Second,
she points out that the common reading ignores Socrates’ mention of the fact that Leontius looks on the
bodies of recently executed criminals (“Pity and Disgust in Plato's Republic, 181). If the only lesson
were to show thumos in conflict with perverse appetites, why include the detail that the bodies belonged
to executed criminals?
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passages of the Republic.304 Thumos, she argues, is an enculturated feeling of moral
disgust at varieties of appetitive desires that are by nature “lawless,” or that lack a
principle of limit within themselves. Liebert identifies grief—rather than perverse sexual
attraction—as the appetitive desire that Leontius experiences, on the grounds that the
expression of grief was significantly restricted in the education of the guardians, and is
designated as a lawless desire in Book X. This proposal better interprets the episode
because it explains the qualification that the corpses belong to executed prisoners. On
Liebert's proposal, the conflict between thumos and the epithumotikon is as follows.
Leontius sees the corpses and feels a natural tendency to pity them, but because the
corpses belong to criminals, his pity is not sanctioned by the demands of justice, which
prohibits citizens from showing pity for dead criminals. The outburst of “disgust and
revulsion at himself” (δυσχεραίνοι καὶ ὰποτρέποι εαυτόν, 439e8) reflects an enculturated
response to an epithumotikon that has gotten out of control.305
While I find Liebert’s reading more persuasive than the common reading, it is
worth noting that that even on the common reading of the Leontius episode, the same
mechanism of disgust at an appetite would be operative, so that thumos would generate a
second-order desire by first manifesting as anger at oneself, and then disgust at the object
of one's appetite. Nonetheless, Liebert's reading has two advantages. First, it reveals a
304 Of particular note is Liebert's use of a passage from Socrates' conclusions about the effects of musical
education in Book III. Liebert points out that the effect of musical education is to render students able to
perceive what is well-formed and feel disgust rightly [ὁρθῶς ... δυσχεραίνων], and argues that this
passage shows Socrates' interesting in giving students a “pre-rational means of evaluating the world”
(“Pity and Disgust in Plato's Republic,” 190). Disgust thus represents the aesthetic aspect of moral
condemnation.
305 In my opinion Cooper overlooks the significance of thumos ability to direct anger at oneself.
Concerning Leontius, he says that “the anger he feels at himself is the natural response to this failure to
measure up in his own eyes” (“Plato on Human Motivation,” 134). What Cooper overlooks is that it is
not really Leontius “own eyes” to which Leontius is living up; rather, it is the internalization of cultural
norms in the form of a sense of accountability to authoritative persons, such as one's parents and
teachers.
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neater consistency between the Leontius episode and Socrates’ observations about
thumos’ response to beliefs about just and unjust punishment. If thumos is a form of
moral disgust that arises from cultural conditioning, then it is an attitude that is amenable
to a society’s reasoned—in ideal cases, at least—deliberations about the appropriateness
of, and restrictions on, certain appetites. Similarly, the examples of just and unjust
punishment show how a thumotic response is dependent upon judgments about just and
unjust deserts. On Liebert's reading, Leontius' thumos is roused because he views the
punishment as just, but his appetitive response of grief resists the judgment that the
prisoners somehow “got what they deserved.”306 The second advantage is that her reading
shows how thumotic concerns are dependent upon the consciousness of others, either as
discrete individuals who hold punitive authority, or in the form of the “super-ego” of
social norms.
The education of thumos thus fosters a sense of accountability to other persons.
What thumos lacks, however, is a sense of accountability to reasons. That thumos lacks a
full sense of accountability to reasons is apparent in Socrates' argument for the
subordination of thumos to the logistikon, which contains observations about the
dependence that feelings of indignation have on beliefs about deserved and undeserved
punishment. Most notably, the examples portray, on the one hand, the emotive response
to the belief that one suffers an unjust punishment, and on the other hand, the lack of
emotive response to the belief that one suffers a just punishment. The first scenario
306 One might ask whether these arguments reflect Plato’s views on capital punishment, and that perhaps
we ought to reject this account of the relationship between thumos and the epithumotikon. Pity, the
objection might go, humanizes us; but this account of thumos and the epithumotikon recommends the
callous indifference to these “humanizing” instincts. Reconstructing Plato’s views on capital
punishment is beyond the scope of this dissertation, but one can reply to the objection by noting that
Socrates’ project here is simply descriptive. All he needs to establish is that thumos exercises control
over appetites—sometimes even over pity—by manifesting as a feeling of disgust with oneself.
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concerns someone who believes he is committing injustice:
When someone thinks he has committed injustice, is it not the case that the nobler
he is, the less he is able to get angry when suffering hunger and cold anything
else at the hands of the person whom he thinks does these things justly—and
what I am saying—isn't he unwilling to rouse his thumos against that person?
Ὅταν τις οἴηται ἀδικεῖν, οὐχ ὅσῳ ἄν γενναιότερος ᾖ, τοσούτῳ ἧττον δύναται
οργίζεσθαι καὶ πεινῶν καὶ ῥιγῶν καὶ ἄλλο ὁτιοῦν τῶν τοιούτων πάσχων ὑπ'
ἐκείνου ὅν ἄν οἴηται δικαίως ταῦτα δρᾶν καὶ, ὅ λέγω, οὐκ ἐθέλει πρὸς τοῦτον
αὐτοῦ ἐγείρεσθαι ὁ θυμός (440c1-5);
Socrates’ claim in this example is fairly simple: our having an emotive response, such as
anger or indignation, depends upon beliefs we hold about the desert of the punishment we
are suffering, and, by implication, our beliefs about whether we have done something that
deserves punishment. Two points are striking about Socrates' phrasing here, however.
First, the willingness to endure punishment depends not upon reasoned judgments about
the moral value of one's action, but rather on the confidence one has in the authority and
competence of the punisher: that person is someone “whom he thinks does these things
justly.” Second, this willingness to suffer just punishment without rousing one's anger
stems from the quality of one's “nobility,” or one's being “well bred” (γενναῖος), not from
a quality of one's logistikon. In other words, the “well-bred” person holds himself
accountable to those whose authority he trusts.
Another reason that thumotic interests depend on an attitude of pistis, or trust in
persons rather than responsiveness to reasons, can be found in the set of background
beliefs that inform the person's conclusion that, in this particular instance, he or she
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suffers a just punishment. The confidence that the person has in the authority of the
punisher also assumes confidence in the system that distributes deserts (whether honors
or punishments) generally.307 Confidence in that system does not require insight either
into the reasons for that system or whether that system actually conforms to the standards
it claims to endorse. For example, one does not need to understand John Rawls' A Theory
of Justice to have faith that the courts are managing one's case justly. Nonetheless, the
well-bred person in the example above trusts that the authority that punishes him gives
what is properly due to him, even if he does not understand the principles or reasons that
underlie the system as a whole. Again, what this suggests is that the primary concern of
thumos is accountability to persons rather than to reasons. Moreover, by recognizing
thumos as this form of accountability we can better see how thumos generates secondorder desires. The key here is that experiencing or not experiencing an emotive response
of indignation does not require that one have in mind the rational basis (if there is one)
for such a system of distribution. What matters—if we follow Liebert in characterizing
one function of thumos as enculturated disgust—is that one's confidence in this system
and its representative authorities can reproduce that the values of that system virtually
within oneself, so as to generate feelings of disgust at oneself both for failing to conform
to the behaviors that typically receive praise, and for having illicit appetites when those
307 Tad Brennan has offered an account of tripartite psychology that attempts to explain the different
elements of the soul from the perspective of the demiurge in the Timaeus. From this perspective he aims
to explain the necessity of just these three parts—appetite, thumos, reason—for an embodied soul.
According to his account, the need for thumos is explained by the lack of an economy that can distribute
appetitive goods in a principled way. Honor, which one wins by taking risks in the acquisition and
defense of appetitive goods (such as in war), provides the merit according to which one person will
receive more, and another less, of the appetitive goods available. I think Brennan's approach has
difficulty explaining how Plato incorporates thumos into a philosophical orientation, though I mention
his suggestion in order to draw attention to the intimate relation between thumotic interests and the
inter-subjectivity that underlies an economy for distributing honors and appetitive goods. See Tad
Brennan, “The Nature of the Spirited Part of the Soul and its Object,” in Plato and the Divided Self, eds.
Rachel Barney, Tad Brennan, and Charles Brittain (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 107108; 122-124.
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appetites are invisible to other persons.308
Concerning the subordination of thumos to the logistikon, Socrates concludes, on
the basis of the examples discussed, that “earlier [τὸτε] we thought [thumos] to be
something desiring, but now we are saying that it falls short by much; rather it is much
more likely that in the civil war of the soul, it takes up arms on the side of the rational
part.”309 To clarify this relationship of subordination, we should ask what Socrates means
by “more likely” (πολύ μάλλον) in this passage. Griffith's translation is somewhat
misleading in that it lends itself to the interpretation that, as a matter of empirical
probability, thumos will side with the logistikon in most cases where there is a potential
for psychic conflict. It is not clear the Socrates has established this, however. As we have
seen, the experience of anger depends upon the judgment that one has suffered injustice,
but claim that thumos is “more likely” to side with the logistikon is a bit puzzling, as
there is no guarantee that this alliance will always hold. Moreover, this interpretation of
the “likelihood” of the alliance relies on the empirical generalization that in most people
thumos just happens to side with the logistikon; it does not furnish an argument that
thumos ought to be subordinate to the logistikon even if, for example, thumos is not
subordinate to the logistikon in the souls of most people. It is worth noting in connection
with this point an admission of the precariousness of thumos' alliance with the logistikon
when Socrates says that thumos “is auxiliary to the rational element by nature, provided it
is not corrupted by a poor upbringing” (441a1-3, Griffith). As with the phrase “more
308Thumos thus explains why the properly just person would not depart from just actions even if he had
Gyges' ring.
309 τότε μὲν γὰρ ἐπιθυμητικόν τι αὐτὸ ᾠόμεθα εἶναι, νῦν δὲ πολλοῦ δεῖν φαμεν, ἀλλὰ πολὺ μᾶλλον αὐτὸ
ἐν τῇ τῆς ψυχῆς στάσει τίθεσθαι τὰ ὅπλα πρὸς τὸ λογιστικόν, Rep., 440e3-4. The Griffith translation
provides a slightly misleading translation of the “πολύ μάλλον” in this passage. Griffith translates, “it is
“far more likely (etc.).” But this translation makes the alignment of thumos with reason almost a matter
of probability. The μάλλον clearly applies to what Socrates thinks they ought to say about thumos and
its relation to the epithumotikon and reason.
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likely,” the phrase “by nature” needs clarification. Socrates must mean “by nature” in the
sense that thumos carries out its proper function, or is properly subordinated to
logistikon; hence the addition of the clause, “provided it is not corrupted by a poor
upbringing.” If the “natural” alliance of thumos and the logistikon were just that alliance
which occurs as a matter of empirical probability, in the absence of any conditioning or
habituation, then it would make little sense for Socrates to add this clause.
An example of the damage that results when thumos fails to ally with the
logistikon is instructive here, as it helps demonstrate the sense of the “naturalness” of the
alliance Socrates has in mind.310 There are likely many people who have had the same
experience as Leontius in relation to other appetitive cravings (e.g., addiction to
cigarettes or other drugs). Some of these people may have the opinion that satisfying their
craving is bad, but fail to have thumos as the “ally” of their logistikon. For example,
suppose someone else purposely hid an addicts' drug, so as to prevent him from
indulging. Rather than endure this “punishment,” the addict might become angry with
whomever hid the drug, even though he would admit that he ought to quit his addiction if
he were asked what would be best for his health. Socrates does not mean that thumos is
the natural ally of the logistikon in the sense that it is incapable of allying with the
epithumotikon; rather, the alliance with the logistikon is “natural” in the sense that it is
the best role for thumos, given the sort of thing that thumos is. The justification for this
310 Aristotle’s discussion of the person who is quick to anger as a particular example of the weak-willed
person might work here as well. Aristotle’s analysis of the person who experiences weakness of will
would also fit this interpretation. Aristotle points out that the weak-willed person must feel regret after
indulging some appetite, since regret separates him from the self-indulgent person, whose indulgence
stems from an opinion and choice the indulging his appetites brings happiness (EN, 1150b30). What I
would point out here is that regret belongs to thumos: regret is an emotional “image” or “reminder” of
one’s sincerely held priorities and commitments. Although regret may manifest as a first order desire--“I
wish I hadn’t done that!”--the fact that it is a desire for a counterfactual state of affairs actually makes it
more complex than standard appetitive desires, since appetitive desires seem to be characterized by the
immediacy of their objects.
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alignment of the parts of the soul rests on the premise that only the logistikon has a
comprehensive perspective of the ends of both thumos and the epithumotikon. As we can
see in the example above, the alliance of thumos with the epithumotikon only contributes
to the deterioration of the person's health, because the anger the person feels at having his
drug taken away lacks a comprehensive view of the effects of the drug on the whole
person.
In summary, what I am suggesting concerning the subordination of thumos to the
logistikon is that thumos has the power to preserve an internal impression of an external
authority. Thumos is “naturally,” or properly subordinate to the logistikon because its
form of consciousness is structured with a placeholder for some authority whose demands
it can internalize and impose upon itself and appetite. As far as concerns the turning of
the soul, we should notice that thumos is primed for the acceptance of reason as the
ultimate authority, even though Book IV—and perhaps even the Republic as a whole—
lacks an clear portrait of a philosophically mature form of reason.311 Nonetheless, it

311To make this interpretation more plausible, we might consider what Socrates says about fear, another
emotion that has an essential relation to thumos. What will again emerge from studying the virtuous
management of fear is an account of thumos as that which may present a sort of image or impression of
reason in the form of a second-order desire. Socrates defines courage as the virtue that arises when “the
spirited element […] though surrounded by pleasures and pains, keeps intact the instructions given to it
by reason about what is to be feared and what is not to be feared” (442c1-3, Griffith). The crucial
question that we must pose to this definition is what demarcates the truly fearsome from what is not
fearsome? The resources for answering this question are scarce in the Republic, though in light of the
dialogue's overarching interest in answering what is good for the soul, a plausible answer is that the
truly fearsome is what harms the soul, that is, injustice. The Myth of Er, at least, would seem to
corroborate this interpretation, inasmuch as it offers an image of what the unjust soul will suffer as a
result of its wrongdoings, and conspicuously lacks the rigorous argumentation that Socrates carries out
in the rest of the Republic. This suggests a way of uniting the Myth of Er with the remainder of the
Republic's argument by casting it in a sort of thumotic role. I propose this Contra Julia Annas, “Plato's
Myths of Judgment” in Phronesis, Vol.27, No.2 [1982], 129; Cf. Ronald R. Johnson, who describes the
myth as a “symbolic summary” of the Republic's main argument (“Does Plato's 'Myth of Er' Contribute
to the Argument of the "Republic'?” in Philosophy & Rhetoric, Vol.23, No.1 [1999], 12). If this
suggestion is accurate, then thumos may carry out its function—preserving the instructions about what
is to be feared and not to be feared—without full comprehension of reasons that justice and injustice
demarcate “what is not to be feared” from “what is to be feared.” That comprehension is gained from
the conversation that spans the whole of the Republic, though for thumos the “image” of this argument
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should be clear that thumos is “primed” in the sense that it receives a surrogate for
accountability to reasons in the form of accountability to authoritative persons.
In the absence of a clear portrait of the rational life, however, we discover an
explanatory gap: how does the transition from accountability to persons to accountability
to reasons occur? While I do not think Socrates provides a full account of this transition
in the Republic, the episode from the Odyssey that Socrates uses to argue for the division
between thumos and the logistikon may offer a clue. In the episode from the Odyssey,
Homer describes Odysseus' experience of the desire for revenge by saying that he
“considered many things in his mind and heart, whether darting up he should bring death
to each, or whether he should let them mingle with the arrogant suiters for the last
time.”312 Socrates identifies the moment at which Odysseus “rebukes his heart” as the
indication of psychic conflict. Although Socrates does not say it explicitly, I suggest that
we interpret Odysseus' actions as another example of the logistikon “restraining” or
“stopping” another part of the soul. This interpretation is corroborated by what Socrates
says earlier about the person whose unjustified indignation at being punished for
wrongdoing is “soothed by the logos beside him, like a dog being recalled by a
shepherd.”313 Just as the logistikon could restrain the epithumotikon, so too can it restrain
thumos. But the question is how the logistikon stops thumos, given that thumos lacks a
mature sense of accountability to the logistikon? I suggest that the logistikon can restrain
thumos by showing thumos that sometimes the satisfaction of its own interests is self-

suffices for it to carry out its function. In this sense thumos can act as a second-order desire-- “I desire
that my desires be in line with justice”--by containing within itself a sort of image of a philosophical
insight.
312 πολλὰ δὲ μερμήριζε κατὰ φρένα καὶ κατὰ θυμόν, ἠὲ μεταΐξας θάνατον τεύξειεν ἑκάστῃ, ἦ ἔτ᾽ ἐῷ
μνηστῆρσιν ὑπερφιάλοισι μιγῆναι ὕστατα καὶ πύματα (Odyssey, XX.10-14).
313 […] ὥσπερ κύων ὑπὸ νομέως ὑπὸ τοῦ λόγου τοῦ παρ' αὐτῷ ἀνακληθεῖς πραυνθῇ (440d3-4);
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defeating. This is especially evident in episode from the Odyssey: Odysseus “rebukes his
heart” because taking revenge at that moment, although it might bring immediate
pleasure, would thwart the ultimate goal of regaining control of the household.314
Concerning the transition from accountability to persons to accountability to reasons, we
might say that the first recognition that one is accountable to reasons comes in the form
of an insight about the limited perspective of thumotic interests. Odysseus' self-restraint
suggests that the logistikon possesses the insight that the satisfaction of thumotic interests
are in some cases self-defeating. Although thumotic interests remain primary in this
example, thumos still needs the logistikon to give its interests a stable prioritization. The
awareness of this need for a stable prioritization of interests indicates the recognition of a
non-personal authority.

§4. Unity amid Self-opposition within Reason: The Virtue Model of Justice and the
Project of Psychic Integration
A summary of the conclusions from my reading of Socrates' arguments for
tripartite psychology is as follows. The logistikon deserves its position as “ruler” of the
soul because it alone has (1) a comprehensive perspective of the ends of the other parts of
the soul (epithumotikon and thumos) and (2) powers of hypothesis, prioritization, and
evaluation that allow it to manage the satisfaction of these often conflicting interests.
These features of the logistikon are best seen in the examples of Odysseus and the person
who refuses drink. In Odysseus' case, the logistikon prohibits the immediate satisfaction
314 This observation explains in turn how the episode allows for an application of the PNO. On the one
hand, there is the desire for revenge, whose satisfaction would bring pleasure; on the other hand, the
logistikon prohibits the satisfaction of this desire. To simultaneously achieve the ends of thumos and
obey the imperative of reason would require incompatible actions; therefore we must divide thumos and
the logistikon.
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of the desire for revenge because satisfying that desire would thwart the long-term aim of
regaining control over the household. However, this end is also thumotic in nature, as it
concerns Odysseus' honor and reputation. Thus the logistikon actually prevents thumos
from thwarting its own true ends. In the case of the person who refuses to drink, we can
imagine any number of undesirable consequences that might follow from the
epithumotikon's rule of the soul. Sometimes the epithumotikon thwarts its own ends, as in
the case where a person suffers a horrible allergic reaction from eating some food he
craved, and cannot eat for days thereafter. Sometimes, however, the epithumotikon
thwarts the ends of thumos, as when a guard drinks, falls asleep during his watch, and is
later reprimanded for his failure. The logistikon stands in a position to rule the soul
because it comprehends the separate functions of the epithumotikon and thumos, and can
maintain a stable prioritization of their respective ends.
Having reviewed the arguments for tripartite psychology, we stand in a better
position to understand the significance of Glaucon's acknowledgment that just actions
preserve the health of the soul, regardless of the consequences of such actions for the
agent who performs them. Socrates defines justice as the “the doing of its own” ([…] ἡ
δικαιοσύνη εἶναι, τὸ τὰ αὐτοῦ πράττειν, 433b3-4) and “the thing which provided to all
those [virtues] the power to come into being, and provides preservation to them when
they have come into being, for as long as it is present.”315 From our examination of the
arguments for tripartite psychology we have already seen the effects of allowing either
the epithumotikon or thumos to prioritize its own ends without the logistikon's evaluation:
either that part of the soul hinders the achievement of its own ends, or it produces some

315 […] ὁ πᾶσιν ἐκείνοις τὴν δύναμιν παρέσχεν, ὥστε ἐγγενέσθαι, καὶ ἐγγενομένοις γε σωτηρίαν παρέχει
ἕωσπερ ἄν ἐνῇ (544b6-8).
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effect that is detrimental to the whole person. By defining justice as each part's “doing its
own,” Socrates is simply drawing our attention to the hierarchy of the parts that we
already described as optimal for the good of the whole person.316 Justice is the
epithumotikon's restriction of its activities to the communication of urges necessary for
supplying material needs; thumos' restriction of its activities to the internalization of
social norms and experience of emotions that reinforce social authority; and the
logistikon's exercise of forethought and care over the whole soul by hypothesizing,
evaluating, and prioritizing the competing ends of thumos and the epithumotikon. Justice
is the health of the soul in the sense that the non-interference of these parts best promotes
the project of integrating and harmonizing the competing interests of these parts.
Clarifying the difference between justice and sophrosunē offers another way to
understand the description of justice as the power that allows the other virtues to come
into being. Irwin tests the difference between these two virtues by considering the
counterexample of the “continent” or “strong-willed” (ἐγκρατος) person from the
Nicomachean Ethics.317 Although the strong-willed person succeeds in resisting his
epithumotikon, he nonetheless experiences his appetites as recalcitrant; getting his
appetites to heed reason is a struggle, even if he succeeds every time. This
counterexample illuminates justice as a distinct virtue because it shows how justice can
cause a person to act in a way that conforms to the virtue of sophrosunē without himself
being sophron. The strong-willed person doesn't have the conviction that satisfying his

316 Aryeh Kosman puts this point well: it is just for the parts of the soul to perform the functions that they
do because they perform their functions best. In this way justice in the soul preserves the intuition
behind the “one man, one task” principle. See Aryeh Ksoman, “Justice and Virtue: Inquiry into Proper
Difference” in The Cambridge Companion to Plato's Republic, ed. G.R.F. Ferrari (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 128.
317 EN, 1102b25-28.
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appetites ought to be first in the prioritization of the ends of thumos and epithumotikon; in
fact, he consciously rejects this arrangement. Therefore he is just in the psychic sense.
But when the logistikon indicates an aversion to the object of an appetite, this person
experiences his epithumotikon as recalcitrant; that is, his epithumotikon does not want to
perform the function of the logistikon, but in some sense it does not fully accept the rule
of the logistikon. Expressed in political terms, this is the difference between reform and
revolution. A reformer need not challenge a governor's rule; he might just want the
governor to act differently, even though he accepts the governor as the ruler. In this case,
the reformer is just, but not sophron. On the other hand, if the reformer wants to replace
the governor altogether, then he becomes a revolutionary; he is neither just nor sophron.
Likewise in the case of the strong-willed person. If the strong-willed person lacked the
conviction that the epithumotikon ought to accept the rule of the logistikon, then it
wouldn't be possible for him to experience his epithumotikon as “recalcitrant” (indeed, he
would no longer be “strong-willed”). Thus, without justice, there is no possibility of
sophrosunē; but without sophrosunē, justice in the sense of “non-interference” is still
possible.318 Justice therefore makes the project of psychic integration possible, but does

318 I dispute the conclusions Irwin draws about the strong-willed man because he wrongly reverses the
order of dependency between justice and sophrosunē. He argues that “this sort of conformity [e.g., of
the strong-willed man with characteristically sophron behavior] cannot constitute psychic justice”
(Plato's Ethics, 228); in other words, he attributes the recalcitrance of the epithumotikon to a kind of
injustice. But without this basic conformity, there would be no room for the strong-willed person to
develop the virtue of sophrosunē. One might wonder whether the compliance of appetites rules out the
need for thumos altogether. I think not. Although it might be ideal if thumos did not have to spend so
much effort enforcing reason's commands, thumos would still have the function of “preserving” the
instructions of reason, something that the epithumotikon cannot do. My proposal also helps counter
some of the excessively intellectualized accounts of sophrosunē. One worry is that the description of
sophrosunē as an “agreement” among the parts of the soul attributes cognitive powers each part of the
soul: see Irwin, Plato's Ethics, 218; Bobonich, Plato's Utopia Recast, 219-220. But sophrosunē need
not refer to the agreement of beliefs; it might simply describe the way the epithumotikon obeys reason,
as either compliant or non-compliant. Irwin shares my view in identifying the “reluctance” and
“recalcitrance” of the epithumotikon as the proper test of sophrosunē (Plato's Ethics, 228). Santas also
disputes the view that the agreement described by sophrosunē is cognitive, but he neglects the
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not fully realize it. This notion of justice is analogous with a state of bodily health
because bodily health also allows for the possibility of physical excellence, but does not
guarantee it. For example, a person who wants to become a virtuoso dancer needs health
to begin the exercises that will improve his dancing; but despite his health, he may still
have to struggle to coordinate his movements in a way that would be considered graceful.
This conclusion does not alter the portrait of the logistikon as an algorithm or
“mere executive” that determines how best to satisfy the demands of the epithumotikon
and thumos. As we saw earlier, this portrait of the logistikon typically receives criticism
for its lack of philosophical interest, and thus for its discontinuity with the portrait of the
lover of wisdom in the central books of the Republic. I suggest that this criticism is
misguided for two reasons. The first is that the logistikon's power of hypothesis is in fact
consistent with the hypothesizing that characterizes dialectical inquiry; the second is that
the educational program of Books II-III and virtues of tripartite psychology make the
project of psychic integration an imperative, and this imperative is crucial for the
philosopher who begins exercising the power of hypothesis with respect to theoretical
concerns. Although the hypothesizing of the logistikon in book IV differs from the
philosopher's hypothesizing in Book VII, the difference concerns the content rather than
the form of reasoning: practical rather than theoretical affairs are the primary concern of
the logistikon in Book IV. Philosophers differ in hypothesizing about such topics as the
good, the just, and the beautiful, asking what follows if these concepts are defined in
such-and-such ways. But the form of reasoning is the same. Hypothesizing about Forms
and hypothesizing about practical matters also differ in that the former have far greater
implications for the conduct of one's life—a point that Socrates emphasizes when he
connection with pleasure and pain (Understanding Plato's Republic, 93).

193

replies to Thrasymachus that he considers knowledge of justice “a thing worth more than
much gold” (πρᾶγμα πολλῶν χρυχίων τιμιώτερον, 336e7).
When applied to properly philosophical topics, however, the power of hypothesis
threatens the soul with another type of disintegration, one quite different from the conflict
of interests that the soul met in thumos and the epithumotikon. We in fact observe this
phenomenon in the Republic when Glaucon prefaces his revival of Thrasymachus' view
with the disclaimer that he does not actually believe that injustice is more profitable than
justice.319 The necessity of hypothesizing contradictory perspectives poses a threat to
psychic integrity in the sense that it might be unclear which arguments should be taken
seriously, and which entertained solely for the benefit of intellectual exercise. This
feature of philosophy threatens psychic integrity by encouraging the view that one's
intellectual life has no bearing on one's practical affairs. Worse, it invites the accusation
that philosophers are dissemblers par excellence—an accusation that Thrasymachus casts
in Book I when he complains of Socrates' irony and unwillingness to answer questions.320
Thrasymachus complains of the “irony of Socrates” when Socrates denies the request to
say what he thinks justice is and to take the role as answerer rather than questioner.321 In
effect, Thrasymachus' complaint is this: “You agree, Socrates, that this argument is just a
game, but you feign seriousness so that you may better entertain yourself by poking holes
in the serious arguments of others.”322
Psychic disintegration also threatens to affect thumos, since as a result of this
319 Rep., 358c5-6.
320 […] αὕτη 'κείνη ἡ εἰωθυῖα εἰρωνεία Σωκράτους (337a3).
321 Socrates says that he and Polemarchus “are not able” (οὐ δυνάμεθα, 336e10) to define justice.
322 Alcibiades also accuses Socrates of this insincerity in the Symposium when likens Socrates to a Silenus
(216d7) and says that he “thinks us nothing, and conducts his whole life playing and being ironic
towards other people” (ἡγεῖται δὲ πάντα τὰ κτήματα οὐδενὸς ἄξια καὶ ἡμᾶς οὐδὲν εἶναι, εἰρωνευόμενος
δὲ καὶ πάιζων πάντα τὸν βίον πρός τοὺς ἀνθρώπους, 216e3-6).
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higher-order hypothesizing, in which ultimate questions may be left unanswered for some
time, thumos is effectively left leaderless. As I suggested above, thumos is structured with
the placeholder for an authority, which is typically filled by one's accountability to
authoritative persons. From a philosophical perspective, however, only reason is truly
authoritative, and so the exercise of hypothesis in philosophical topics leaves this
placeholder absent. Despite these threats to the project of psychic integration, I argue that
tripartite psychology offers crucial resources for counteracting the unique threat of
psychic disintegration that philosophical inquiry poses. Two virtues in particular—
courage and sophrosunē—encourage an interest in psychic integration that can support
the soul when it faces the threat of psychic disintegration. The necessity of this interest,
which tripartite psychology encourages, is ultimately what makes tripartite psychology
continuous with the portrait of the philosopher in the central books.323
The courageous person's thumos “keeps intact the instructions given to it by
reason about what is to be feared and what is not to be feared.”324 This definition of
courage shows interest in psychic unity in the sense that courage is the maintenance of
stable character amid a variety of appetitive drives and cravings. For a simple example,
we may think of the guard who keeps his watch despite the cold (pain) and the welcome
distraction of drinking (pleasure). In its philosophical form, however, courage seems to
323 Kamtekar holds a similar view of the purpose of tripartite psychology, i.e., that it performs the
“practical and protreptic goal of representing the development of philosophic virtue to would-be
philosophers” (“Speaking with the Same Voice as Reason,” 197). Annas wonders how Plato can claim
that habituative education, which encourages “moral conformity” can develop into “intellectual honesty
and rigor” (Introduction, 87). The answer I propose here may make the process less mysterious. Richard
Patterson holds a view very close to my own. He argues that “factors internal to reason” may “lead
reason astray” and, for this reason, reason needs virtues such as self-control and courage (“Plato on
Philosophic Character,” in Journal of the History of Philosophy, 25/3 [Jul 1, 1987]: 326). My proposal
differs in that I do not identify desire, but rather the self-opposing power of hypothesis as the source of
internal source of instability in the logistikon.
324 […] ὅταν αὐτοῦ τὸ θυμοειδὲς διασώζει διὰ τε λυπῶν καὶ ἡδονῶν τὸ ὑπο τοῦ λόγου παραγγελθὲν δεινόν
τε καὶ μή (442c1-3).
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manifest as the willingness to risk answering questions of ultimate concern even when
one might be wrong, and to see one's inquiry through to the end even when the
competitor theories are numerous.325 These features of philosophical courage are apparent
when Socrates discusses the “test of being,” saying that the philosopher must be willing
to “fight his way through all attempts to disprove his theory in his eagerness to test it by
the standard of being rather than the standard of opinion” (534c1-3, Griffith). Readiness
to fight, a characteristic of the guardians in Books II-IV, manifests as willingness to
compete with the many philosophical theories that one may encounter.326
Sophrosunē, on the other hand, might assist the project of psychic integration in
philosophical matters by encouraging the compliance of thumos. If we consider the
difference between accountability to persons and accountability to reasons, we will see
that thumos also shows its own recalcitrance. The thumotic perspective that has
internalized culturally-sanctioned norms might be unable to admit of exceptions or
contradictions to those norms, even when those exceptions are instances of virtuous
action. Polemarchus provides a good example of this phenomenon. The internalization of
the definition of justice that he learned from his father, Cephalus, represents a thumotic
commitment that causes him conceptual difficulties when Socrates presents him with the
example of a person who refuses to return the weapons of his mentally-deranged friend.
Polemarchus has difficulty reconciling the virtue of the action with the principle—justice
is giving everyone their due—that he has internalized. This phenomenon presents an
opportunity for the exercise of sophrosunē in the search for wisdom in the following
sense. Sophrosunē might manifest as tolerance for, rather than repression of, offensive
325 Cf. Patterson, “Plato on Philosophic Character,” 346-347.
326 See also Patterson, who rightly notes that excessive thumos is the cause of dialectic's dissolution into
mere eristic (“Plato on Philosophic Character,” 339-340).
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contradictions: the sophron person experiences his thumos as compliant rather than
resistant when he encounters such a contradiction for the sake of theoretical inquiry. The
over-zealous absolutism of a thumos that cannot tolerate an offensive contradiction thus
risks unifying the soul in an artificially rigid way—and this rigidity is no healthier for the
soul than it is health for a dancer to obsessively hold a pose for hours on end. In contrast,
the unity of the soul which exercises sophrosunē in the face of contradiction better
resembles the unity of a living organism—something that maintains its integrity in the
midst of both internal and external dynamism.
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Conclusion: The Preparatory Function of Psychic Integration for the Philosopher in
Republic V-VII
In Republic V-VII, Socrates devotes a considerable effort to discussing arguments
that he would use to persuade imagined opponents to accept his proposal that
philosophers ought to rule the city. Glaucon imagines as the relevant opponent a crowd of
people that would be ready to kill anyone who made such a proposal, and challenges
Socrates to make a speech to pacify them (473e5-474a1).327 Socrates tries to persuade
these opponents by way of the following claims. (1) There is a difference betweenν
“lovers of spectating” (φιλοθεάμονες, 475d1) and the “true” philosophers (τοὺς δὲ
ἀληθινούς, 475e3); (2) There is a distinction between “all the forms of things” (πάντων
τῶν εἰδῶν, 476a3) and the many participants in these forms; (3) “what altogether is” (τὸ
παντελῶς ὄν, 477a2) is an object of knowledge, while the objects of opinion are
“between what is not something and what purely and simply is something;”328 (4)
Knowledge and opinion are capacities differentiated by these two types of objects (477a479d);329 (5) The true philosophers are defined by their acceptance of this distinction,

327 Some scholars identify the lovers of spectating, (φιλοθεάμονες, 475d1) as the group that Socrates is
trying to persuade of the value of the philosopher. See Gail Fine, “Knowledge and Belief in Republic
V” in Plato 1, Metaphysics and Epistemology, ed. Gail Fine (New York: Oxford University Press,
1999), 219; Reeve, Plato's Utopia Recast, 64. In doing so, however, they risk identifying the lovers of
sights with the “πάνυ πολλούς” (473e5), the imagined crowd that is ready to kill Socrates. But it is not
clear that these two groups are the same. When Socrates introduces the lover of sights, he does so in
response to Glaucon's observation that certain people might fall in the group of “lovers of learning”
(φιλομαθῆς, 475c2) whom we would not consider philosophers. Glaucon thus introduces the
φιλοθεάμονες as a counterexample to Socrates' identification of the φιλομαθής with the philosopher.
Simply put, there are people who enjoy going to the theater, but who would never go near a
philosophical discussion (475d4). We might also think of people who enjoy learning about all kinds of
technical skills, but who would never dream of studying philosophy. These people seem to be “lovers of
learning,” but Glaucon says they would not consider them philosophers. A plausible resolution of the
identities of these two parties seems to be this: the lovers of sights are placeholder for the sophists
discussed in Book VI, while the mob represents the demos that needs to be persuaded that true
philosophers are not the sophists they know as corrupters of the youth.
328 […] μεταξύ που κυλινδεῖται τοῦ τε μὴ ὄντος καὴ τοῦ ὄντος εἰλικρινῶς (479d3-4).
329 The phrase “what wholly is” is a cause considerable interpretive difficulties. It may refer to
immutability; the non-identity of form with particular; or the simplicity of the form as a “one over
many” condition of forms (See Santas, 126-37, 141). A second problem is the “two-worlds” thesis two
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while the lovers of spectating are defined by their rejection of it (476c-d); (6)
philosophers love and seek an understanding of “the reality that wholly is,” (ἐκείνης τῆς
οὐσίας τῦς ἀεὶ οὔσης 485b1-2) and precisely because of this love they can provide the
greatest benefit to the city (485b1; 497a1-2); (7) philosophers must undergo an education
in mathematics and dialectic in order to gain insight into the “Good itself” before they
can provide this benefit to the city (519d-e).
Although these arguments are a departure from the main argument and inquiry of
the Republic,330 they raise questions about the accuracy of the account of virtue that we
received in Books II-IV, and the ultimate protreptic effect of tripartite psychology. When
Socrates discusses the effect of mathematical-dialectical education on the soul, he
proposes that the right education will turn “the entire soul […] away from what is coming
to be, until it is able to bear the sight of what is, and in particular the brightest part of it”
(518c7-8, Griffith). Socrates and Glaucon then agree that “number and calculation”
(ἀριθμὸν τε καὶ λογισμόν, 522c5-6) form a subject of study that will “draw the soul away
from the world of becoming toward the world of what is” (521d1-2, Griffith), and
which this distinction seems to commit us. It becomes unclear how knowledge could be an
improvement on opinion, for instance, because the types of objects of these cognitive states are
radically distinct (See Annas, Introduction, 194; Irwin, Plato's Ethics, 267). For an argument against the
two-worlds theory, see Fine, “Knowledge and Belief in Republic V,” 216. A third problem is the
problem of the sense of εἶναι when we say something “wholly is.” Commentators have distinguished
between predicative, veridical, and existential senses (Annas, Introduction, 196; Vlastos, “A
Metaphysical Paradox,” 43-47; Kahn, “The Greek Verb 'To Be' and the Concept of Being,” in Essays on
Being [New York: Oxford University Press, 2009], 18). Annas opts for the predicative sense
(Introduction, 198); Irwin appears to prefer the veridical sense (Plato's Ethics, 268). Others dispute
these distinctions altogether. See Kahn, 19; Lesley Brown, “Being in the Sophist, A Syntactical
Inquiry,” in Oxford Studies in Ancient Philosophy 4 (1986): 50. Some argue that the phrase might not
even single out forms at this stage in Socrates' argument, because doing so would be too controversial
for those whom he is trying to persuade, i.e., the lover of sights. Cf. Fine, 219; Reeve, who proposes
that “'what is completely should be understood as 'what in no way resembles F' [italics mine].” He
alleges that this does not require a reference to forms because it only adds the “conditions under which a
particular property is the property F” (Philosopher-Kings, 65). My purpose in this conclusion is not to
answer these difficulties, but rather to show how an interest in this distinction necessarily arises from
the project of psychic integration.
330 Socrates indicates as much at 449b1.
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proceed to describe the mathematical and dialectical education that the philosopherguardians will receive. Prima facie, then, it would appear that the protreptic of the
Republic is really directed at developing our enthusiasm for this form of education, since
that education seems to effect the total reorientation of the soul. But the purpose of the
second education that philosopher-guardians receive is not simply theoretical. Socrates
differentiates between virtues of the soul and body on the one hand—which he says are
“close” on account of their “being implanted by habits and training”331—and virtues of
phronēsis on the other hand (518d6-e2). He argues that the virtue of phronēsis differs
from the virtues of body and soul because it:
[…] becomes useful and beneficial, or useless and harmful, depending on which
way it is facing. Think of those people who have the reputation of being evil
but clever. Have you ever notice the beady little eyes their souls have, how
sharp they are at picking out the things they are after? This suggests that their
soul has nothing wrong with its eyesight, but that it is coerced into the service of
evil. The more acute its vision is, therefore, the more evil it does. (519a1-5,
Griffith).
Socrates' worry seems to be that phronēsis differs from body and soul in that its
engagement in evil (κακία) is not a result of a failure to perform its proper function;
rather phronēsis can engage in evil and still perform its function to a superlative degree.
In this it differs from the virtues of thumos, epithumotikon, and logistikon, because,
according to Socrates' argument in Book IV, these parts of the soul cause unjust actions

331 […] αἱ μὲν τοίνυν ἄλλαι ἀρεταὶ καλοὐμεναι ψυχῆς κινδυνεύουσιν ἐγγὺς τι εἶναι τῶν τοῦ σώματος· τῷ
ὄντι γὰρ οὐκ ένοῦσαι προτερον ὕστερον ἐμποιεῖσθαι ἔθεσι καὶ ἀσκήσεσιν (518d6-e1).

200

precisely when they fail to perform their proper function.332 Another worry about the
power of phronēsis seems to be that it might recruit the virtues of body and soul into the
service of some wicked project. This worry is not new to Book VII; in Books I and II, we
saw that Thrasymachus and Glaucon considered the recognition of the greater
profitability of injustice a mark of personal enlightenment, and counted courage and the
ability to speak well as complimentary to the practice of injustice. Thus the Republic's
interlocutors themselves provide the evidence that radical notions can reorient the virtues
of body and soul toward wicked ends.333 These passages therefore force us to reconsider
the accuracy of our account of the virtues of body and soul that we identified as necessary
to the project of psychic integration.
In the next sentence, Socrates points out that a soul might be prevented from
achieving the virtue of phronēsis because it lacks the virtues of body and soul. The
“leaden weights of becoming,” he argues, cling to the soul “as a result of eating, gluttony,
and pleasures of that sort, and direct the gaze of the soul downward” (519b1-3, Griffith).
Since the regulation of these pleasures was associated with sophrosunē, it seems that at
the very least, the virtues of body and soul serve as a necessary preliminary to the
development of phronēsis, simply because without the virtues of the body, one could not
have an interest in the kinds of activities and studies that phronēsis engages with, i.e., the
“things above.” But the connection between these two types of virtues is complicated
once more when Socrates says that the philosopher-guardians who have directed their
332 See especially 442e1-2. Socrates says that to confirm their account of justice they can turn to the
“vulgar” (τὰ φορτικὰ, 443e1) to test their account of justice in the soul. Socrates argues that the person
who is just in the psychic sense that he means will behave in ways commonly thought to be just. So, by
contrast, a person who engages in actions thought to be characteristically unjust does so because in
some way the parts of his soul are not performing their proper functions. This does not seem to be the
case with phronēsis.
333 Reeve, Philosopher-Kings, 50, also advances this view.
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phronēsis in the right way and have contemplated the forms will make the best governors
of the city, because they “have other rewards and a way of life better than the
political.”334 In other words, phronēsis also appears to have a “downward” effect on the
habituated virtues; it allegedly protects the virtues of the body and soul from corruption
because those who make the pursuit of wisdom their life-project will be least interested in
the rewards of political life. Therefore, philosopher-guardians least of all will experience
temptations to seek out political rewards in ways that might bring about the re-orientation
of the virtues of body in soul toward a wicked end.
Even if we share Plato's worry about the corruptibility of the virtues of body and
soul, the question still stands as to why specifically a mathematical-dialectical education
will dispel this worry. This proposition concerning the need for mathematical-dialectical
education therefore raises some difficulties. Most notably, becoming a knower of
mathematics does not seem to require that one be courageous, keep one's promises, or
stop oneself from gorging on food that is unhealthy. The virtues that Plato identifies as
part of the project of psychic integration thus seem unnecessary for the study of
mathematics and dialectics. The type of reasoning in which mathematicians engage
seems to be totally unrelated to moral virtues; neither does it need these virtues as a
prerequisite, nor does it influence them.335
In Chapter One I argued that two basic interpretive approaches can be made to the
Republic on the basis of the division between the inquiries that occupy the central books
(V-VII) and the outer books (II-IV, VIII-IX). The common concern among these two
interpretations is this question regarding the type of virtue that philosophical education
334 […] ἔχουσι τε τιμὰς ἄλλας καὶ βίον ἀμείνω τοῦ πολιτικοῦ (521b6-7).
335 See also Annas, Introduction, 194. Annas proposes the worry that the knowledge obtained from
mathematical-dialectical education might be “irrelevant” to the practical problems of political life.

202

provides. On a methodological view, the general conception of philosophy into which the
Republic initiates readers is a practice of dialogical, ethical, and epistemic virtues.336 Our
task as philosophers is to continually re-examine our own assumptions, hold open the
possibility that we are wrong, and encourage others to do the same. Caring for the soul
requires testing our beliefs, maintaining openness to the revision of our beliefs, and
pursuing the project of psychic integration by aligning our practical lives—in its
epithumotic and thumotic aspects—with our best-tested philosophical convictions. Seeing
as this description captures much of what Socrates does with interlocutors in the
dialogues, it is unclear why Plato would demand more, viz., that to really do philosophy,
we must receive a mathematical-dialectical education.
A metaphysical conception of philosophy can answer this question by explaining
the insecurity of the virtues of body and soul in terms of a failure to grasp the forms, e.g.,
of justice or the good. When Socrates draws the distinction between form and participant,
he explains why people mistake the form itself as many by saying that:
with regard to just and unjust and good and bad and all the forms […] each
[form] is one, but through association with actions and bodies and with each other,
each makes its appearance as many showing themselves everywhere.337
He later explains that things like actions and bodies disperse the “one” (ἕν) of each form
into many because these things “will lay claim to both” of their opposites (ἕκαστον
ἀμφοτέρων ἕξεται, 479b5). For example, stabbing a person with a spear might in one

336 See Chapter 1, p.35. See McCoy, Plato on the Rhetoric of Philosophers and Sophists, 134-137, who
proposes that “love, more than knowledge, defines the soul of the philosopher in the Republic.” See
also Gordon, Turning Toward Philosophy, 31; 39.
337 […] Καὶ περὶ δικαίου καὶ ἀδίκου καὶ ἀγαθοῦ καὶ κακοῦ καὶ πάντων τῶν εἰδῶν πέρι ὁ αὐτὸς λόγος,
αὐτὸ μὲν ἕν ἕκαστον εἶναι, τῇ δὲ τῶν πράξεων καὶ σωμάτων καὶ ἀλλήλων κοινωνίᾳ πανταχοῦ
φανταζόμενα πολλὰ φαίνεσθαι ἕκαστον (476a4-7).
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context be just, but in another context be unjust; in extreme political circumstances,
devising a plot to assassinate a political leader might be just, but manifestly unjust in
other circumstances;338 joining the army to fight an enemy might in some circumstances
be courageous, but other circumstances it might be truly courageous to refuse to fight.
Finally, the association of the forms “with each other” suggests that actions might be
courageous in some circumstances, but just in others. This claim about the nature of
participants raises a problem concerning our reliable practice of the virtues of body and
soul. Those virtues that we learn by habitually performing certain actions under certain
circumstances only prepare us for the circumstances to which we are accustomed. These
actions, in other words, do not unqualifiedly represent the virtues of which they are
instances.339 Without knowledge of the eidē as they are in themselves, separated from the
contexts and relations with which we are familiar, we risk committing vicious actions out
of sheer ignorance of how the eidē of these virtues might appear in unfamiliar
circumstances.340 Thus, the virtues without the metaphysical insight that Socrates
mentions in Books VI and VII are in a certain sense spurious.341
338 The German theologian Dietrich Bonhoeffer, for example, participated in an attempt to assassinate
Hitler in 1944.
339 A common way of describing the difference between the single “itself” of the form and the “many”
participants in this section is to say that the many instances of the form, e.g., in “actions” and “bodies”,
are not “unqualifiedly” instances of that form (Annas, Introduction, 207). See also Burnyeat, who
argues that the purpose of mathematical studies is to learn how to think about “unqualified being”
(“Plato on Why Mathematics is Good for the Soul,” 20). Reeve construes the inadequacy of the “many”
as a problem of relative resemblance to the form. His terms differ but the proposal is much the same:
the “in between” status of objects of opinion consists in their being “less than complete resemblers, no
more F than not F” (Philosopher-Kings, 70). Irwin argues that the “many beautifuls” refer to the “many
different properties that give equally good answers to the 'What is it?' question that Socrates typically
asks when discussing virtue with an interlocutor (Plato's Ethics).
340 Socrates describes the virtues variously as εἴδη and with the reflexive “itself” in the Republic and in
other dialogues. These are common descriptions that Socrates reserves for forms. See Phaedrus, 247d78 (αὐτὴν δικαιοσύνην […] σωφροσύνην); Republiс, 445c4-5 (ἕν μεν εἶναι εἶδος τῆς ἀρετῆς).
341 Bobonich, Plato's Utopia Recast, 16. Cooper identifies the need for inquiry into the Good itself by
pointing out that the logistikon must know what is good for the whole person for whom it calculates.
Without this knowledge, it risks managing the interests of thumos and epithumotikon in the wrong way.
See John Cooper, “The Psychology of Justice in Plato,” American Philosophical Quarterly 14, Vol.2
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The positions of the methodological and metaphysical interpretations therefore
leave us with two questions: (1) how can the virtues of “body and soul”—those that
belong to the project of psychic integration—be necessary for engagement in
mathematical-dialectical education, and (2) how can mathematical-dialectical education
influence the virtues that belong to the project of psychic integration? To answer these
questions I propose the following path of investigation. Regarding (1), if we show that
the virtues of psychic integration are necessary for mathematical-dialectical inquiry, and
can be described in the context of this inquiry using the same terms we used to describe
them as in tripartite psychology, we will have shown that the virtues of psychic
integration are not spurious; they are rather the same form applied to a less-familiar
context. Regarding (2), if we show that from within the project of psychic integration a
necessary interest in mathematical-dialectical education emerges, as a result of some
inability to complete that project, we will have shown a way in which mathematicaldialectical education influences the virtues of psychic integration.342
§1. Response to (1): The Necessity of the Moral Virtues for Mathematical-Dialectical
Inquiry
In the conclusion of the preceding chapter I described some ways in which
courage and sophrosunē might support the project of psychic integration when the soul is
(April, 1977), 152.
342 Reeve argues that in the Republic Plato revised his theory about our acquaintance with the forms from
the doctrine of recollection in the Meno. The crucial improvement in his view is that “forms are no
longer objects of direct, non-theory-laden cognition” (Philosopher-Kings, 108-109). This revision, he
suggests, is reflected in the allegory of the cave: each stage of the cave provides the means to the
prisoners to surpass that same stage. If recollection were the model for knowledge of the form, then
presumably it wouldn't make sense to describe the process of coming to know the forms as a staged
ascent. Miller argues for the same thesis about the stages of education in an excellent analysis of the
mathematical studies in Republic VII: each successive study reveals its implicitness in the preceding
study. See Miller, “Beginning the 'Longer Way,” in The Cambridge Companion to Plato's Republic
(New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 320-323. In this section I argue that tripartite
psychology does the same, by providing us with the tools to begin thinking about mathematics and
dialectic.
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left leaderless by a logistikon that has turned its power of hypothesizing to matters of
philosophy. Courage performs three functions that are necessary for mathematicaldialectical education. First, it shows the willingness to put one's beliefs forward when
there is a significant risk of seeing one's beliefs refuted. Whether this belief is an
uncertain mathematical hypothesis, or a proposed definition of justice, the risk of
refutation is the same. Second, courage manifests as perseverance in an inquiry even after
one has been refuted. These two functions can be understood in terms of the same
emotional stability that the guardians show in the midst of pain (from suffering actual
refutation) and fear (of possibly being refuted). Finally, the role of thumos in tripartite
psychology explains the effectiveness of Socrates' provocative-aporetic means of
persuasion, and shows how the use of these means encourages the virtuous development
of thumos. Typically, anger is a response to the perception of some moral wrong, but in
the experience of aporia, the interlocutor can find no such perception. If we look
carefully, however, we will notice that this experience of an ill-suited target for one's
anger is the same experience as is described in the Leontius' case. Leontius would
perhaps like to be angry at the dead bodies, but in themselves they cannot provoke moral
indignation at one's desire to look at them. Thus the proper target for his anger is himself.
In like manner, when experiencing aporia on might like to be angry at one's questioner,
but the questioner is not the proper target; the proper target oneself. Thus, the thumos of
an interlocutor who becomes angry with Socrates after experiencing aporia is not
performing its function in the soul correctly.343
In the preceding section I also suggested that sophrosunē might manifest as
343 Readers may recall the distinction I drew in Chapter 1, p.16, between thumotic anger and aporetic
anger. It should be apparent now that tripartite psychology provides useful tools for understanding how
aporetic anger results from the improper functioning of thumos.
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tolerance of contradictions that appear offensive to thumos for the sake of inquiry. We
should recall that thumos internalizes and enforces cultural norms by means of
conditioned aesthetic responses—such as disgust—to perceived violations of those
norms. This power of thumos also comes with a risk, however: it might perceive any
questioning of these norms as an attempt to undermine them. An interlocutor who
experiences the intolerance of thumos for a hypothesis that he considers offensive
resembles Odysseus in the example Socrates used to differentiate thumos from the
logistikon. In this case, the interlocutor might wish to silence the examiner, but lacks the
foresight to see that the examiner might benefit him by actually strengthening his
conviction in the moral proposition or principle that was questioned. This presents an
opportunity for the logistikon to restrain thumos, and thereby satisfy thumos' own interest
in maintaining the internalized cultural norm. If thumos were allowed to silence the
examiner, thumos would effectively be disagreeing with the rule of the logistikon in this
particular instance, but not attempting to perform the logistikon's function. Here the
interest of thumos is still to perform its function—to preserve a conviction it has
received—albeit over-zealously. Therefore, sophrosunē is the relevant virtue here: a
particular harmony between thumos and the logistikon is essential to philosophical
inquiry.344
Finally, there is a sense in which justice, too, is necessary for mathematicaldialectical inquiry. In other dialogues, Socrates uses legal terms to characterize the
relations of interlocutors to each other and of the audience to the interlocutors.345 For

344 See also Patterson, 333.
345 See Protagoras, 337e5-7. When the conversation between Protagoras and Socrates breaks down,
Hippias entreats them to consider them all “arbiters” who are trying to “reconcile” them (ὥσπερ ὑπὸ
διαιτητῶν ἡμῶν συμβιβαζόντων, 337e6-7).
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example, the relation of interlocutors may be likened to that between rhetors in court,
while the audience might be likened to a jury. In Books I and II of the Republic Socrates
uses these terms to structure the inquiry into justice. Before Socrates begins his third
elenchos in Book I, he asks Glaucon whether he agrees or disagrees with Thrasymachus
about the profitability of the unjust life (348a5). Socrates then asks if he would like to
“persuade [Thrasymachus], if we are able to find a way, that he does not speak the
truth?”346 Glaucon agrees, and Socrates proposes that they set their respective speeches
side by side (λόγον παρὰ λόγον, 348a5), and choose jurors to make a judgment.347 This
procedure suggests a division of labor, and hence a requirement that each “do his own;” it
also suggests boundaries that people performing these different roles might overstep. But
immediately following this suggestion, Socrates violates the logic of this metaphor: he
and Glaucon, he says, will be “at the same time both jurors and advocates” (ἅμα αὐτοί τε
δικασταὶ καὶ ῥήτορες ἐσόμεθα, 348b1-2). Their playing both “juror and advocate” would
seem to be unjust, because now one person seems to be taking on two distinct tasks. I
suggest that this moment offers a glimpse into the necessity of the virtue of justice for
mathematical-dialectical education. If we assign the tasks of rhetor and juror to parts of
the soul, the two parts that seem best suited to these functions are thumos and the
logistikon. As we saw in the case of courage, the task of thumos is to persevere in an
inquiry; it is interested in victory, and shouldn't give up easily. Moreover, in performing
just this function, thumos provides a valuable service to the inquiry: it presents a
hypothesis in its strongest form. But not all hypotheses will withstand the test of
examination. Thus, if thumos pursues its advocacy after a hypothesis has been refuted, it

346 Βούλει οὖν αὐτὸν πείθωμεν, ἄν δυνώμεθά πῇ ἐξευρεῖν, ὡς οὐκ ἀληθῆ λέγει (348a2-3);
347 […] καὶ ἤδη δικαστῶν τινῶν τῶν διακρινούντων δεησόμεθα (348b1-2).

208

effectively tries to perform the function of the logistikon, because it tries to promote its
own interest in victory as the good of the whole soul. Therefore justice is the relevant
virtue in this instance.

§Response to (2): The Influence of Mathematical-Dialectical Inquiry on the Virtues of
Psychic Integration
The question remains as to how mathematical-dialectical inquiry can influence the
virtues of the project of psychic integration in such a way that they will not be recruited
into the service of a project that appears good, but is actually wicked. I should state here
that in answering this question, I will not offer any proposals about how to understand the
forms, or the form of the Good; rather, I shall try to explain how a mathematicaldialectical education influence the virtues I described as the virtues of psychic
integration. To begin answering this question, it will help to identify the recipient of
tripartite psychology, the person who is tasked with the project of psychic integration. We
might identify this recipient by deciding whether it is necessary for a person to possess
the account of tripartite psychology in order to be just in the same way tripartite
psychology defines justice. I suggest that it is possible to imagine a person who is just—
whose thumos, epithumotikon, and logistikon all perform their proper functions—but who
lacks acquaintance with a theory of tripartite psychology. Such a person might rely on
terms such as thumos in a folk-psychological sense, but reliance on these terms would not
imply acquaintance with the theoretical trappings of tripartite psychology, such as the
PNO and the specific functions that belong to each part of the soul.
Socrates offers tripartite psychology and the accompanying project of psychic
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integration to a rather different person, namely, to a person such as Glaucon, whose
thumos has internalized the norms conventionally associated with justice, but whose
psychic integration is incomplete as a result of encountering the problem of moral
skepticism. In the preceding section I also argued that the power of hypothesis and selfopposition in the logistikon renders the success of the project of psychic integration
uncertain. When we consider the recipient of tripartite psychology, the reason for the
uncertainty of successful psychic integration becomes clear: the recipient's logistikon has
already considered hypotheses that are opposed to the norms thumos has internalized.
Glaucon and Adeimantus have already considered how conclusions such as “the unjust
man has more in every way than the just man” follow from the premises of the Technē
Model of justice, i.e., that pleonexia is psychologically basic, reason is instrumental to
desire, and nomoi do not deserve respect because they are human artifacts. Thus, the
recipient of tripartite psychology is someone whose logistikon has already begun to
hypothesize about matters beyond the scope of immediate practical concerns, such as
how best to fulfill a request for a shipment of arms.
Socrates tasks Glaucon and Adeimantus with the project of psychic integration in
part because they already sense they are divided within themselves, and he assuages their
worries about moral skepticism by persuading them that justice is necessary to achieve
psychic integration. But here I suggest that the brothers still sense a threat to psychic
integration from the logistikon. Rather than threatening psychic integration with a
specific hypothesis that contradicts a present conviction, the logistikon opens up the
possibility that hypothesizing might be nothing more than an endless exchanging of
appearances. This possibility is represented in the sophists in Book VI (49a6-497a1),
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particularly in their description they receive as both shapers and students of public
opinion. On the one hand, the sophists exploit the setting of “some common assembly of
a mass of people with a lot of noise”348 to force individuals who might resist their
proposals to “call the same things with them [the sophists] beautiful and ugly.”349 If
anyone resists, the sophists will use “compulsion” (ἀνάγκη, 492d1) in the form of fines
and death-threats (καὶ χρήμασι κὰι θανάτοις, 492d6). In this sense they create the
appearance of a consensus of public opinion by coercing those who disagree to agree. On
the other hand, however, Socrates says that the Sophists teach as wisdom “the same
opinions of the many, which they [the many] hold whenever they are gathered
together.”350 They study these opinions as if they were studying the habits of a “creature”
(θρέμματος, 493a7); as the creature responds to different circumstances they call “good”
anything that causes the creature pleasure, and “bad” anything that causes the creature
pain (493a7-c7).
Socrates' purpose in using this analogy is to show that the sophists rely on an
unsteady criterion for “good” and “bad,” since public opinion can swiftly change.351 But
the sophists’ reliance on a dubious epistemic criterion is not the only reason to doubt their
claims to wisdom; their role as both producers and students of these opinions suggest a
quite different reason for doubting their wisdom. As producers of public opinion, the
sophists demonstrate the truth in their reputation for making the weaker argument the
stronger. In doing this they argue for whatever position suits their interests at that
moment: today it might be that Alcibiades is the traitor who destroyed Athens; tomorrow
348 […] τινα ἄλλον κοινὸν πλήθους ξύλλογον ξύν πολλῷ θορύβῳ (492b6).
349 […] καὶ φήσειν τε τὰ αὐτὰ τοὐτοις καλὰ καὶ αἰσχρὰ εἶναι (492c6-d1).
350 […] παιδεύειν ἤ ταῦτα τᾶ τῶν πολλῶν δόγματα, ἅ δοξάζουσιν ὅταν ἀθροισθῶσιν (493a5-6).
351 Socrates also proposes that his analogy shows that the sophists mistake the “necessary” for the “good”
(493c4). The truth of this claim is more difficult to see.
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it might be that Alcibiades is the savior of Athens' democracy. This approach to argument
relies on their ability to take a position as simply given—as a sort of hypothesis—and to
say whatever is necessary to make this position true. In this sense, the sophists are
hypothesizing when they manufacture public opinion: they ask themselves “if X is true,
what must be true and what must be false to maintain the truth of X?352 But when they
study public opinion, they are really studying the opinions that they have produced! Their
wisdom thus amounts to a kind of echo-chamber in which they hear the same opinion
they manufactured repeated back to them, but mistake “the many” as the origin of this
opinion. It is thus reassuring that Socrates describes the sophist as someone who denies
the distinction between “something itself” (αὐτὸ τι ἕκαστον, 493e2) and “the many
examples of it” (τὰ πολλὰ ἕκαστα, 493e3, Griffith). In denying this, the sophist inhabits
the same dream-like state as the lover of sights (476c).
The sophists therefore represent the threat of a logistikon that continually
exchanges its commitments to the truth of various hypotheses. A logistikon that does this
negates the possibility of psychic integration, because contradictory pronouncements
about a just course of action, for example, leave thumos uncertain about how to enforce
the judgments of the logistikon. For example, a Sophist might argue at one time that the
Boeotians are enemies of the Athenians, but at another time that they are friends. How is
the sophist's own thumos to respond to these contradictory pronouncements, which may
require thumos to enforce contradictory restraints on the epithumotikon (e.g., giving
352 Commenting on the Phaedo, Irwin provides an observation about hypothesizing that helps illuminate
the backwardness of the sophist's hypothesizing: “(1) We defend a hypothesis against one sort of
objection by showing that its consequences are acceptable in the light of our other beliefs. (2) We
defend it by appealing to a higher hypothesis until we 'come to something adequate' [Phd.101d5-el]”
See Plato's Ethics, 274. Sophists do not really reason about the “consequences” of a hypothesis; rather,
they identify the other beliefs that must be true if their hypothesis is to remain true, and devote
themselves to defending those beliefs.
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military assistance to the Boeotians versus fighting them)? Most likely the sophist is
indifferent to the question of the alignment of his thumos, and precisely this indifference
is the indication of his failure to achieve psychic integration.
In light of the unique threat that the logistikon poses to the success of psychic
integration, it makes sense that a person devoted to such a project would want answers
about how to keep the logistikon's hypothesizing in contact with reality. This conclusion
suggests that mathematical-dialectical education can influence the virtues of tripartite
psychology because we have shown that the project of psychic integration necessarily
requires, as a condition for its success, a commitment to the distinction Socrates draws
between knowledge and opinion. If tripartite psychology offers the tools for setting out
on the path toward mathematical-dialectical education, then we will have more
compelling evidence of a point of contact between these two types of education.
I suggest two ways in which the arguments for tripartite psychology resemble
mathematical-dialectical education, and thereby provide the tools for the initiatory steps
into that education. The first is in Socrates' use of the PNO. When Socrates turns to an
investigation of the soul, a crucial aspect of the city-soul analogy comes into play, in that
the soul contains the small “letters” of justice that we cannot easily see.353 Thus, the
partitioning of the soul requires that we, like the person who Socrates says will be most
qualified for dialectic, “give up” our eyesight (537d). Although Socrates justifies his
introduction of the PNO by appealing to three-dimensional objects, such as the spinning
top, the soul differs in its invisibility; thus in a sense we grasp the different parts “by
thought alone” rather than by pointing to an image or diagram.
The second is found in the way arguments for the specific divisions of the soul
353 368d; for the grammatical analogy, see Chapter 3, p.14.
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mimic the progression from the sun-analogy for the Good (507c-509b) to the divided line
(509d-511e). One striking feature of this progression is the gradual reduction of
complexity between two images—sun and line—in order to reveal pure ratio, which does
not depend on any particular image.354 Socrates introduces the image of the sun as an
analogy for conceptualizing the Good as the “cause of knowledge and truth” (αἰτίαν δ'
ἐπιστήμης οὖσαν καἶ ἀληθείας, 508e3). The Sun causes sight both by making the objects
of sight visible and providing the element through which the visible can become seen.355
For without the light of the sun we cannot see, even if the organs that make us capable of
sight are in perfect condition. Socrates then proposes that we extract this same relation
between the Sun and sight and apply it to the Good and the soul's capacity for knowledge.
The mention of the capacity for knowledge should remind us of the distinction between
the capacities for knowledge and opinion in Book V—a distinction Socrates used to
differentiate the lover of wisdom from the lover of spectating. There these capacities
were differentiated by their objects: “that which wholly is wholly knowable” (τὸ μὲν
παντελῶς ὄν παντελῶς γνωστόν, 477a2), and that which both is and is not, because it can
always “lay claim to both” of its opposites (ἕκαστον ἀμφοτέρων ἕξεται, 479b5), is an
object of opinion.356 The sun-analogy asks us to think of the Good as playing the same
causal role in relation to the capacity for knowledge as the sun does in relation to the
capacity for sight: the Good activates the soul's capacity for knowledge by making the

354 Miller argues that the revealing of pure ratio is the function of the study of harmonics at the end of the
Guardians' mathematical education (“Beginning the 'Longer Way,'” 319-20).
355 Cushman suggests that Plato is relying on his own contemporary physiology of sight, according to
which “vision occurs when the fire in the organ of sight coalesces with light from the outside organ”
(Therapeia, 147). It is not clear what this proposal adds to the interpretation of the sun analogy,
however.
356 The description of objects of opinion as “in between” being and non-being also presents difficulties.
Annas interprets the εἶναι in the predicative sense and suggests that objects of opinion are “what is F
and also not F” (Introduction, 201).
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things that “wholly are” knowable and by providing the common element through which
the knowable can become known.357
When introducing the divided line, Socrates asks Glaucon and Adeimantus to
isolate a relation and reproduce this relation in another setting. But Socrates' use of the
line is striking because it shows a deliberate reduction of the image of the sun to the
simplest form of any image whatsoever: the line is an image that cannot be any further
reduced without ceasing to be an image. The division of the line itself is simple. Socrates
asks the brothers to imagine dividing a line into unequal parts, and then dividing those
parts in the same proportion as the whole line was divided in the first division (509d). In
asking them to carry out this task, Socrates is directing their attention from the use of
analogy in complex images to the building of ratios in the simplest image possible.358 I
suggest that, in like manner, the arguments for the specific divisions of the soul begin by
presenting us with a complex image, ask us to isolate the essential relations in this image,
and transfer those relations to the non-visible parts of the soul. For example, Socrates
uses the example of a person who is thirsty but refuses to drink to divide epithumotikon
from logistikon. By thinking about this image, we had to infer certain things about what

357 These passages pose significant interpretive difficulties. My only interest here lies in the role that
images play in moving the interlocutor from analogy in a complex image to pure ratio in a simple
image. One interpretation is that the objects that the Good makes knowable are other forms, and in turn
makes possible our knowledge of any particular good (Santas, 142; 144). Annas disputes the view that
the arguments in Book V show that forms alone are objects of knowledge. She disputes this view on the
grounds that Plato has not excluded the possibility that there might be other examples of “what is” than
forms (Introduction, 210). Reeve also disputes the claim that the forms are the exclusive knowledge of
objects on the grounds that dialectician investigates “all things” (περὶ πάντος, 533b3); he suggests
instead that the dialectician seeks a “unified theory of everything” (Philosopher-Kings, 92).
358 Nicholas Denyer shares this view with me. He points out that it is possible to construct the line such
that the sections representing knowledge is larger than that representing opinion, or that the section
representing opinion is larger than that representing knowledge. He argues that the arbitrariness of
deciding how to construct the line is inconsequential; what matters is that “we are getting some practice
in the kind of strenuously abstract thought that is needed to take us from the visible to the intelligible
realm” (“Sun and Line: The Role of the Good,” in The Cambridge Companion to Plato's Republic
[New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007], 294).
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the functions and relations of the logistikon and epithumotikon must be if we are to
adequately explain the character of psychic conflict in this example. Likewise with the
examples of Leontius and Odysseus, which Socrates used to divide thumos from the
epithumotikon, and logistikon from thumos. To adequately capture the character of
psychic conflict in those instances, we had to isolate the functions of thumos in relation to
both epithumotikon and logistikon, i.e., the ability to produce second-order desires, and
the ability to internalize cultural norms by creating aesthetic responses to perceived moral
wrongs. And just now, when we turned to the question of the preparatory nature of the
virtues of body and soul, we isolated the essential relations between the parts of the soul
and tried to reproduce them in another context, i.e., the context of intellectual inquiry.
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